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THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN OREGON NATURAL
DESERT ASSOCIATION v. DOMBECK: "DISCHARGING"
RESPONSIBILITY FOR WATER POLLUTION ON
FEDERAL LANDS
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress established the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA),1 commonly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), to
address the growing concerns over the deterioration in the quality
of state waters. 2 A primary goal of CWA is "to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters."13 The means used to achieve this objective is directly regulat-
ing identifiable sources of water pollution. 4 The regulatory scheme
of CWA classifies sources of pollution into point sources5 and
1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1987 & Supp. V 1994). The Act was first enacted on June 30, 1948
as the "Water Pollution Control Act." See C.W.A. § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251. The pur-
pose of the original Act was to "prepare or adopt comprehensive programs for
eliminating or reducing the pollution of interstate waters and tributaries thereof
and improving the sanitary condition of surface and underground waters." Id.
2. See C.W.A. § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a).
3. Id. For further discussion of CWA's goals, see infra notes 24-26 and accom-
panying text.
4. See id. C.W.A. § 101 (a) (1)-(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1)-(7); see also Lieuten-
ant Commander Jeffrey W. Styron, Regulation of Nonpoint Sources of Water Pollution
on Public Lands, 41 NAVAL L. REv. 97, 98 (1993) (addressing emergence of
nonpoint source pollution as predominant remaining water pollution problem);
Alia S. Miles, Comment, Searching for the Definition of "Discharge": Section 401 of The
Clean Water Act, 28 ENVrL. L. 191, 196 (1998) (noting means to achieve CWA's
primary goal is "by combining state water quality standards with the technology-
based approach of setting effluent limitations on what a point source can dis-
charge into the waters"). Water pollution control is addressed directly through
various permit provisions of CWA. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. CWA
further provides for control measures aimed at reducing known, but not as easily
identifiable, water pollution through indirect regulation. See infra notes 10 & 34
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the identifiability of a source as a
means of assigning regulation under CWA, see infra note 17; infra notes 71-73 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the differentiation in regulation for point
and nonpoint sources of pollution, see infra notes 9-10 & 27-34 and accompanying
text.
5. See id. C.W.A. § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). For the statutory definition
of point source, see infra note 54 and accompanying text. For an in-depth discus-
sion of the case law interpreting the term "point source," see infra notes 64-85 and
accompanying text.
(431)
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nonpoint sources. 6 Identifiable sources of water pollution easily en-
compass point sources of pollution, thus, courts have broadly inter-
preted point sources of water pollution. 7 In contrast, nonpoint
sources of pollution are not easily identifiable though they are a
major cause of contamination in the nation's waters.8 Although
6. See infra note 53. The term nonpoint source is not defined by CWA. See
Brian L. Frank, Comment, Cows in Hot Water: Regulation of Livestock Grazing Through
the Federal Clean Water Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1269, 1287-88 (1995) (stating,
"virtually any activity that produces pollution not channeled through a discrete
conveyance may be a nonpoint source"); see also Miles, supra note 4, at 197 (defin-
ing nonpoint source as "any source of pollution that cannot be traced to a point
source"). EPA, however, has provided the following characterization of nonpoint
source pollution:
[U]nlike pollution from industrial and sewage treatment plants,
[nonpoint source pollution (NPS)] comes from many diffuse sources.
NPS pollution is caused by rainfall or snowmelt moving over and through
the ground. As the runoff moves, it picks up and carries away natural and
human-made pollutants, finally depositing them into lakes, rivers, wet-
lands, coastal waters, and even our underground sources of drinking
water. These pollutants include:
-Excess fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides from agricultural lands
and residential areas;
-Oil, grease, and toxic chemicals from urban runoff and energy
production;
-Sediment from improperly managed construction sites, crop and forest
lands, and eroding streambanks;
-Salt from irrigation practices and acid drainage from abandoned
mines;
-Bacteria and nutrients from livestock, pet wastes, and faulty septic
systems;
-Atmospheric deposition and hydromodification are also sources of
nonpoint source pollution.
Environmental Protection Agency, What Is Nonpoint Source (NPS) Pollution? Ques-
tions and Answers (visited May 10, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/NPS/qa.
html>. See also United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 652 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1993) (providing EPA's characterization of nonpoint source pollution in ob-
serving nonpoint sources of pollution "are many, difficult to identify and difficult
to control"), cert. denied by United States v. Villegas, 512 U.S. 1245 (1994); Oregon
Natural Resources Council v. Lyng, 882 F.2d 1417, 1424 n.8 (9th Cir. 1989)
(describing nonpoint source pollution).
For a discussion of courts' distinction between nonpoint and point sources of
pollution, see infra notes 64-85 and accompanying text. For the Ninth Circuit's
characterization of nonpoint sources, and nonpoint sources of pollution, see infra
note 68-73 and accompanying text. For a discussion of nonpoint sources as charac-
terized by Congress, see infra note 57.
7. For a list and discussion of courts broadly interpreting the term "point
source," see infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. For a court decision declin-
ing to expand the definition of point source, see infra notes 77-80 and accompany-
ing text.
8. See Styron, supra note 4, at 97-98 (establishing nonpoint sources as predom-
inant source of pollution stating, "As efforts to check pollution from identifiable
point sources progress, the problems resulting from nonpoint sources are becom-
ing much more apparent."); Dianne K. Conway, Note, TMDL Litigation: So Now
What? 17 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 83, 87 n.22 (1997) (citing EPA study finding "78% of
states claimed that the problem of nonpoint source pollution was greater or equal
2
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to that of point source pollution"); see also Environmental Protection Agency, What
is Nonpoint Source (NPS) Pollution? Questions and Answers (visited May 10, 1999)
<http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/NPS/qa.html> ("States report that nonpoint
source pollution is the leading cause of water quality problems.").
EPA has listed the main cause of nonpoint pollution as runoff resulting from
agriculture, silviculture, mining, construction activities, and runoff from urban ar-
eas. See Conway, supra, at 87 (citing EPA, Managing Nonpoint Source Pollution: Final
Report to Congress on Section 319 of the Clean Water Act (1989), 15-16 (1992)). EPA
further indicates that agriculture is the leading cause of pollution in the nation's
rivers and streams. See Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water, Water
Quality Report: The Quality of Our Nation's Water: 1996 (visited May 10, 1999)
<http://www.epa.gov/305b> (noting 70% of all water quality problems attributa-
ble to agriculture). In addition, "the most recent National Water Quality Inven-
tory reports that agricultural nonpoint source (NPS) pollution is the leading
source of water quality impacts to surveyed rivers and lakes, the third largest source
of impairments to surveyed estuaries, and also a major contributor to ground water
contamination and wetlands degradation." Environmental Protection Agency,
Managing Nonpoint Source Pollution from Agriculture, Pointer No. 6 (visited May 10,
1999) <http://www.epa.gov/owowwtrl/NPS/facts/point6.htm>. The report also
recently said "that forestry activities contribute to approximately [nine] percent of
water quality problems." Environmental Protection Agency, Managing Nonpoint
Source Pollution from Forestry, Pointer No. 8 (visited May 10, 1999) <http://www.epa.
gov/owowwtrl/NPS/facts/point8.htm>. See also Debra L. Donahue, The Untapped
Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201, 203 (1996) (noting
nonpoint source pollution has set back efforts to restore water quality). In addi-
tion to causing pollution to waters, activities such as grazing and logging also dam-
age indigenous plants and surrounding soil. See ROBERT W. ADLER ET. lAL, THE
CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER, 180-83 (1993) (describing effects of grazing
and logging on Federal lands); Frank, supra note 6, at 1269 (describing effects of
grazing on federal lands). For example, grazing often results in soil erosion and
sediment buildup causing warm polluted waters. See Styron, supra note 4, at 102.
Upon undertaking a study of the grazing practices in the United States, it has been
asserted that livestock grazing is the "single largest contributor to environmental
degradation of public lands." Frank, supra note 6, at 1269. The vast majority of
public land has been polluted by livestock grazing, and approximately seventy per-
cent of the Western lands are comprised of ranching areas. See id at 1273 n.35. Not
only do they destroy the immediate area they inhabit, but also entire ecosystems.
See id. at 1276. Cattle tend to congregate in one area, systematically destroying the
foliage and riparian life, as well as polluting waters by defecating, which carries
downstream to other waters. See id. at 1273 n.35.
One dramatic example of the effect of nonpoint pollution from mining and
agriculture, is the deterioration of the rivers around the Black Hills. See Water Pol-
lution: Tribe, Environmental Groups Sue EPA for Failure to Set TMDLS in South Dakota,
128 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-4 (Monday, July 6, 1998). Children playing in the
rivers develop skin rashes; fish either no longer inhabit the water or exhibit open
sores; and some lakes within the district cannot be used for swimming, fishing or
farming. See id.
The effects of nonpoint pollutants may not always be so easily identifiable in
every water body. See Environmental Protection Agency, What Is Nonpoint Source
(NPS) Pollution? Questions and Answers (visited May 10, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/
OWOW/NPS/qa.html>. The pollutants do, however, "have harmful effects on
drinking water supplies, recreation, fisheries, and wildlife." Id.
For a discussion of the impact and regulation of agricultural nonpoint source
pollution under CWA, see generally George A. Gould, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source
Pollution, and Federal Law, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 461 (1990); David Zaring, Note,
Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act's
Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARv. ENvrL. L. REV. 515 (1996). For a discussion of
1999]
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CWA is generally held to be effective in reducing point sources of
pollution, 9 it is unclear how effectively the Act regulates nonpoint
sources of pollution.10
mining activity regulation under CWA, see generally Alison Barry, Mining and
Water Quality Under the Clean Water Act, COLO. LAw., Sept., 1996, at 93.
9. See, e.g., Donahue, supra note 8, at 203 (listing examples of point sources
effectively regulated).
10. Compare ADLER, supra note 8, at 171 (explaining reasons for section 319
failure in reducing nonpoint source pollution) and WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAw 298 (2d ed. 1994) (noting section 319 only minimally reduced
pollution) and Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons From
the Clean Air Act, 23 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 203, 287-89 (1999) (advocating for inte-
grated approach to reduce nonpoint source pollution) and Kevin Beaton, Overview
of Idaho Water Qaulity Standards, The 1998 Idaho Water Quality Symposium, 35 IDAHO
L. REv. 453, 454-55 (explaining CWA's flaw results from lack of mandatory controls
for nonpoint source activities) and Donahue, supra note 8, at 203 (asserting
nonpoint source pollution has "scarcely" been addressed) and Arthur D. Smith,
Introduction to the 1998 Idaho Water Quality Symposium, The 1998 Idaho Water Quality
Symposium, 35 Idaho L. Rev. 431, 435 (1999) (identifying states' failure in control-
ling nonpoint source pollution as impetus for Ninth Circuit TMDL litigation) and
Styron, supra note 4, at 108 (positing CWA does not regulate nonpoint sources due
to states unwillingness to voluntarily limit such pollution) and Miles, supra note 4,
at 199 (noting current debate regarding nonpoint source regulation due to inef-
fectiveness of CWA in regulating nonpoint source pollution) with Environmental
Protection Agency, Managing Nonpoint Source Pollution from Agriculture, Pointer No. 6
(visited May 10, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/owowwtrl/NPS/facts/point6.htm>
(noting nonpoint source regulation has been effective in reducing runoff).
Water pollution is recognized as remaining a significant problem "in large
part from inadequate programs to address cumulative harms to aquatic ecosystems
from disparate and diffuse pollution sources." Adler, supra, at 203. A 1991 EPA
report based on twenty state reports on the impact of nonpoint source water pollu-
tion submitted to Congress "estimated that more than half of river miles impacted
by nonpoint source pollution could not support designated uses because of the
impact, and use was only partially supported in 28% of the river miles." Conway,
supra note at 8, at n.24 (citing Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-506/9-90,
Managing Nonpoint Source Pollution: Final Report to Congress on Section 319 of the Clean
Water Act (1989) 15-16 (1992) (1989 NPS Report)).
In general, water pollution controls are categorized into technology based
limitations aimed at regulating individual polluters, and water quality standards,
set by the states, to control cumulative effects from many sources of pollution, i.e.
nonpoint source pollution. See Adler, supra, at 206-07 (contrasting types of pollu-
tion control under CWA); cf Miles, supra note 4, at 198 (reviewing 1972 Amend-
ments to CWA). Water quality standards are comprised of three elements:
beneficial uses, water quality criteria, and antidegradation policies-implemented
through total maximum daily loads of pollution allowable for each waterbody-and
a continued planning process which encourages "areawide waste treatment man-
agement" plans. See generally, Adler, supra, at 209-230 (describing development and
implementation of water quality standards). The continuing planning process for
each waterbody must include controls for both point sources of pollution, through
CWA section 301, and nonpoint sources of pollution, through CWA section 208
and, most recently, CWA section 319. See Adler, supra, at 219 (distinguishing be-
tween point and nonpoint source water quality standards); Miles, supra note 4, at
199-200 (discussing regulation of nonpoint sources). This overall pollution con-
trol scheme focuses on controlling identifiable sources of pollution from individ-
ual polluters and leaves the regulation of nonpoint sources of pollution to the
states. See Adler, supra, at 207, 288 (explaining flaws in CW A regulation scheme
4
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol10/iss2/5
OREGON NATURAL DESERT ASSOCIATION
and noting CWA nonpoint source pollution policy focuses on allowing individual
states to develop programs suited to their needs); Clare F. Saperstein, Note, State
Solution to Nonpoint Source Pollution: Implementation and Enforcement of the 1990
Coastal Zone Amendments Reauthorization Act Section 6217, 73 B.U. L. REV. 889, 890
(1995) (characterizing nonpoint source pollution). Thus, each state is responsible
for setting its own water quality standards with which nonpoint sources of pollu-
tion, such as grazing, silvicultural and agricultural activities, must comply. See Ad-
ler, supra, at 213 (discussing water quality standard promulgation) (citing CWA
§ 303(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)); Saperstein, supra, at 896 (describing
nonpoint source management under CWA section 208). Under CWA section 208,
which directly addresses nonpoint sources, the method to control nonpoint
sources of pollution are Best Management Practices. See Styron, supra, note 4, at
106 (describing section 208); Miles, supra note 4, at 199-200 (offering reason for
failure of section 208 program). Contrary to point source regulation, a state is not
required under CWA section 208 to create or implement a continuing planning
process, and further, EPA is precluded from doing so in its place. See Adler, supra,
at 226-27 (comparing CWA provisions addressing point source and nonpoint
sources). Section 319 was added in 1987 and was intended as a more sure means
by which states could reduce nonpoint source pollution. See Adler, supra, at 228
(critiquing CWA section 319's effectiveness); Miles, supra note 4, at 200 ("Section
319 basically makes states more accountable to EPA for the success of their section
208 plans by requiring states to report to EPA their success in meeting implemen-
tation schedules and by threatening funding cutoffs if the states fail to make satis-
factory progress."); Saperstein, supra, at 896-98 (reviewing CWA nonpoint source
controls). Under this provision, states identify nonpoint source water pollution
problems and then develop management programs tailored to these specific water
quality problems. See Environmental Protection Agency, Section 319 Federal Con-
sistency Guidance, 63 Fed. Reg. 45504 (1998). With the addition of this provision,
a new focus of nonpoint source control was a watershed approach, addressing spe-
cific, as opposed to diverse water quality problems. See Adler, supra, at 228 (assert-
ing, however, "section 319 did little to remedy the lack of precise requirement for
states to match specific management practices with the degree of control necessary
... to meet [water quality standards]").
Leaving regulation of nonpoint pollution to the states, however, particularly
the western states, has allowed those sources responsible for the majority of pollu-
tion on federal lands to go unabated. See 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at
4336 (recognizing possible reluctance of states to develop effective control meas-
ures); H. Michael Anderson, Water Quality Planning for the National Forests, 17
ENVrrL. L. 591, 608 (1987) (asserting, CWA, by leaving states to define how to regu-
late nonpoint sources, exempts nonpoint sources of pollution from water quality
standards in some western states); Styron, supra note 4, at 98, 111-12 (noting many
western states, where the majority of public lands lie, exempt logging and grazing
from regulation, further stating, "Clearly, the activities currently taking place on
public lands must be addressed if states are going to be able to reach the goals
established by [CWA]" ); Robert D. Fentress, Comment, Nonpoint Source Pollution,
Groundwater, and the 1987 Water Quality Act: Section 208 Revisited?, 19 ENVrL. L. 807,
825 (1989) (noting Congress failed to give EPA power to require state plans even
though abatement of nonpoint source pollution is national goal); Saperstein, supra
note 10, at 898-99 (observing voluntariness of CWA nonpoint source programs
reduces pollution control effectiveness); Air and Water Pollution: Western States Rede-
fining Problem Away? AMERICAN POLrriCAL NETWORK GREENWRE, June 18, 1998 (re-
porting on some western states' failure to list, or removal from list of, polluted
waterbodies which should be subject to CWA regulation). A large portion of the
west is federal land, including one half of Oregon. See Tom Alkire, Nonpoint
Sources: CWA Decision Moots Oregon Grazing Rules, Could Affect TMDLS in Many West-
ern States, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 738 (Aug. 7, 1998). Of these federal lands, only
fifty percent are maintaining water quality standards, in large part because of graz-
1999] 435
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ing. See Bob Egelko, Court Says States Lack Authority on Federal Land, PORTLAND ORE-
GONIAN, Thursday, July 23, 1998, at A-14. As noted, state implementation and
enforcement of nonpoint source pollution plans are voluntary, and due to possible
land use and development limitations, "nonpoint source controls are more politi-
cally charged and difficult to plan, implement, and administer." Conway, supra
note 8, at 88; see also Styron, supra note 4, at 107 (explaining states refusal to imple-
ment section 208 is reason for abundance of nonpoint source pollution and recog-
nizing lack of enforcement as major criticism of section 208). There are no
uniform guidelines for setting and monitoring water quality standards, thus, states
base their varying control measure on politics and economics. See Adler, supra, at
253-54 (describing inconsistency in regulation of nonpoint source pollution
among states); Styron, supra note 4, at 111-12 (pointing out differentiation be-
tween states in applying nonpoint source control laws). Further, section 319's ap-
proach, though moving toward addressing specific nonpoint source problems, may
not be able to adequately address the cumulative effects of many different
nonpoint sources of pollution. See Adler, supra, at 285 (suggesting cumulative im-
pacts may cause violation of water quality standards). Some commentators have
posited that western states are reluctant to increase regulation under CWA due to
the lobby of powerful interest groups (among them cattle ranchers). See Donahue,
supra note 8, at 285 (stating Congress likely avoided regulating nonpoint sources
due to political power groups such as livestock ranchers); Styron, supra note 4, at
112 (suggesting reluctance of states to regulate nonpoint sources is due to fear
about economic results to "most nonpoint source polluters-especially forestry and
livestock grazing"); Fentress, supra, at 822 (noting nonpoint source management is
not taken seriously because states hesitate to tell "powerful constituents" how to
regulate their operations); Frank, supra note 6, at 1277-78 (reviewing history of
federal land management); Zaring, supra note 8, at 540-41 (regulating nonpoint
sources would be difficult even were source identifiable due to pressure of political
groups who elect legislators). For example, over the years ranchers began to mo-
nopolize federal lands "[u] sing whatever means were necessary," and promulgated
their own "'cow custom"' of unwritten laws regarding the use of resources on fed-
eral lands. See Frank, supra note 6, at 1277, 1277 n.68. Today, "'cow custom"'
defines the control of the livestock grazing industry. See id. at 1277 n.68 (citation
omitted). New regulations would be expensive for ranchers to comply with, and
would increase taxes within the state. See Zaring, supra note 8, at 537-39 (discuss-
ing agriculture bill tailored to special interest groups); see also Styron, supra note 4,
at 112 (noting those responsible for nonpoint source pollution are not willing to
limit nonpoint sources, fearing negative economic consequences). They failed to
consider, however, that the lack of effective control measures for nonpoint sources
of pollution may require point source polluters to meet state water quality stan-
dards alone. See Adler, supra, at 228-29 (noting CWA may be read to exclude
nonpoint source controls from water quality standards). Even for those states with
a commitment to addressing nonpoint source pollution, CWA is limited in infor-
mation on how to implement nonpoint source programs. See Saperstein, supra
note 10, at 897-98 (explaining CWA lacks guidelines for establishment, and en-
forcement, of nonpoint source programs).
EPA has recently promulgated regulations regarding the management of
nonpoint source pollution that addresses the lack of guidance and resulting lack of
consistency between states and federal agencies in controlling nonpoint source
pollution. See Environmental Protection Agency, Section 319 Federal Consistency
Guidance, 63 Fed. Reg. 45504 (1998). EPA clearly states in this regulation,
The federal consistency provisions in Section 319 of [CWA] authorize
each state to review federal activities for consistency with the state
nonpoint source management program. If the state determines that an
application or project is not consistent with the goals and objective of its
nonpoint source management program and makes its concerns known to
the responsible federal agency, the federal agency must make efforts to
6
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol10/iss2/5
1999] OREGON NATURAL DESERT ASSOCIATION 437
accommodate the state's concerns or explain its decision not to. The
purpose of the guidance is to support closer coordination among State
and Federal agencies, improve implementation of nonpoint source man-
agement programs, and more effectively protect water quality.
Id. Further, EPA is currently developing guidelines for the use of state an-
tidegradation policies in addressing nonpoint source pollution. See Susan Brun-
inga, Water Pollution: Guidance to Address Nonpoint Sources by Antidegradation Plans
Being Drafted, 169 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-10 (Tuesday, Sept. 1, 1998) (reporting
agency official's statement). Barring an EPA regulation addressing nonpoint
source management issues, states may well be able to look to their own laws in
order to control nonpoint sources of water pollution within their borders. See gen-
erally Environmental Law Institute, ALMANAC OF ENFORCEABLE STATE LAWS TO CON-
TROL NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION, 1997. Recognizing that current
control methods are inadequate for preventing, controlling and abating nonpoint
source pollution, particularly due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms pro-
vided under CWA, the Environmental Law Institute reviewed state laws and pro-
grams and produced "a state-by-state summary of enforcement-based laws that are
potentially applicable to nonpoint source water pollution." Id. at 1 (defining en-
forceability "as the ability of the state to impose a sanction upon an unwilling per-
son or entity"). Some commentators, however, have proposed that the surest way
to assure control of nonpoint source pollution is for Congress to amend CWA to
mandate regulation of nonpoint sources of pollution. See ADLER, supra note 8, at
24142 (proposing Congress amend CWA to require management of nonpoint
sources); Adler, supra, at 208, 270-73 (analogizing CWA to Clean Air Act in asser-
tion nonpoint source pollution control should focus on identifying specific pollu-
tion sources and control measures states should be required to adopt, and
concluding CWA should be amended to require technology based limitations be
applied to nonpoint sources of pollution); Styron, supra note 4, at 113-14 (propos-
ing federal regulation of water itself); Frank, supra note 6, at 1305-07 (proposing
policy revision mandating regulation of livestock under CWA); Miles, supra note 4,
at 193 ("There can be little doubt that requiring federally permitted activities to
meet state water quality standards would do wonders for water quality, the ecologi-
cal integrity of riparian zones and freshwater ecosystems, and the fish and wildlife
species which depend upon those systems."). Such an amendment to CWA could
be the impetus for states to give practical effect to programs aimed at protecting
water, such as developing and implementing total daily maximum loads for each
waterbody. See Adler, supra, at 283 (advocating for complete prohibition of dis-
charges into polluted waters); Frank, supra note 6, at 1306 (proposing new regula-
tions containing enforcement provisions). For example, a state could condition a
permit for grazing on a rancher's construction of fencing to keep cattle from wad-
ing in streams. See Paul Larmer, judge Sends a Message to Cows, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Oct. 28, 1996. The new watershed approach of CWA section 319 offers an-
other solution to nonpoint source pollution. See Adler, supra, at 208 ("In the cur-
rent political environment, however, Congress is unlikely to subject nonpoint
source water pollution to enforceable federal controls."); Styron, supra note 4 at
114 (exhorting federal agencies to use applicable provisions to limit nonpoint
source pollution because Congress is not likely to address such pollution through
legislation or Amendment). Regulation of individual sources of nonpoint pollu-
tion, however, may not effectively divert or reduce the damage that has already
been done to the nation's waters on federal lands. See Adler, supra, at 204 (sug-
gesting comprehensive, watershed-based approach to augment current controls).
Another alternative, and the subject of this Note, proposes including nonpoint
source pollution under CWA section 401. See infra note 17.
For an overview of how CWA regulates nonpoint source pollution, see gener-
ally ADLER, supra note 8; Styron, supra note 4; Conway, supra note 8; Frank, supra
note 6; Miles, supra note 4. For an in-depth critical discussion of the effectiveness
7
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One area of recent controversy is the scope of an individual
state's power to regulate nonpoint source pollution occurring in
waters located on federal land. 1 Section 401 of CWA requires an
of current nonpoint source regulation, and proposed solution for reducing
nonpoint source pollution more effectively, see generally Adler, supra.
11. Compare generally Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp.
1534 (D. Or. 1996) (construing section 401 as regulating nonpoint sources), rev'd
sub nom. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998
WL 407711, at *1 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998) with Idaho Conservation League v. Cas-
well, No. CV 95-394-S-MHW, 1996 WL 938215, at *1 (D. Idaho Aug. 12, 1996)
(holding section 401 does not regulate nonpoint source pollution). For a discus-
sion of the Ninth Circuit split regarding the scope of section 401 in regulation of
water pollution, see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. For the facts, ration-
ale, and holding of the Ninth Circuit's resolution of this split, see infra notes 86-98
& 107-43 and accompanying text.
Studies have shown that poor land regulation on federal lands has caused
approximately 65% of the pollution in the waters of the western states. See Dona-
hue, supra note 8, at 205 (noting all rivers in West run through federal land); see
generally Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands II: Water Pollution Law,
12 UCLAJ. ENVrL. L. & POL'y 61 (1993) (discussing polluting factors on federal
lands); Frank, supra note 6 (discussing grazing effects on federal land); Miles, supra
note 4 (analyzing effect of nonpoint pollution on federal lands). Livestock graz-
ing, timber cutting, road building and construction, and mining are activities con-
ducted regularly on federal lands and have a significant negative impact on water
quality. See Styron, supra note 4, at 98 (giving examples of nonpoint sources on
federal lands, "includ[ing] timber harvesting, forest road construction, mining,
livestock grazing, and reforestation efforts"); Miles, supra note 4, at 201 ("The
causes and effects of nonpoint source pollution are especially prevalent on public
lands, where many activities that cause nonpoint source pollution are daily occur-
rences, such as livestock grazing, timber cuts and roads, and resource extrac-
tion."). Waters become unfit for recreational use, and the ecosystem within the
water becomes damaged, affecting connected waterbodies. See Styron, supra note
4, at 102; Miles, supra note 4, at 202 (discussing effects of overgrazing). For exam-
ple, livestock grazing, the most common use of federal lands, causes riparian dam-
age, introduces manure and sediment into the water, and "can impair the habitat
of trout and other salmonids." Miles, supra note 4, at 280; see also Styron, supra note
4, at 102 (discussing effects of overgrazing on riparian ecosystems); Frank, supra
note 6, at 1269 (discussing effects of overgrazing on public range land); Miles,
supra note 4, at 202-03 (discussing effects of livestock grazing on water quality). It
has been noted that livestock grazing is the most pernicious cause of damage to
federal lands. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 6, at 1269 (describing ultimate effect of
livestock grazing as destruction of riparian areas "integral to the sustained prosper-
ity of the rangeland ecosystem").
Pursuant to CWA section 401, all activities on federal land must comply with
state water quality standards, but only if point sources result in, or may result in, a
discharge. For a discussion of water regulation on federal land, see infra notes 27-
34 and accompanying text. States, however, have traditionally not been permitted
to impose, or enforce, compliance with their water quality standards when pollu-
tion emanates from nonpoint sources of pollution, thus, states have no authority to
control an immense amount of pollution damaging public lands located within
their boundaries, and that potentially, and in reality, affects surrounding waters
and lands located outside federal lands. See infra note 17.
For a further discussion of the effects of nonpoint source pollution, and
means to regulate nonpoint source pollution, on federal land, see generally Dona-
hue, supra note 8 (analyzing potential power of section 401); Glicksman, supra,
(discussing pollution on federal lands); Styron, supra note 4, (addressing require-
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applicant for a federal license to obtain state certification prior to
issuance of the federal permit for any activity on federal land which
may result in a discharge. 12 Thus, in order for a federal permit
applicant to be subject to section 401 review,1 3 a potential discharge
must exist from conducting the proposed activity. 14 The term "dis-
charge" in section 401, which includes point source pollution, does
not explicitly include nonpoint source pollution.1 5 Nonpoint source
pollution has therefore not been regulated under section 401.16
ments of federal agencies overseeing silviculture and stock grazing activities on
public lands); Frank, supra note 6 (discussing effects of grazing on federal lands);
Miles, supra note 4 (reviewing specific effects of grazing, timber harvesting and
mining on water quality).
12. SeeC.W.A. § 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 401(a)(1). For the statutory language
of section 401 (a)(1), see infra notes 28 & 38.
13. For a description of the purpose and operation of section 401 review, see
infra notes 17 & 28-30 and accompanying text. For an in-depth discussion of the
Supreme Court's decision in PUD No. 1 ofjefferson County v. Washington Department
of Ecology, delineating states' power under section 401 review, see infra notes 35-42
and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. See also Donahue, supra note
8, at 218 (delineating two threshold conditions which must exist in order to trigger
section 401 review).
15. See C.W.A. § 502(16), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16). CWA states "The term
'discharge' when used without qualification includes a discharge of a pollutant, and
a discharge of pollutants." Id. (emphasis added). The term "discharge of a
pollutant" means "any addition of any pollutant ... from a point source." C.W.A.
§ 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (emphasis added).
For a general discussion of possible interpretations of the term "discharge,"
see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit
district court split regarding the interpretation of the term "discharge," see infra
notes 4347 and accompanying text.
16. See ADLER, supra note 8, at 24546 (explaining section 401 has been limited
in coverage to point source pollution); RODGERS, supra note 10, at 294
(interpreting CWA as regulating only point sources of pollution); cf also Conway,
supra note 8, at 86 (concluding based on Act's regulatory scheme, "Thus, the
NPDES system focuses on the treatment of point source pollutants prior to their
entrance into streams and other waterbodies, rather than on the water quality of
those streams and waterbodies." (emphasis added)). But see Donahue, supra note
8, at 229 (arguing that "either a point source or a nonpoint source discharge can
serve as the trigger for section 401 certification"). Traditionally, nonpoint sources
of pollution have been regulated under CWA section 401 by court's expansion of
the term "point source." See ADLER, supra note 8, at 24546; RODGERS, supra note
10, at 294. The language of section 401, however, which applies to "'any activity
... which may result in any discharge,'" does not "[o]n its face" limit section 401
review to point source discharges. See Donahue supra note 8, at 229 (referencing
CWA section 401 (a) in discussing pollution sources the term "discharge" includes
for 401 certification purposes)). For a discussion of nonpoint sources falling
within the definition of point source, see infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
For arguments in favor of, and against, interpreting the term "discharge" as
including both point and nonpoint pollution sources, see infra note 45.
1999]
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Nevertheless, section 401 offers an effective means of reducing pol-
lution from nonpoint sources.
17
17. See ADLER, supra note 8, at 245-46 (proposing "Congress broaden and
strengthen section 401 [by] . . . expressly [stating] that it applies [] to polluted
runoff as well as to discharges from point sources"); Donahue, supra note 8, at 203-
04 (highlighting potential application of section 401 to nonpoint source pollu-
tion); Saperstein, supra note 10, at 890-91 (asserting delegation of authority to
states under NPDES program would be more effective means of regulation for
nonpoint pollution sources); see also Donahue, supra note 8, at 206-07 (asserting
federal permits other than those encompassing point sources should be subject to
section 401 review). But see Frank, supra note 6, at 1305-06 ("New amendments to
the Clean Water Act should place responsibility and accountability for creation and
implementation of new nonpoint regulatory programs with the states."). As op-
posed to regulation under 319, which is voluntary, regulation under section 401
would require EPA, or the source state, to create and implement programs aimed
at reducing and controlling identifiable pollution regardless of its source status.
See Miles, supra note 4, at 209-12 (explaining PUD holding). Though nonpoint
sources are viewed as difficult to identify, and thus hard to regulate, both from a
practical and economic standpoint, in actuality, many nonpoint sources of pollu-
tion are amenable to remedial measures which will make them identifiable. See
Frank, supra note 6, at 1301 (noting water monitoring of areas where cattle gather
regularly may yield needed data to establish permit system); see also Donahue, supra
note 8, at 207 (noting livestock grazing amenable to section 401 review). For ex-
ample, groups of cattle that graze near the same water hole, causing excessive
amounts of pollution to accumulate in the water, are identifiable as a source of
pollution. See Frank, supra note 6, at 1301. Resulting pollutants from the grazing
of the cattle can be measured and a permit system established to regulate the
amounts of pollution. See id. Courts addressing what falls within section 401 have
found that being able to identify the source of pollution, and measure its effects,
justifies holding some nonpoint sources of pollution subject to section 401 review.
See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
EPA's Pollution Prevention Strategy clearly recognizes, and asserts, that
preventing pollution at its source, as opposed to the end of the pipe prevention
strategies, can resolve problems from nonpoint pollution. See Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7849, 7849 (1991) (being
accomplished by changing production or reducing environmentally harmful
materials). In addition, EPA stated that "preventing pollution at its source ... can
[not only] be the most effective way to reduce risks... [but] is often the most cost-
effective option . . . [and] offers the unique advantage of harmonizing environ-
mental protection with economic efficiency." Id. One commentator elaborated
on the importance and potential power of section 401 as a tool for state regulation
of nonpoint source pollution stating:
[D]espite its limitations, the Act in its present form both accords states
greater authority for controlling pollution than they are currently exercis-
ing (and concomitantly, constrains federal discretion), and holds out a
potent, but infrequently wielded, weapon against the most underregu-
lated category of pollution, nonpoint sources. All of this power may be
found in one section, section 401, the certification provision of the Clean
Water Act.
Donahue, supra note 8, at 203-04 (internal citations omitted). For a list ofjudicial
decisions focusing on the identifiability of the pollution source as the means to
determine CWA regulation, as opposed to focusing on the pollution type, see infra
note 70.
One noted environmentalist proposed an alternate means of including
nonpoint source pollution under the scope of section 401. See RODGERS, supra
note 10, at 298 (finding requirement of state plans more effective than guidelines
10
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required under section 319). Given the court's trend to interpret point sources
broadly, he stated that "the drawing of the law more tightly around nonpoint
sources may transform them into 'point' sources for enforcement purposes" and
making "nonpoint sources" into "point sources" for purposes of regulation. Id.; see
also Mary Christina Wood, Regulating Discharges into Groundwater: The Crucial Link
in Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 IARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 569, 579-83
(1988) (advocating either including nonpoint source pollution under NPDES pro-
gram, or allowing broadest point source interpretation possible, to further CWA's
goals). For a list of court decisions expanding the definition of point source to
include nonpoint source pollution, see infra notes 70-76. For case law within the
Ninth Circuit addressing means to regulate nonpoint sources, and nonpoint
source pollution, see infra notes 68-73.
The most effective means of ensuring state certification for nonpoint sources
would be to simply amend CWA to regulate nonpoint source pollution directly. See
Jake Thompson, Water, Land Issues Concern Cattlemen, OMAHA WORlD-HERALD, Sat-
urday, February 7, 1998, at 6 (discussing then Vice President Al Gore's proposal
CWA be revised to regulate nonpoint source pollution). This proposal, however, is
not popular with ranchers who use federal lands in part because of the threat of a
shift in the power allocation for property and water rights. See id. (explaining cat-
tlemen prefer existing nonpoint source controls). In 1997, Vice President Al Gore
announced that he favored CWA revisions which would regulate runoff from land
that flows into drinking supplies. See id. Concern over drinking water could firmly
solidify what appears to be an already existing potential function of section 401.
See Pollution Prevention: How Does the Law Protect Source Water? 29 Env't Rep. (BNA)
942 (Sept. 4, 1998) (noting EPA's shift to preventing pollution as opposed to
"cleaning up" and recognizing CWA's power as alternate tool in fight for safe
drinking water when reauthorized). Paul Schwartz, national campaigns director,
specifically named "animal wastes" as a significant threat to the nation's drinking
waters. See id. Federal regulation is the best approach to accommodating partisan
parties. See id. (recognizing power struggle between agricultural industry and
water suppliers). Section 401 does not explicitly exclude nonpoint sources of pol-
lution. See Larmer, supra note 10. States are not obligated to review federal permit
activities. See id. 401 review is, nonetheless, a powerful tool states can use to pro-
tect their waters. See Egelko, supra note 10. For example, states could "deny a per-
mit or require modifications such as fencing along streams." See Larmer, supra
note 10.
From a policy standpoint, applying 401 review to nonpoint sources of pollu-
tion, particularly grazing, would help alleviate poor land management practices
and allow states to meet their own water quality standards, as well as federal agen-
cies obligations to regulate activities on federal land. See Donahue, supra note 8, at
249-50, 289 (discussing federal agencies responsibilities in regulating federal land
and noting, "Assigning the states such a powerful role in approving federal activi-
ties that may affect water quality is also consistent with Congress's policy to 'recog-
nize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution."' (quoting C.W.A. § 101(b), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(b))). States could thus dictate the areas where cattle may graze or specify
the numbers of livestock permissible. See id. at 291-922 n. 481, 300 (stating, "Un-
less and until Congress decides to amend [CWA] . . . it must be concluded that
livestock grazing on public lands is subject to 401 review").
For a comprehensive analysis of section 401 which illuminates how CWA's lan-
guage, purpose, legislative history, and relevant case law and policy considerations
support regulation of nonpoint sources by section 401, see generally Donahue,
supra note 8.
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In Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Dombeck (ONDA I),18 the
topic of this Note, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recently concluded that nonpoint sources of pollution do
not fall within the statutory definition of discharge under section
401.19 Part II of this Note discusses the statutory provisions, legisla-
tive history and case law pertinent to interpreting the term "dis-
charge" under section 401 of CWA.20 Part III sets forth the facts
and procedural history of the Ninth Circuit's decision in ONDA JJ.21
Part IV explains the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and provides a criti-
cal analysis of the ONDA II decision.2 2 Finally, Part V discusses the
environmental, legal and political impact of the ONDA I/decision.2 3
II. BACKGROUND
A. CWA and Federal Land
Congress contemplated a water pollution prevention program
that was comprehensive in nature24 and aimed not only to reduce
18. 151 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 1998), revg Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v.
Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996). ("Editor's Note: The opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, in Oregon Natural Desert Associa-
tion v. Dombeck, published in the advance sheet at this citation, 151 F.3d 945, was
withdrawn from the bound volume at the request of the Court.").
19. For a discussion of the ONDA II court's holding and analysis, see infra
notes 107-43 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the varying interpretations and analysis of the term
"discharge," see infra notes 31-34 (discussing both a "broad" and "narrow" inter-
pretation of the term "discharge") & 43-47 (presenting Ninth Circuit split regard-
ing the correct interpretation of the term "discharge" in section 401) & 59-63
(judicial interpretation of the term "discharge") and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of ONDA II, see infra
notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the district court's opinion in Oregon Natural Desert
Association v. Thomas, reversed by the Ninth Circuit in ONDA II, see infra notes 99-
106 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis in
OADA II, see infra notes 107-43 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of
the ONDA II decision, see infra notes 144-93 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the environmental, legal and political impact of the
ONDA II decision, see infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
24. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 319 (1981) (reaffirming
Court's decision in Train v. City of New York (quoting language of Train, 420 U.S.
35, 37 (1975))); Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37 (1975) ("The [CWA]
Amendments of 1972 provide a comprehensive program for controlling and abat-
ing water pollution."); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 372
(10th Cir. 1979) (assessing usefulness of CWA's legislative history). CWA's pur-
pose is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's water." C.W.A. § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). Congress specifically
mandated that in order to meet this goal, both category sources of pollution, point
and nonpoint, must be addressed in any program under CWA. See C.W.A.
§ 101 (a) (7), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (7). Thus, CWA promulgates a program targeting
the control and reduction of pollution impairing uses of designated waters. See
generally C.W.A. § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
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water pollution, but to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into
the nation's waters. 25 In furtherance of this goal, the Act prohibits
the discharging of a pollutant into the' nation's navigable waters
from a point source unless specifically approved under a permit
provision. 26
25. See C.W.A. § 101 (a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1); see also Earth Sciences, 599
F.2d at 373 (construing congressional intent in enacting CWA as elimination of
pollution by 1985 from nation's waters, thus, as complete regulation of all water
pollution sources); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 612 F.2d 1232, 1242 (10th Cir.
1979) (noting preserving water quality was intent of Congress). In order to
achieve this goal, Congress mandated that toxic amounts of pollution be prohib-
ited, "areawide waste treatment management planning processes technology be
developed and implemented to assure adequate control of sources of pollutants in
each State; and ... that a major research and demonstration effort be made to
develop technology necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the nav-
igable waters .... ." C.W.A. §§ 101 (a) (3), (5), & (6), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 (a) (3),(5),
& (6). Congress further stated that "an interim goal of water quality [is to] pro-
vide[ ] for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and pro-
vide[ ] for recreation in and on the water .... " C.W.A. § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2). In 1987, Congress specifically mandated that control of nonpoint
source pollution be a national policy of CWA, stating, "it is the national policy that
programs for the control of nonpoint sources of pollution be developed and im-
plemented in an expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of this chapter to be
met through the control of both point and nonpoint sources of pollution." C.W.A.
§ 101 (a) (7), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (7).
For a brief overview of CWA, see generally EPA v. California ex rel. State Water
Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976); Miles, supra note 4, at 196-201.
26. See C.W.A. § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (proscribing discharges unless
compliance with provisions stipulated under permit for Dredge and Fill Material
or National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)); E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 112 (1977) (interpreting section 301 as
prohibition of pollutant discharges); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,
915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990) (construing congressional intent to be one of
complete prohibition of discharges of pollutants without permit (quoting in part
C.W.A. § 301 (a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a))). The relevant language states, "(a) Illegal-
ity of pollutant discharges except in compliance with law [-] Except in compliance
with this section and sections [302, 306, 307, 318] and [404] of this title, the dis-
charge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." C.W.A. § 301 (a), 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a).
CWA section 402 establishes the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem (NPDES), and section 404 establishes the permit program which regulates
dredged or fill material. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsi-
ble for issuing NPDES permits, while the United States Corps of Engineers (Corps)
issues dredge or fill material permits. See C.W.A. § 4 0 2(a)(1), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a)(1) (giving authority to issue permits to Administrator of NPDES pro-
gram); C.W.A. § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (giving authority to issue permits to
Secretary); Save Our Community v. EPA, 971 F.2d 1155, 1162 n.13 (5th Cir. 1992)
(delineating permit issuance and enforcement responsibilities of EPA and Corps).
Point sources which discharge pollutants are categorized so that regulations
and standards of performance can be promulgated and published defining the
allowable amount of effluent. See generally C.W.A. § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (defin-
ing sources to be regulated, describing categories of point sources, and enforce-
ment mechanisms); C.W.A. § 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (establishing standards and
regulations for toxic pollutants); C.W.A. § 318, 33 U.S.C. § 1328 (establishing stan-
dards and regulations for aquaculture). When point sources discharge pollutants
1999]
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1. Activities on Federal Lands Under Section 401
CWA establishes the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) by requiring'that a federal permit be obtained for
any activity on federal lands which may result in the "discharge of a
pollutant" pursuant to section 402.27 Under section 401,28 the ap-
which interfere with the "attainment or maintenance" of a given body of water,
effluent limitations must be established restricting the amount of discharge to
amounts that will reduce the amount of pollutant and maintain the appropriate
level of pollutants required to meet CWA's goal. See generally C.W.A. § 302, 33
U.S.C. § 1312; see also E.I. du Pont, 430 U.S. at 129 (describing purpose of effluent
limitations and deciding EPA must establish effluent limitations, stating,"In sum,
the language of the [Act] supports the view that [section] 301 limitations are to be
adopted by the Administrator, that they are to be based primarily on classes and
categories, and that they are to take the form of regulations").
The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) is addressed
in section 402 of the Act. See id. C.W.A. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. NPDES is "the
national program for issuing, modifying, revoking and reissuing, terminating,
monitoring and enforcing permits ...." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1998). NPDES permits
do not regulate discharges of sludge or fill materials or "pollutants from non point-
source agricultural and silvicultural activities, including storm water runoff from
orchards, cultivated crops, pastures, range lands, and forest lands . . . [and]
[r]eturn flow from irrigated agriculture." 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (e)-(f); see also E.I. du
Pont, 430 U.S. at 116 (noting elimination of all pollutant discharges into nation's
waters as goal in enacting CWA); United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d
643, 645 (2d Cir. 1993) (summarizing CWA's "basic rule" from juxtaposition of
sections 301(a) and 402(a)(1) (quoting C.W.A. § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a))),
cert. denied by United States v. Villegas, 512 U.S. 1245 (1994).
Dredge and fill materials, and sewage sludge, are regulated under section 404
of the Act. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (b); see also C.W.A §§ 404-405, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344-
1345; Save Our Community, 971 F.2d at 1162 ("Specific authorization includes the
discharge of 'dredged or fill material' pursuant to a permit issued under section
404 of the CWA.") (citing C.W.A. § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)).
27. See C.W.A. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Section 402 regulates effluents when
EPA issues a permit for point source discharges. See International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489 (1987) (characterizing NPDES program as "a federal
permit program designed to regulate the discharge of polluting effluents") (citing
C.W.A. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342; EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources
Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205-08 (1976)); see also Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 645 (char-
acterizing NPDES permits as "largest exception to [section 301 (a) 's] seemingly ab-
solute rule"). The United States Supreme Court summed up the operation of a
permit issued pursuant to section 402, stating, "In short, the permit defines, and
facilitates compliance with and enforcement of, a preponderance of a discharger's
obligations under the Amendments." State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at
205 (noting focus of effluent limitations is on category or class not characteristics
of individual point sources). NPDES permit holders must comply with all condi-
tions set forth in the permit. See C.W.A. § 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a). NPDES
permits contain specific limitations on the allowable amount of pollution which
may be emitted from a particular point source of pollution. See International Paper,
479 U.S. at 489 (explaining CWA's 1972 Amendments). In addition, requirements
other than effluent limitations may be added if necessary to carry out the purpose
of CWA. See C.W.A. § 402(a) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1). Further, a "compliance
schedule for the attainment of these limitations" is included. International Paper,
479 U.S. at 489. Section 301 defines the effluent limitations which the point
sources must comply with. See E.I. du Pont, 430 U.S. at 112 (interpreting section
301, noting section 301 defines point source effluent limitation requirements).
Vol. X: p. 431
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plicant must also apply for and receive state certification before a
Although federal NPDES permit holders do not have to comply with state NPDES
schedules of compliance, they must comply with state water quality standards, even
those more stringent than the NPDES permit requirements, which are incorpo-
rated into the federal NPDES permit. See C.W.A. § 402(a)(3), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a)(3)("[P]ermits ... shall be subject to the same terms, conditions, and
requirements as apply to a State permit program ... ."); State Water Resources Control
Bd., 426 U.S. at 227-28 (holding NPDES permit holders are not required to comply
with state NPDES compliance schedules); International Paper, 479 U.S. at 489-90
(noting "source State may require discharge limitations more stringent than those
required by the Federal Government"); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 92
(1992) (deferring to EPA's requirement activities issued NPDES permit must com-
ply with state requirements); United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 556 F.2d 822, 835
(7th Cir. 1977) (recognizing requirement NPDES permits contain state water qual-
ity standards). For an explanation as to the means to develop and enforce effluent
limitations, see generally E.I. du Pont, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); Citizens for a Better
Env't-Cal. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 83 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996); Rybachek v. EPA,
904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990).
Supreme Court decisions addressing the scope, and interpretation, of CWA
include PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U.S.
700 (1994); Arkansas, 503 U.S. 91 (1992); United States Department of Energy v. Ohio,
503 U.S. 607 (1992); International Paper, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); Chemical Manufactur-
ers Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985); Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea ClammersAss'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); EPA v.
National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980); E.I du Pont, 430 U.S. 112 (1977);
State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976). For the Supreme Court's
interpretation of CWA section 301 concerning effluent limitations, see generally
E.I. du Pont, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). For the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of section
301, see infra note 38. For the Supreme Court's interpretation of CWA section
402, see E.I. du Pont, 430 U.S. at 119-20; State Water Resources ControlBoard, 426 U.S.
at 205-209.
Each state is required to create and adopt appropriate water quality standards
for each body of water within its boundaries, identify the uses of each body of
water, and determine the amount of pollution which would impair these uses. See
C.W.A. § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (describing state's responsibility under CWA and
guidelines for establishing water quality standards). For a further description of
the elements comprising water quality standards, see generally PUD, 511 U.S. 700
(1994); Adler, supra note 10; Randolph L. Hill, State Water Quality Certification of
Federal NPDES Permits, 9 TUL. ENvrI.. L.J. 1 (1995).
For a discussion of states' obligations under CWA section 303, see generally
Conway, supra note 8; Hill, supra. For an example of how the United States
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have interpreted CWA section 303, see infra
notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
28. See C.W.A. § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
The plain language of the Act provides:
Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity..
which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide
the licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State in which
the discharge originates or will originate .. . that any such discharge shall
comply with the applicable provisions of [CWA] .... No license or per-
mit shall be granted until the certification required by this section has
been obtained.... No license shall be granted if certification has been
denied by the State .... C.W.A. § 401 (a) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (a) (1) (em-
phasis added).
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 401, see
infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's
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federal license or permit may be issued from the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA).29 Thus, the states have the
opportunity to assess whether the proposed activity will comply with
their water quality standards.3 0 The state permit requirement, how-
ever, applies only to those activities which require a federal permit
and fall within the definition of the term "discharge" as defined by
interpretation of section 401 prior to ONDA II, see infra notes 43-47 and accompa-
nying text.
29. See C.W.A. § 401 (a) (1),33 U.S.C. § 1341 (a) (1); see also Arkansas, 503 U.S.
at 103 ("Section 401(a) (2) appears to prohibit the issuance of any federal license
or permit over the objection of an affected State unless compliance with the af-
fected State's water quality requirements can be ensured."); National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (explaining legislature in-
tended to leave regulation of dams under state control absent clear intent to con-
trary). For a discussion of the facts and court rationale in National Wildlife, see infra
note 50.
30. See, e.g., PUD No. 1 ofJefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology,
511 U.S. 700, 707-08 (1994) (reviewing state responsibilities under CWA) (citing
C.W.A. § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341). For an in-depth discussion of the facts, proce-
dural history and analysis in PUD, see infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
In enacting CWA, Congress specifically recognized that the states have the
responsibility of maintaining the integrity of the waters located within their bound-
aries. See C.W.A. § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). Congress's policy is "to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent,
reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use ... of
land and water resources .... . Id. The states are required to set water quality
standards for all navigable waters within their boundaries. See C.W.A. § 303(c), 33
U.S.C. § 1313(c); see also C.W.A. § 303(c) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (describing
purpose of water quality standards); 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.5, 131.11 (describing how to
establish water quality program); PUD, 511 U.S. at 714 (noting CWA section
303(c)(2)(A) requires states to establish antidegradation measures). Further,
Congress appointed the EPA as the Administrator of the Act to help states achieve
CWA's goal. See C.W.A. § 1251(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d). For example, EPA is re-
sponsible for assessing which states have the capacity to implement a permit pro-
gram that will meet CWA's standards, and monitor state compliance. See C.W.A.
§ 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. In addition, EPA is responsible for overseeing the devel-
opment of technology, which serves to reduce discharges into the nation's water,
and establishing and applying enforcement mechanisms. See C.W.A. §§ 301, 304,
33 U.S.C. § 1311, 1314. Only if a state cannot meet water quality standards will
EPA promulgate federal standards for the state. See C.W.A. § 303(c) (3), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(c) (3).
An activity subject to section 401 review, pursuant to section 402, means that
the permit holders must comply with the water quality standards set by the state.
See State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 220-21 (discussing relationship be-
tween CWA section 401 and 402); see also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479
U.S. 481, 490 (1987) ("The CWA therefore establishes a regulatory 'partnership'
between the Federal Government and the source State."). For a discussion of the
operation of 401 review, see generally Donahue, supra, note 8; Hill, supra note 27.
For further discussion of EPA's role in administering CWA, see infra note 81. For
judicial decisions addressing deference due EPA as Administrator of CWA, see
generally PUD, 511 U.S. 700 (1994); United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 3
F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Ser-
vice, 834 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987); National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d
156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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the Act.3 1 The term "discharge" has traditionally been interpreted
to include only point sources of pollution.3 2 Point sources of pollu-
tion are directly regulated by CWA under the permit provisions,
including section 401.3 In contrast, nonpoint sources of pollution
are only regulated indirectly through other provisions of CWA and
are not subject to section 401 review.3 4 Thus, defining what consti-
31. See C.W.A. § 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1); see also PUD, 511 U.S. at
709 (setting forth requirements triggering section 401 certification). For the statu-
tory language defining the term "discharge," see infra note 49 and accompanying
text.
32. See., e.g., Idaho Conservation League v. Caswell, No. CV 95-394-S-MHW,
1996 WL 938215, at *8 (D. Idaho Aug. 12, 1996) (holding USFS did not violate
CWA when issued permit for construction of forest logging road without requiring
state certification). For a discussion of the facts, holding and analysis in Idaho Con-
servation, see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
33. See Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1315 (D. Or. 1997) ("The CWA's primary mechanism for
regulating the addition of pollutants to navigable waters is the [NPDES] permit...
which allows regulated discharges of pollutants notwithstanding the Act's general
prohibition, so long as the discharger complies with all applicable limitations.")
(citing C.W.A. § 402(a) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1)); Beartooth Alliance v. Crown
Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 1174 (D. Mont. 1995) (noting categorical prohibi-
tion of discharge of pollutants from point sources without NPDES permit) (citing
CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East
Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 309 (9th Cir. 1993)).
34. Cf., e.g., Idaho Conservation, 1996 WL 938215, at *9 (holding construction
of forest logging road is nonpoint source not subject to 401 review). But cf Ore-
gon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534, 1541 (D. Or. 1996) (hold-
ing nonpoint sources are regulated under section 401), rev'd sub nom. Oregon
Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL 407711, at *1
(9th Cir. July 22, 1998). Prior to FWPCA, no statute was in place to regulate water
pollution. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 487 (1987) (not-
ing federal common law addressed water pollution). In 1948, FWPCA was en-
acted, with the stated purpose " ' to enhance the quality and value of our water
resources and to establish a national policy for the prevention, control, and abate-
ment of water pollution.'" EPA v. California ex. rel. State Water Resources Control
Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 203 n.8 (1976) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1151(a)). The method
used to address water pollution under this scheme centered around defining ac-
ceptable levels of pollution for each individual body of water. See id. at 202
(describing CWA prior to 1972 Amendments); Natural Resources Defense Council
v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990) (defining water quality standards,
"standards set by the states specifying the tolerable degree of pollution for particu-
lar waters") (citation omitted). In 1970, section 401 (a) was enacted as section
21 (b) of the Water Quality Improvement Act (WQIA). See Idaho Conservation, 1996
WL 938215, at *8. Section 21(b) prohibited "any discharge" into the nation's wa-
ters by any activity without state certification. See id. The term "discharge" in "any
discharge" was not defined by WQIA. See id. In 1972, however, Congress added the
definitions of "discharge" and "discharge of a pollutant." See id. Congress
amended CWA in 1972 because "'the Federal Water pollution control program
.... [was] inadequate in every vital respect.'" State Water Resources Control Bd., 426
U.S. at 203 (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-414, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1972, p.
3674, 2 Leg. Hist. 1425, and discussing inadequacy of water quality standards in
controlling pollution). The United States Supreme Court has interpreted Con-
gress's intention in amending CWA as to "'establish an all-encompassing program
1999]
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of water pollution regulation," City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318
(1981), by adopting "comprehensive amendments to the Act." International Paper,
479 U.S. at 488. The 1972 Amendments have also been interpreted as shifting
water pollution control from water quality standards to "national technology stan-
dards for point sources of pollution." Conway, supra note 8, at 85 (citation omit-
ted); see, e.g., NRDC, 915 F.2d at 1316-17 (concluding nonpoint sources of
pollution are regulated only indirectly because 1972 CWA Amendments replaced
previous regulatory scheme). In addition, the 1972 Amendments have been cited
as support for the proposition that the Act only regulates point sources of pollu-
tion by virtue of the addition of definitions for the terms "discharge" and "dis-
charge of a pollutant." See, e.g., Idaho Conservation, 1996 WL 938215, at *8-*9
(holding CWA section 401 does not regulate nonpoint sources).
The Ninth Circuit has recognized that nonpoint sources of pollution are regu-
lated indirectly through separate provisions of CWA. See, e.g., NRDC, 915 F.2d at
1316, 1316 n.3 (concluding lack of penalty for nonpoint source polluters failure to
adopt nonpoint source management controls supported conclusion "discharge of
pollutants from nonpoint sources... [are] not directly prohibited"); Oregon Nat-
ural Resources Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 850 (9th Cir.
1987) ("Nonpoint sources, because of their very nature, are not regulated under
the NPDES."); Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984) (not-
ing nonpoint sources of pollution "are not subject to NPDES permit requirements;
rather, the Act directs the Administrator only to develop guidelines for identifying
and controlling such sources"); see also Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v.
EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 791 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding lack of direct mechanism
under CWA for EPA to mandate states adopt appropriate nonpoint controls due to
Congress's recognition "uniform federal regulation was virtually impossible," not
concern for state authority); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165-
66, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (describing, and deferring to, EPA's view which asserted
CWA regulates point sources of pollutants through section 402, nonpoint sources
of pollution through section 208, "[t]he latter category [being] defined by exclu-
sion and includ[ing] all water quality problems not subject to [section] 402");
United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 559 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979) ("It is clear
from the legislative history Congress would have regulated so-called nonpoint
sources if a workable method could have been derived.").
The purpose of the Amendments, however, was to limit effluents from point
sources "as well as achiev[e] acceptable water quality standards." State Water Resources
Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 204 (reviewing Congress's purpose in enacting 1972
Amendments) (emphasis added). Though establishing "direct restrictions on dis-
charges," the Amendments did not abandon the control of water pollution
through water quality standards, leaving control to the states, but added additional
means of regulation. Id. (specifying Amendments' aim to limit effluents "as well as
achieving acceptable water quality standards"); see also NRDC, 915 F.2d at 1316
("The amendments placed certain limits on what an individual firm could dis-
charge, regardless of whether the stream into which it was dumping was overpol-
luted at the time.").
The Ninth Circuit recognized that the addition of effluent limitations was not
intended to replace the previous regulatory scheme, but rather was intended as an
improvement in enforcing maintenance of water quality standards, in Northwest
Environmental Advocates v. City of Portland. See Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of
Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 1995),
and cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1018 (1996). But cf. NRDC, 915 F.2d at 1316; ONRC, 834
F.2d at 849 (interpreting 1972 Amendments as establishing dual regulatory
scheme in which only point sources are directly regulated). In Northwest Environ-
mental Advocates, an environmental group alleged that the City of Portland violated
CWA when untreated raw sewage flows, known as CSOs, overflowed from the city
sewer system when it rained, because the overflow was not covered by the NPDES
permit issued by EPA. See Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d
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tutes a discharge is pivotal in delineating the states' power to en-
force water quality standards within their boundaries.
979, 980 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 1995), and cert. denied,
518 U.S. 1018 (1996). The Northwest Environmental Advocates court held that the
environmental group could sue to force the CSOs to comply with Oregon water
quality standards even though no effluent limitations were set for the CSOs in the
NPDES permit. See id. at 986 (reconsidering their decision in Northwest Environmen-
talAdvocates v. City of Portland, 11 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 1993) affirming district court's
holding CWA does not allow citizens to enforce water quality standards). The
Northwest Environmental Advocates court specifically stated, "[Although the district
court] concluded that violations of water quality standards may be actionable 'only
if they are incorporated into an NPDES permit through effluent limitations' ...
[b]ecause the plain language of CWA [section] 505, the legislative history, and
case law support a finding of citizen suit jurisdiction in this case, we reverse on this
issue." Id. at 986 (internal citation omitted).
The City of Portland argued that effluent limitations, established by CWA's
1972 Amendments, were intended by Congress to become the primary means to
achieve water quality standards. See id. The Northwest Environmental Advocates court
reviewed the legislative history to the 1972 Amendments and concluded that "[i] n
fact, the legislative history indicates just the opposite." Id. The Ninth Circuit ex-
plained that Congress's main concern was the underutilization of allowable legal
action to enforce water quality standards. See id. at 986-87 (highlighting Senate
Committee's discussion of "dual purpose of water quality standards" (quoting S.
REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong; 2nd Sess. 2 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3671; 40 C.F.R. § 131.2 (1992))). The Senate Committee specifically noted that
"'only one case has reached the courts in more than two decades.'" See id. (quoting
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3672). Further, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress
did not intend CWA's enforcement provisions be limited to violations of effluent
limitations because the Senate Committee expressly recognized that a violation of
effluent limitations was only one basis for a citizen suit. See id. at 987. Thus, any
pollution affecting water quality standards, including nonpoint source pollution
such as the CSOs overflow caused by rainfall, is subject to CWA's direct regulatory
provisions. Cf id. at 989 (discussing Congress's recognition regulation is not de-
pendant upon whether effluent limitations may be developed). The Ninth Circuit
explained that although the CSOs overflows resulted from "uncontrollable events,"
and many pollutants affecting water quality standards are not amenable to effluent
limitations, requiring the pollution sources of these pollutants to meet water qual-
ity standards through citizen suits "effectuate[s] complementary provisions of
CWA and the underlying purpose of the statute as a whole." Id. (noting pollutants
not amenable to effluent limitations remain subject to direct regulation "[e]ven
after the 1972 amendments").
For the proposition that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Northwest Environmen-
tal Advocates overruled its prior decision in ONRC, see infra note 189 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in ONRC, prior to
Northwest Environmental Advocates and PUD, reviewing, and interpreting, CWA's
1972 Amendments impact on pollution source regulation, see infra note 38. For
an in-depth discussion of two Ninth Circuit district courts interpreting the 1972
CWA Amendments in light of the issue before them, and reaching opposite con-
clusions regarding whether nonpoint sources fall within the ambit of section 401,
see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the impact of
CWA's 1972 Amendments, see generally City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); E.I
du Pont de Nemours Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); State Water Resources Control
Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976); Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); Conway,
supra, note 8.
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2. Scope of States' Power of Review Under Section 401: PUD No.
1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of
Ecology
The Supreme Court addressed the scope of states' power
under section 401 in PUD No. 1 ofJefferson County v. Washington De-
partment of Ecology (PUD).35 The Court examined whether states
could impose additional requirements or restrictions on activities
requiring certification under section 401.36 Specifically, the Wash-
ington State Department of Ecology imposed minimum stream flow
rates as part of the certification under CWA for building a hydroe-
lectric power plant.3 7 The Court held "that the State may include
minimum stream flow requirements in a certification issued pursu-
ant to [section] 401 of the Clean Water Act insofar as necessary to
35. 511 U.S. 700 (1994). The Court began its analysis by defining the role of
EPA and the state in accomplishing the Act's goals. See id. at 704. The states are
required by CWA to submit a proposal to EPA which establishes water quality stan-
dards. See id. at 704-05 (citing C.W.A. §§ 301(b) (1) (C), 303; 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311(b) (1) (C), 1313). In addition, states are responsible for enforcing these
standards on intrastate waters under CWA section 309(a) and, under section 401,
are required to "provide a water quality certification before a federal license or
permit can be issued for activities that may result in any discharge into intrastate
navigable waters." Id. at 707 (citing C.W.A. §§ 309(a), 401; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a),
1341).
36. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511
U.S. 700, 710 (1994) (stating specific issue as "whether the minimum stream flow
requirement that the State imposed on the Elkhorn [hydroelectric] Project is a
permissible condition of a [section] 401 certification under [CWA]"). In PLD, a
local utility service and a city planned to build a hydroelectric plant near the
Olympic National Forest on the Dosewallips River. See id. at 708. The river water
would be blocked from flowing through 1.2 miles of the river in order to generate
electricity. See id. at 708-09. The water would be withdrawn, sent through turbines
at the plant, then redeposited in the river below the 1.2 mile area from which it
was diverted from. See id. As a result, the amount of water flowing through the 1.2
mile portion of the river would be less than the amount required by state water
quality standards. See id. at 709. The state required that these water levels be in-
creased before approving the project discharges. See id.
The proposed hydroelectric plant could potentially discharge several pollu-
tants, thus requiring state certification before the project could proceed. See id. at
711. The state conditioned the issuance of the permit on maintaining a certain
level of water flow through the river. See id. at 709. Since this requirement was
unrelated to the discharge of pollutants, a dispute arose over whether the state
may impose minimum stream flow requirements. Cf id. at 711 (declining to dis-
pute petitioners' assertion minimum flow requirement was unrelated to specific
discharges). Both parties conceded that two "discharges" could occur; thus, the
project required section 401 certification. See id. The first discharge might occur
from the construction of the plant, resulting in the release of dredge and fill mate-
rial; the second discharge could occur when the water was redeposited via a tail-
race into the river. See id.
For a discussion of whether redepositing of releases falls within the definition
of discharge, see infra note 62 and accompanying text.
37. See id. at 700.
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enforce a designated use contained in a state water quality stan-
dard. s38 Thus, once an applicant's activity falls within the purview
38. Id. at 723. This holding further defines the scope of section 401 by con-
cluding that states may require limitations "to ensure compliance with state water
quality standards or any other 'appropriate requirement of State law,"' and that
minimum stream flow conditions are an appropriate requirement of state law.
Donahue, supra note 8, at 209 (explaining PUD court's holdings relevant to CWA
section 401's scope (quoting PUD, 511 U.S. at 712 (quoting C.W.A. § 401(a), 33
U.S.C. § 1 34 1(a))); see also PUD, 511 U.S. at 713). The Court set out the relevant
language to be interpreted:
"Section 401, as set forth in 33 U.S.C. [section] 1341, provides in relevant
part:
'(a) Compliance with applicable requirements; application; procedures;
license suspension
(1) Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity
including, but not limited to, the construction or operation of facilities,
which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide
the licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State . . . that
any such discharge will comply with the applicable provisions of sections
[301, 302, 303, 306], and [307] of this tide.
(d) Limitations and monitoring requirements of certification
Any certification provided under this section shall set forth any effluent limi-
tations and other limitations, and monitoring requirements necessary to as-
sure that any applicant for a Federal license or permit will comply with any
applicable effluent limitations and other limitations, under section [301] or
[302] of this title, standard of performance under section [306] of this
title, or prohibition, effluent standard, or pretreatment standard under
section [307] of this title, and with any other appropriate requirement of State
law set forth in such certification, and shall become a condition on any Fed-
eral license or permit subject to the provisions of this section."'
PUD, 511 U.S. at 708 n.2 (quoting C.W.A. § 401(a), (a)(1) & (a)(1)(d), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (a), (a)(1) & (a)(1)(d)) (emphasis added).
The Court rejected petitioners' argument that section 401 only applied to dis-
charges. See id. at 711. Section 401 (a) requires "any discharge" to be in compli-
ance with applicable provisions of the Act. See id. The language of section 401 (d)
.refers to the compliance of the applicant, not the discharge." Id. (emphasis ad-
ded). Thus, a state "may impose 'other limitations' on the project . . . to assure
compliance with ... [CWA] and with 'any other appropriate requirement of State
law.'" See id. The Court therefore concluded, "Section 401 (a) (1) identifies the
category of activities subject to certification - namely, those with discharges. And
[section] 401(d) is most reasonably read as authorizing additional conditions and
limitations on the activity as a whole once the threshold condition, the existence of
a discharge, is satisfied." Id. at 711-12. Because section 401 (d) requires an "appli-
cant," and not a "discharge," to comply with various provisions of CWA, "the State
may [ ] impose water quality limitations [which are not] specifically tied to a 'dis-
charge.'" Id. at 726.
The Court further noted that EPA's regulations parralled its own interpreta-
tion of this provision; thus, the regulations were entitled to deference. See id. at
712-13 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3) (1992)). EPA's implementing regulations
for section 401 require the state to find that any activity will not violate water qual-
ity standards. See id. at 712 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3) (1993)). Further,
EPA concluded that section 401 mandates that activities, not discharges, must com-
ply with state water quality standards. See id. Because EPA's interpretation of sec-
tion 401 was reasonable, the PUD court concluded it was entitled to deference. See
id. (providing as examples precedent in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110
(1992); Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
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(1984)). Under CWA section 303, individual states are required to promulgate
and maintain water quality standards aimed at protecting designated uses. See id.
Further, imposing conditions or limitations in furtherance of this mandate under
the Act, is an obligation of the state. See id. Thus, 401 (d) "authorizes the State to
place restrictions on the activity as a whole once the threshold condition, the exist-
ence of a discharge, is satisfied." Id. at 712-13 (qualifying restrictions to effluent
limitations, relevant CWA provisions, and state law requirements deemed appro-
priate) (emphasis added). The PUD court agreed that a proper function of 401
certification is ensuring activities comply with CWA section 303. See id. at 712. The
Court did recognize that, unlike section 401 (a), section 401(d) does not list sec-
tion 303. See id. at 712-13. As such, it could be argued that the "activity" would not
have to comply with state water quality standards. Cf id. (declining to adopt this
interpretation). The Court further noted, however, that states may impose limita-
tions in order to comply with section 301, and because section 301 incorporates
section 303, water quality standards are "other limitations" 401 may require activi-
ties to comply with pursuant to section 401(d). See id. at 713 (citing C.W.A.
§ 301(b) (1) (C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1) (C); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-830, p.9 6
(1997), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1977, pp. 4326, 4471). In addition to
complying with effluent limitations for point sources, under section 301 (b) (1) (C),
compliance with "any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet
water quality standards... established pursuant to any State law or regulations .... "
is required. C.W.A. § 301(b) (1) (C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1) (C) (emphasis added).
The PUD court explicitly noted that section 301 is not limited to discharges. See
PUD, 511 U.S. at 713 n.3. Section 301 (b) (1) (C) "expressly refers to state water
quality standards, and is not limited to discharges." Id. The Court did note that
some discharges are prohibited by section 301(a), but stated that section 301 (a)
"also contains a broad enabling provision which requires States to take certain
actions '[i]n order to carry out [CWA's goal] .... [including] any more stringent
limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality standards .... estab-
lished pursuant to any State law or regulations .... .' Id. (quoting C.W.A.
§ 301 (b) (1) (C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b) (1) (C)). Similarly, section 401 (d)'s reference
to "any other appropriate requirement of State law" also may include water quality
standards.
See id. at 701. In conclusion, the PUD court, though declining to state what laws or
regulations section 301 contemplates, did state that, "state quality standards
adopted pursuant to [section] 303 are among the 'other limitations' with which a
State may ensure compliance through the [section] 401 certification process...
[and] at a minimum, limitations imposed pursuant to state water quality standards
adopted pursuant to [section] 303 are 'appropriate' requirements of state law." Id.
at 713.
The Ninth Circuit also examined and construed section 301(b) (1) (C) in Ore-
gon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Service (ONRC), and concluded
that section 301 only applies to regulation of discharges. Cf Oregon Natural Re-
sources Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 849 (9th Cir. 1987)
(addressing CWA section 301(b) (1) (C) language "any applicable water quality
standards established pursuant to this chapter" and concluding section 301 only
regulates point sources of pollution). The ONRC court held that the language in
section 301 (b) (1) (C) did not entitle citizens "to sue under the citizen suit provi-
sion of the Act to enforce state water quality standards affected by nonpoint
sources." Id. The ONRC court provided "runoff from irrigated agriculture and
silvicultural activities" as examples of nonpoint source pollution. See id. (citing as
support Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984)). Thus, in
contrast to the PUD court, the ONRC court concluded that, by implication, only
discharges are regulated, as discharges only emanate from point sources of pollu-
tion. See id. Further, the ONRC court found that the dual regulatory scheme pres-
ent in CWA lends support for its conclusion. See id.
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In ONRC, the United States Forest Service (USFS), charged with overseeing
national forests, sold land in the Willamette Timber National Forest to a private
company, Bugaboo, for timber harvesting. See id. at 844. The sale at issue was
called the North Roaring Devil timber sale. See id. at 843-44. In addition, USFS
issued a permit for the timber harvesting and associated activities which included
the construction of a bridge and road. See id. at 848. Three issues were on appeal
before the ONRC court. See id. at 843-44 (enumerating plaintiffs' appeals for Buga-
boo's activities, claiming Administrative Procedure Act, National Environmental
Policy Act and CWA violations). The issue relevant to the discussion in this Note
involves Bugaboo's alleged violation of CWA in building a bridge and logging road
which violates Oregon's water quality standards. See id. at 844. Plaintiffs-appellants
include an environmental association, called the Oregon Natural Resources Coun-
cil (ONRC), Breitenbush Community, Inc., and a private individual Michael Don-
nelly (collectivley ONRC). See id. at 843. ONRC sued USFS to enjoin Bugaboo's
activities, claiming the activities would violate the state of Oregon's water quality
standards, and CWA section 313. See id. at 848. Specifically, defendants were al-
leged to "have violated and plan to violate" Oregon's antidegredation plan. See id.
at 848 n.6. Defendants responded that CWA does not allow a citizen suit for en-
forcement of water quality standards unless the water quality standards are con-
tained in an NPDES permit. See id.
Section 303 addresses water quality standards and implementation plans. See
C.W.A. § 303(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a). Section 303(a) (3) (A) requires each state to
adopt water quality standards for all waters within its boundaries. See C.W.A.
§ 303(a) (3) (A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(A). In addition, states must have these
water quality standards approved by EPA. See id. These water quality standards
must be reviewed at least once every three years. See C.W.A. § 303(c) (1), 33 U.S.C.§ 1313(c)(1). States must monitor their waters so that if, or when, effluent limita-
tions are no longer effective in maintaining water quality standards, they can be
modified. See C.W.A. § 303(d) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (A). Effluent limita-
tions based on total maximum daily loads for pollutants which meet and maintain
water quality standards must be established by the state. See C.W.A.
§ 303(d)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C). Effluent limitations are "any restric-
tion established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentra-
tions of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged
from point sources into navigable waters, the waters of contiguous zone or the
ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other floating craft." C.W.A.
§ 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11). Any modifications to water quality standards for
a waterbody must specify the designated water uses of the water, and "the water
quality criteria for such waters based on these uses." C.W.A. § 303(c) (2) (A), 33
U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (A). The guidelines states must follow in establishing these
new water quality standards mandate that water quality standards "be established
taking into consideration their use and value for public water supplies, propaga-
tion of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and
other purposes ... ." Id. Section 313 addresses the control of pollution for federal
facilities. C.W.A. § 313, 33 U.S.C. § 1323. Any federal agency, department or in-
strumentality of the federal government who oversees any facility or property, or
conducts an activity which results, or may result, "in the discharge or runoff of
pollutants . . . shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate,
and local requirements." C.W.A. § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
As a threshold issue, the ONRC court noted that all parties conceded that
CWA sections 301 (a) and 301(b) (1) (A) and (B) only apply to point sources. See
ONRC, 834 F.2d at 848-49. Further, the parties conceded that the activities in ques-
tion would produce pollution from nonpoint sources. Cf id. at 848-49 (conceding
CWA section 301 (a) specifically refers to point source discharges which were not at
issue). Thus, the ONRC court was never called upon to determine whether the
logging activities and construction in question were point or nonpoint sources of
pollution. Cf id.; see also PUD, 511 U.S. at 710 (explaining analysis Court would
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apply in resolving issue presented). The Ninth Circuit characterized the specific
issue they were asked to address as whether section 301 (b) (1) (C)'s "additional en-
forceable standards, including state water quality standards can be applied to pol-
lution from nonpoint sources." ONRC, 834 F.2d at 849. ONRC claimed that
because states are required to establish and maintain water quality standards, and
section 301(b) (1) (C) references water quality standards with no mention of point
sources, they "are entitled to sue under the citizen suit provision of [CWA] to
enforce state water quality standards." Id. In a footnote, the ONRC court elabo-
rated on the term "nonpoint source pollution" as explained by the Ninth Circuit in
Trustees for Alaska. See id. at 849 n.9. "Nonpoint source pollution is not specifically
defined by the Act, but is pollution that does not result from the 'discharge' or
'addition' of pollutants from a point source. Examples of nonpoint source pollu-
tion include runoff from irrigated agriculture and silvicultural activities." Id. (cit-
ing as support Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984)
(quoting C.W.A. § 304(f) (2) (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f) (2) (B))). To accomplish this
objective, ONRC asserted that USFS should have required Bugaboo to apply for
state certification before issuing their permit. See ONRC, 834 F.2d at 849.
It is interesting to note that in Trustees for Alaska, the Ninth Circuit did not, in
fact, specifically quote language from the subsection of 304(f) (2) referencing agri-
cultural and silvicultural activities. See Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at 558 (quoting
subsection of 304(f) (2) concerning mining activities). Section 304(f) (2) (A) re-
quires that published information regarding the development of water quality cri-
teria, pursuant to CWA section 304(a), include the means of controlling pollution
which results from "agricultural and silvicultural activities including runoff from
fields and crop and forest lands." C.W.A. §304(f)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(f) (2) (A). The Ninth Circuit in Trustees for Alaska quoted section
304(f) (2) (B) which lists "'mining activities, including runoff and siltation from
new, currently operating, and abandoned surface and underground mines'" as
activities requiring water quality control method information be developed and
published. Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at 558 (concluding mining sources of pollu-
tion may be subject to NPDES regulation despite being listed in CWA section
304(f) (2) (B) (quoting C.W.A. § 304(f) (2) (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f) (2) (B)).
Contrary to the Trustees for Alaska court's conclusion that some nonpoint
sources of pollution may in fact be regulated under the NPDES permit provision,
looking to Congress's creation of two discrete programs in addressing pollution
under CWA and the title of section 301, "Effluent Limitations," the ONRC court
held that the NPDES does not regulate nonpoint sources of pollution. See ONRC,
834 F.2d at 849. The ONRC court did recognize that nonpoint source pollution
"constitutes a major source of pollution in the nation's waters." Id. (citing V.
NovoTNv & G. CHESTERS, HANDBOOK OF NONPOINT POLLUTION 2 (1981) (asserting
nonpoint sources of pollution account for more than 50% of the total water qual-
ity problem)). The ONRC court nonetheless concluded that ONRC was not enti-
tled to sue under CWA to enforce nonpoint source pollution affecting state water
quality standards. See id. at 849, 851 ("[P]laintiffs cannot enforce state water qual-
ity standards with respect to nonpoint sources pursuant to [CWA's citizen suit pro-
vision] that section because Congress did not so provide. Thus, plaintiffs have no
exclusive and comprehensive remedy in the citizen suit provision of the Act. .. ").
The ONRC court cited three sections of CWA in support of its reading of a
separate regulatory scheme which precludes regulation under CWA section 301
for nonpoint source pollution. See id. at 849. Section 319 of CWA specifically es-
tablishes a waste treatment program directed at nonpoint source pollution, and
establishes the guidelines for state areawide treatment management programs ad-
dressing nonpoint management, while section 101(a)(7) makes control of
nonpoint source pollution a policy goal of CWA. See id. In addition, the title of
section 301, "Effluent Limitations," is defined as a restriction of pollutants "dis-
charged from point sources into navigable waters." Id. at 849 (quoting C.W.A.
§ 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11)) (emphasis added); see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.2
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of section 401, the state may impose any conditions or limitations
related to the activity.3
9
(1998) (defining effluent limitations as "any restriction ... on quantities, dis-
charge rates, and concentrations of 'pollutants' which are 'discharged' from 'point
sources'").
The ONRC court first addressed section 319, reviewing the 1972 and 1987
Amendments to CWA. See ONRC, 834 F.2d at 849. In 1972, Congress made two
major changes to CWA: it established the NPDES permit program and "concomi-
tandy created a new approach to regulating and abating water pollution, [draw-
ing] a distinct line between point and nonpoint sources of pollution." Id. Under
this dual regulatory scheme, point sources of pollution are to be regulated by
NPDES. See id. at 849 (citing C.W.A. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342); 849 n.ll (quoting
definitions of discharge and "discharge of a pollutant" as support). Nonpoint
sources of pollution, however, are to be addressed indirectly through new, sepa-
rate, provisions of the Act. See id. Regulation of nonpoint sources are voluntary,
being accomplished through waste treatment management plans. See id. at 849
(asserting nonpoint sources of pollution not regulated under NPDES program).
Further, in 1987, Congress provided for grants and assistance to be given to states
that develop nonpoint source programs. See id. at 849 n.12 (discussing Congress's
policy for pollution control as amended in 1987 to control two distinct types of
pollution, point and nonpoint source pollution).
Second, the ONRC court observed that section 101 (a) (7) was also added in
the 1987 CWA revisions. See id. The grants and assistance were included in the
new provisions as a means to implement the new national policy concerning
nonpoint source pollution stated in section 101 (a) (7). See id. ("The new language
states that: '(7) it is the national policy that programs for the control of nonpoint
sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so
as to enable the goals of the Act to be met through the control of both point and
nonpoint sources of pollution.'" (quoting Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 316(b), 101 Stat. 60
(Feb. 4,1987)).
Third, the ONRC court construed section 301 as regulating point source, but
not nonpoint source, pollution. See id. at 948. The ONRC court noted that section
301's title, "Effluent Limitations," is a method of controlling discharges from point
sources. See id. (referencing CWA section 502(11) defining effluent limitations).
The Ninth Circuit then briefly reviewed the three provisions of section 301 (b) (1)
and concluded they were all means of deriving these effluent limitations, including
water quality standards. See id. at 849-50 (quoting sections 301(b) (1) (A)-(C)). Ac-
cording to the Ninth Circuit, effluent limitations must be complied with in order
to avoid an unlawful discharge of a pollutant, explicitly prohibited by section
301 (a). See id. at 850. Section 301 (b)(1)(C) allows the use of any means necessary
to comply with "effluent limitations" guidelines, "[t]hus, effluent limitations may
be derived from state water quality standards and may be enforced when included
in a discharger's permit .... [I]t is not the water quality standards themselves that
are enforceable in section [301] (b) (1) (C), but it is the 'limitations necessary to
meet' those standards, or 'required to implement' the standards." Id. The ONRC
court concluded, "The title and construction of section [301] (b) (1) lead us to the
logical conclusion that the 'limitations' set forth in section [301] (b)(1)(C) are
'effluent limitations' and, therefore, by definition, applicable only to point
sources. Having reached this conclusion, we find that plaintiffs do not have a
cause of action under the citizen suit provision of CWA." Id. (internal citation
omitted). For a critical discussion of ONRC, proposing the Court's decision in PUD
overruled the Ninth Circuit's decision in ONRC, see infra note 42. For the Ninth
Circuit's recognition that PUD called into question their holding in ONRC, see
infra note 189.
39. See PUD, 511 U.S. at 713.
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The Court's analysis and holding in PUD, while giving impor-
tant insight into states' power under CWA, nonetheless leaves sev-
eral important issues unsettled.40 First, the Court did not address
whether the two possible pollution emissions in question, "the re-
lease of dredged and fill material during the construction of the
project, and the discharge of water at the end of the tailrace after
the water has been used to generate electricity," were discharges as
contemplated by the Act.4 1 Second, the Court did not discuss
40. Cf id. at 711 ("There is no dispute that petitioners were required to ob-
tain a certification from the State pursuant to [section] 401."). See also Donahue,
supra note 8, at 207 ("[T]he significance of [PUD] is twofold: it hints at an ex-
tremely broad application for [CWA] section 401, yet it leaves open or does not
address several questions that must be answered to determine the precise contours
of section 401's scope.").
41. PUD, 511 U.S. at 711 (describing two possible discharges) & 725-26
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing majority opinion's focus on "'applicant,'
rather than a 'discharge'" in construing section 402 and asserting that section 401
as a whole applies only to discharges); see also North Carolina v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 112 F.3d 1175, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[PUD] never at-
tempted to define a discharge and in no way indicated that an alteration of a dis-
charge was sufficient to invoke the certification requirement of Section
401 (a) (1)."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1036 (1998), and cert. denied by Roanoke River
Basin Ass'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 118 S. Ct. 1037 (1998); Idaho
Conservation League v. Caswell, No. CV 95-394-S-MHW, 1996 WL 938215, at *10
(D. Idaho Aug. 12, 1996) (noting activities in PUD were undisputedly discharges,
and concluding, "Thus, [PUD] "does not stand for the proposition that all
nonpoint sources are subject to Section 401 certification"); Donahue, supra note 8,
at 208 n.29 ("The meaning of the operative term 'discharge' in [section] 401 (a)
received no attention by the [PUD] Court."). The court in PUD never discussed
whether the discharges at issue emanated from a point source. See Donahue, supra
note 8, at 217 (construing PUD as supporting proposition that discharge type is
irrelevant for section 401 review). Donahue noted that "[t]he Court's decision was
plainly not premised on the existence of any particular kind of discharge." Id. at
238. Indeed, one activity in question, water flowing from a dam tailrace, although
traditionally held to be a point source, has in some situations been categorized as a
nonpoint pollution source. See id. at 217; see also North Carolina, 112 F.3d 1175 at
1188 (noting PUD did not address definition of discharge or indicate discharge
alterations from dam were "sufficient to invoke the certification requirement of
[section] 401 (a) (1)").
In his dissent, Justice Thomas asserted that the majority opinion "adopt[ed]
an interpretation that fails to adequately harmonize the subsections of [section]
401." See PUD, 511 U.S. at 724 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Specifically, he noted,
first, that the majority's interpretation contradicts the plain meaning of the statute,
and second, that the majority relied in part on EPA's interpretation in reaching
their conclusion without initially determining whether the language of the statute
was ambiguous. In interpreting the various 401 sections, section 401(a) (1) sets
forth the scope of the certification process. See id. at 726 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas asserted that the plain language of this section limits a state's 401
review to "'any discharge' that 'may result' from 'any activity.'" Id. at 724 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Thus, only discharges must comply with the pro-
visions of section 401, not the activity as a whole. See id. at 726 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
From this proper reading of the statute, Justice Thomas asserted that since
section 401, pursuant to section 401 (a)(1), applies to discharges, it follows that,
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whether the source of the possible pollution emissions were point
or nonpoint sources for purposes of determining regulation under
the Act. 42
reading section 401 as a whole, section 401 (d) permits "other limitations" relating
to discharges which an applicant must comply with. See id. at 726-27 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas concluded that, "Indeed, any broader interpretation
of [section] 401(d) would permit that subsection to swallow [section] 401 (a) (1)."
Id. at 727. States would have unchecked authority to impose any conditions on an
activity regardless whether the condition related to a discharge as stipulated in
section 401 (a)(1) and eliminate the constraints of that subsection. See id. at 726
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas further criticized the basis of the majority's opinion which was
"based at least in part upon deference to the 'conclusion' of the Environmental
Agency (EPA) that [section] 401(d) is not limited to requirements relating to dis-
charges." Id. at 728 (Thomas,J., dissenting). Citing to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc., he criticized the majority for failing to consider
whether the Act's language was ambiguous before invoking deference to EPA. See
id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Further, the Court should have realized that there was
no EPA construction directly addressing the question of proper reconciliation be-
tween the sections 401(d) and 401 (a) (1) because the Government did not seek
deference to an EPA regulation in this case. See id. at 728-29 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). Lastly, Justice Thomas noted that the only EPA regulation addressing the
conditions which may appear in section 401 certifications, "speaks exclusively in
terms of limiting discharges." Id. at 729 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 40
C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(4) (1993) (stipulating conditions relate to activity discharge)).
He concluded that it is unclear whether this regulation is entitled to deference
because it does not define the scope of section 401(d) unambiguously and in fact
shows that "EPA's position on the question whether conditions under [section]
401(d) must be related to discharges is far from clear." Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
42. Cf PUD, 511 U.S. at 710 ("To resolve [the principle] ... dispute we must
first determine the scope of the State's authority under [section] 401 . . . [and]
then determine whether the limitation at issue here . . .falls within the scope of
that authority."); see also Donahue, supra note 8, at 209 (noting PUD court did not
consider whether two possible discharges emanated from point or nonpoint
sources); Mark T. Pifher, Water, Watersheds and the West: The Impact of the Jefferson
County Decision, 2 ENVTL. LAWYER 1, 20 n.141 (1995) (explaining PUD court "did
not find it necessary to differentiate between point and nonpoint source dis-
charges in reaching its decision"); Katherine P. Ransel, The Sleeping Giant Awakens:
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 25 ENVrL. LAW 255, 266
(1995) ("The Court did not determine whether the discharge triggering the appli-
cation of section 401 must be a point source discharge or whether it also includes
nonpoint source discharges.").
Before beginning its analysis of section 401, the PUD court noted that the
discharges in question must meet state water quality standards under the provi-
sion. See PUD, 511 U.S. at 711. The Court stated, "Because a federal license is
required, and because the project may result in discharges into the Dosewallips
River, petitioners are also required to obtain state certification of the project pur-
suant to [section] 401 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. [section] 1341."' Id. at
709. The Court did not discuss whether the activity in question would result in
discharges from point sources as contemplated by the Act. Cf id. at 725-26
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion for failing to analyze thresh-
old requirement of whether activity would result in discharge).
The PUD dissent, written by Justice Thomas, disputed the redepositing of river
water from a tailrace as meeting the definition of discharge. See id. at 725. Justice
Thomas asserted that "a minimum stream flow requirement is a limitation on in-
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take - the opposite of discharge." Id. at 725. In concluding that section 401 did
not apply to the redepositing of water into the river, and thus, that the require-
ment of minimum stream flow conditions was not properly within the authority of
the state, the dissent concluded, "It is reasonable to infer that the conditions a
State is permitted to impose on certification process must relate to the very pur-
pose the certification is designed to serve. Thus, while [section] 401(d) permits a
State to place conditions on a certification to ensure compliance of the 'applicant,'
those conditions must still be related to discharges." Id. at 726-27; see also Oregon
Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 852 n.17
(9th Cir. 1987) (concluding section 401 may not require a permit or certification
for nonpoint sources). Justice Thomas reasoned that section 401's scope is deline-
ated by the provisions the activity must comply with, all of which address dis-
charges. See PUD, 511 U.S. at 727.
The implications of the PUD decision are numerous but it is particularly im-
portant to determining the scope of a states' power in subjecting nonpoint source
pollution to section 401 review. See Ransel, supra, at 268-69 (analyzing implications
of PUD for federal permits, nonpoint source pollution, and water law and policy);
see also Dana Leonard, Note, PUD No. 1, Thomas, and the Future of Section 401 of the
Clean Water Act: An Expansion of State Regulation, 18J. LAND RESOURCE & ENvrL. L.
293, 308 (1998) (concluding Congress intended expansive application of section
401). PUD appears to stand for the proposition that in order for states to maintain
their water quality standards, they must be able to require activities causing
nonpoint source pollution to comply with conditions which make it possible to
meet water quality standards. See Ransel, supra, at 266 (remarking PUD court cor-
rectly interpreted term "discharge" in expansive manner). PUD expands the scope
of section 401 to cover any activity that would negatively impact water quality stan-
dards. See id. at 269-70 ("Because the Court made it clear that the states can act to
protect the physical and biological integrity of their waters, as well as impose con-
ditions based on specific numeric and chemical criteria, the states' authority would
seem to apply equally to nonpoint as well as to point source discharges from such
activities as grazing and timber practices, as long as a federal permit or license can
be said to be involved." ); Leonard, supra, at 308 (discussing Oregon Natural Desert
Association v. Thomas) and 309 (asserting PUD authorizes 401 certification of fed-
eral activities, thus, may authorize 401 certification of non-permitted activities).
For a critical discussion of the possible implications for nonpoint source regu-
lation and activities on federal land after the PUD decision, see Donahue, supra
note 8, at 217-18; Pifher, supra, at 19-29; Ransel, supra, at 268-83; Miles, supra note
4, at 206-09; see generally Leonard, supra.
Further, the Supreme Court's decision in PUD may have rendered the Ninth
Circuit's analysis of section 301 in ONRC invalid. The plaintiff in ONRC did not
sue to force activities permitted under NPDES provisions to comply with state
water quality standards. See id. at 848 (explaining defendant's argument ONRC
can only sue to enforce water quality standards related to NPDES permit provi-
sions). The ONRC court's holding, nonetheless, precluded enforcing additional
standards for permitted activities necessary to meet state water quality standards
which are unrelated to point sources. Cf id. at 849 (rejecting argument citizen suit
provision can be used to enforce water quality standards). The majority's decision
in PUD, however, interpreted section 301 as permitting additional means outside
NPDES conditions for ensuring federally permitted activities comply with other
state requirements, such as state water quality standards. See PUD, 511 U.S. at 712-
13. While not defining what additional means a state is authorized to enforce
under section 301 (b) (1)(C), the Court did expressly state that section 301 is not
limited to discharges. See id. at 713, 713 n.3. Assuming, arguendo, that the term
"discharge" only includes point sources of pollution, the decision in PUD leaves
open the possibility that nonpoint sources of pollution not meeting state limita-
tions could be subject to state conditions under section 301(b) (1) (C), a possibility
the ONRC court specifically rejected. The decision in PUD thus contradicts the
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3. The Ninth Circuit Split: Does the Term "Discharge" in CWA
Section 401 Include Nonpoint Sources of Pollution?
In 1996, two district courts within the Ninth Circuit specifically
addressed whether a discharge encompassing a point source was a
prerequisite for triggering section 401 review. 43 Both district courts
addressed, for the first time, whether nonpoint sources of pollution
fall within the statutory definition of discharge. 44 Looking to the
plain language of CWA, and CWA's legislative history, the two dis-
trict courts came to opposite conclusions. 45 The United States Dis-
Ninth Circuit's statutory analysis of section 301 in ONRC. For a subsequent Ninth
Circuit decision recognizing this impact of the PUD court's decision, see infra note
189.
43. See generally Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas (ONDA 1), 940 F.
Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996), revd sub nom. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck,
Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL 407711, at *1 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998); Idaho
Conservation League v. Caswell, No. CV 95-394-S-MHW, 1996 WL 938215, at *1 (D.
Idaho Aug. 12, 1996). For an in-depth discussion of the opposing legal arguments
addressing whether section 401 applies to nonpoint pollution sources from feder-
ally permitted activities, see Miles, supra note 4, at 209-228 (reviewing term "dis-
charge's" broad and narrow reading).
44. See ONDA 1, 940 F. Supp. at 1539 (noting issue is whether grazing is dis-
charge under section 401); Idaho Conservation, 1996 WL 938215, at *7-*10 (address-
ing whether section 401 applies to logging activities). The Idaho Conservation court
specifically noted that not only had the parties failed to cite any authority for their
respective opinions, but further, the court could not find any cases which were
directly on point "and thus, this issue appears to be a case of first impression."
Idaho Conservation, 1996 WL 938215, at *9. The ONDA I court, while not specifi-
cally stating they were addressing an issue of first impression, did not cite any au-
thority on point which analyzed the scope of the term "discharge" in section 401.
Cf Donahue, supra note 8, at 206 (highlighting lack of attention to section 401 and
stating, "Few if any reported cases have examined thoroughly the language of the
[Act] or considered systematically its relation to other [CWA] provisions [and]
[n]o reported case has expressly considered whether the section 401 certification
authority extends to nonpoint source pollution caused by federally permitted activ-
ities conducted on the public lands").
45. Compare ONDA I, 940 F. Supp. at 1541 (holding section 401 encompasses
nonpoint source pollution) with Idaho Conservation, 1996 WL 938215, at *9 (hold-
ing section 401 does not regulate nonpoint source pollution).
The language of section 401 (a) contemplates regulation of "any discharge."
See C.W.A. § 401(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a). For the statutory language of section
401 (a), see supra notes 28 & 38. Focusing on the word "includes" in CWA's defini-
tion of discharge, several commentators assert that discharge and "discharge of a
pollutant" are separate terms. See Donahue, supra note 8, at 230 (explaining Con-
gress's use of "means" in "discharge of pollutant," versus "includes" in "discharge,"
denotes different terms); see also Miles, supra note 4, at 212-25 (discussing different
approaches to interpreting term "discharge"). The only definition in section 502
which uses "includes" is the one for discharge, thus showing Congress intended to
include point sources, but not exclude other types of sources of pollution. See
Donahue, supra note 8, at 230 ("This plainly reveals that Congress intended 'dis-
charge' to be interpreted as including, but not limited to, point source discharges.").
In contrast, Congress used the word "means" in the definition of "discharge of a
pollutant." See id. This denotes Congress's intent for the term discharge to have
two separate usages, the broader of which is "discharge." See id; see also Miles, supra
1999] 459
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note 4, at 212 (highlighting arguments in favor of broad reading); cf In Re Per-
roton, 958 F.2d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[I]n statutes that contain statutory defi-
nition sections it is commonly understood that such definitions establish meaning
where the terms appear in that same Act." (citation omitted)). Indeed, the word
"includes" has unexpressed meaning, while the term "means" excludes any other
meaning not stated. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484 (1987) (construing
Congressional intent in definition of term "political propaganda," stating, "It is
axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of
that term"); United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998) ("When
. .. the meaning of a word is clearly explained in a statute, courts are not at liberty
to look beyond the statutory definition."); Pottgieser v. Kizer, 906 F.2d 1319, 1322
(9th Cir. 1990) (construing plain meaning of definition term "medical assistance")
(citing as support Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 & n.10 (1979) ("A defini-
tion which declares what a term 'means' . . . excludes any meaning that is not
stated.") overruled in part on other grounds)); see also North Carolina v. Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Comm'n, 112 F.3d 1175, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting definition
of discharge is inclusive in nature in holding resulting water reduction from dam
not discharge of a pollutant), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1036 (1998), and cert. denied by
Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 118 S. Ct. 1037
(1998); Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 757 F.2d
1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1985) (using principle word "includes" in statutory definitions
indicates term "is one of enlargement, not of limitation") (citations omitted), rev'd
on other grounds, 474 U.S. 9 (1985); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d
156, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (comparing operation of words "includes" and "means"
in statutory definitions, implying word "includes" is non-exclusive); Exxon Corp. v.
Lujan, 730 F. Supp. 1535, 1545 (D. Wyo. 1990) ("The use of the word 'includes'
rather than 'means' in a definition indicates that what follows is a nonexclusive list
which may be enlarged upon.").
Further, the language "any discharge" in section 401 was retained from the
version of FWPCA existing before the CWA Amendments. See Donahue, supra
note 8, at 232 (reviewing CWA's legislative history and concluding it "shows no
intent to require a point source discharge as a predicate for section 401 review");
Miles, supra note 4, at 216 (noting regulation prior to 1972 focused on water qual-
ity standards). The 1970 Water Quality Act, a precursor to CWA, did not make a
distinction between point and nonpoint sources of pollution. See Donahue, supra
note 8, at 232. Thus, the 1972 Amendments to the Water Quality Act (establishing
CWA) were not intended to limit section 401's scope. See id. (explaining because
section 401's regulation of "any discharge" "predates the adoption of the 'point
source' definition in the 1972 [CWA] Amendments, it goes without saying that
Congress was not contemplating 'point source discharges' when it wrote 'any dis-
charge' into the precursor of section 401" (internal citations omitted)). In sup-
port of her position, Donahue cited congressional debates on the Amendment of
section 401. See id. at 224 ("'All we ask is that activities that threaten to pollute the
environment be subjected to the examination of the ... State ... before the Fed-
eral license or permit be granted.") (citations omitted). She states that "the word
'pollutant' (as in 'discharge of a pollutant') appears nowhere in section 401" or in
legislative history discussing section 401. Id. at 231, 231 n.166. Lastly, policy sup-
ports this inclusive reading of the term "discharge" because it would allow states to
achieve CWA's goals. See Donahue, supra note 8, at 290 (highlighting cost-effec-
tiveness of subjecting nonpoint sources to 401 review); Miles, supra note 4, at 221
(discussing policy reasons for state regulation of nonpoint sources). For addi-
tional policy considerations supporting this proposition, see Donahue, supra note
8, at 289-98.
Reviewing the possible interpretations of the term "discharge," one commen-
tator, Alia Miles, set forth the arguments supporting a "narrower reading of the
term "discharge." See Miles, supra note 4, at 221-25. Miles points out that Con-
gress's intention was not necessarily to include all pollutants, including runoff, or
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trict Court for the District of Oregon held that the term "discharge"
is not limited to point sources of pollution. 46 In contrast, the
United States District Court for the District of Idaho held that sec-
tion 401 of CWA applies only to point source discharges.47 Resolu-
nonpoint sources in "discharge's" definition, but rather, to include only discharges
from point sources. See id. at 222 (pointing out "one can argue using the word 'dis-
charge' instead of the phrase 'discharge of pollutants' indicates that the provision
applies to discharge from a point source, but not of material listed as a pollutant in
the CWA"). Looking to all provision of the Act, it appears that Congress did not
use the term "runoff" and "discharge" synonymously, thus if Congress had in-
tended section 401 to apply to "runoff" they could have specified so as they did in
section 313. See id. (citing federal facilities provision which specifically regulates
both pollution sources). Further, not only do the provisions usually reference the
words "discharge" and "point source" together, but not the word "discharge" with
"nonpoint source," but Congress did not choose to change the language of section
401 in 1987 when they mandated a specific focus on nonpoint sources of pollu-
tion. See id. at 222-23 ("If section 401 was actually intended to apply to federal
permits for both point and nonpoint source activities, it seems likely that Congress
would have amended the provision to insure proper implementation.").
Lastly, the creation of a dual regulatory scheme supports the exclusion of
nonpoint sources from the ambit of section 401. See id. at 223-25 (elaborating on
possible "implementation problems" were section 401 applied to "any nonpoint
source activities which may result in a discharge"). However, Miles concludes that
"[o] n balance, the logic of the arguments for a broad reading are more persuasive
and true to the canons of statutory interpretation." Id. at 225 (reviewing argu-
ments for broad reading of term "discharge"). The fact that the discharge defini-
tion uses the word "includes," and the phrase "any discharge" in section 401
preceded CWA's 1972 Amendments, thus should be ascribed its plain meaning,
supports requiring section 401 certification which indicates a federally permitted
nonpoint source activity which may result in a discharge will not violate state water
quality standards. See id. Nonpoint sources are not specifically excluded from reg-
ulation by CWA sections other than sections 208 and 319, including section 401,
and nothing in CWA's scheme precludes a provision from regulating both sources
of pollution. See id. at 225-26.
For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's recognition provisions may regulate
both pollution sources, see supra note 69. For case law addressing the distinction
in use between the word "includes" and "means" within a statutory definition, see
supra note 38 (discussing ONRC); infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing ONDA I and Idaho Conservation); infra notes 50 (discussing National Wild-
life)& 56-58 (discussing United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc.) & 60
(discussing NDRC) & 62 (discussing North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission); infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (discussing ONDA I]).
46. See ONDA I, 940 F. Supp. at 1534 (determining "CWA's reference to any
'discharge' into navigable waters was not limited to point sources, and.., pollu-
tion of creek and river caused by cattle grazing constituted 'discharge' for which
state certification was required"). For the text of the ONDA IIcourt's holding, see
infra notes 96-97. For a detailed discussion of the ONDA I court's holding and
rationale, see infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
47. See Idaho Conservation, 1996 WL 938215, at *9 ("[I]t is evident that Section
401 only intended to encompass those projects which resulted in a "point source
discharge."); see also Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-
35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL 407711, at *1 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998) (overturning
ONDA 1), revg Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Or.
1996). In Idaho Conservation, the United States Forest Service (USFS) approved a
private company's proposal to build two roads through land located in the Clear-
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tion of this issue was left to the Ninth Circuit in ONDA II, the
subject of this Note.
water National Forest so the company could access its private land. See Idaho Con-
servation, 1996 WL 938215, at *1. These roads would allow access to land the
company, Plum Creek, intended to log. See id. The access roads would be located
near both banks of Walton Creek. See id. An environmental group, Idaho Conser-
vation League (ICL), sought declaratory and injunctive relief against USFS, its
management, and Plum Creek. See id. at *1. ICL alleged that the proposed activi-
ties would violate CWA because the activities would violate state water quality stan-
dards and impair the use of Walton Creek. See id at *2. Specifically, ICL alleged
that USFS violated CWA by failing to obtain state certification under section 401
before approving the proposal. See id. at *8. USFS argued that section 401 does
not apply to construction of a forest logging road because logging activities are not
point sources of pollution. See id. at *7-*8.
The district court held that logging activities are nonpoint pollution sources,
and that section 401 did not apply to any nonpoint sources, including Plum
Creek's proposed activities. See id. at *9. The Idaho Conservation court recognized
that section 401 (a) was adopted in 1970 prior to the enactment of the current
version of CWA. See id. at *8 (explaining section 401 (a) originated as section
21(b) of Water Quality Improvement Act (WQIA)). Although CWA retains
WQIA's prohibition against "any discharge," by "any applicant," for a federal li-
cense, the term "discharge" was not defined by WQA. See id. Looking to the plain
language of CWA, the Idaho Conservation court noted that the definition of dis-
charge included "discharge of a pollutant." See id. The district court, focusing
exclusively on the language of "discharge of a pollutant," which specifically re-
quires that the pollution emanate from a point source, concluded, "Thus, it is
evident that Section 401 only intended to encompass those projects which resulted
in a 'point source discharge.'" Id. at *9.
The district court looked to the legislative history and Amendments in sup-
port of its decision. The Idaho Conservation court noted that two regulatory
schemes were established, one addressing point source pollution, and the other
nonpoint pollution. See id. at *9 (citing C.W.A. § 208, 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (describing
areawide waste treatment management), C.W.A. § 319, 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (manag-
ing nonpoint sources)). The Idaho Conservation court construed this regulatory
scheme to mean Congress intended for construction of forest roads to be
nonpoint sources of pollution, "and therefore [ ] not subject to the certification
requirement of Section 401." Id. The district court found further support for its
position based on CWA section 319 being added pursuant to CWA's 1987 Amend-
ments, which specifically addressed nonpoint source pollution. See id. (citing
C.W.A. § 319, 33 U.S.C. § 1329).
Lastly, the Idaho Conservation court distinguished the Supreme Court's ruling
in PUD No. 1 ofJefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology. See id. at *10. In
PUD, the parties not only agreed that the hydroelectric power plant project re-
quired section 401 certification, but "it was undisputed that the project would re-
sult in the discharge of pollutants . . . .Thus, [PLD] does not stand for the
proposition that all nonpoint sources are subject to Section 401 certification." Id.
The district court appears to have found an implied assertion in PUD that the
Court proceeded in its analysis because there were discharges, thus not necessitating
the discussion of whether the activities were in fact discharges. Cf id. (presuming
discharge of water at end of tailrace in PUD was discharge of pollutant).
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B. Statutory Language
1. Discharge Defined
CWA defines the term "discharge" in two ways: (1) as it stands
alone and (2) in conjunction with a particular emission.48 The Act
states, "'discharge' when used without qualification includes a dis-
charge of a pollutant, and a discharge of pollutants. '49 Discharge
of a pollutant or pollutants "means (A) any addition of any pollutant
to navigable waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any
pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from
any point source other than a vessel or other floating craft. 50
48. Compare C.W.A. § 502(16), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16) (defining term "dis-
charge") with C.W.A. § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (defining term "discharge of
a pollutant").
49. C.W.A. § 502(16), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16) (emphasis added). For case law
addressing judicial interpretation of the terms "discharge" and "discharge of a pol-
lutant," see infra notes 43-47 & 59-63 & 99-143 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of "includes" operation in a statutory definition, see supra notes 45 & 50 &
60.
50. C.W.A. § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (emphasis added). The Act also
defines key terms within this definition. Navigable waters means "the waters of the
United States, including territorial seas." Pollutant "means dredged soil, solid
waste . . . biological materials . . .and agricultural waste discharged into water."
C.W.A. § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). Agricultural pollution includes "sedimenta-
tion; animal wastes; fertilizers; pesticides, fungicides and herbicides; forest and
crop residues; agricultural processing wastes; and inorganic salts and minerals." S.
REP. No. 92-414, at 3668 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3759. A dis-
charge "includes a discharge of a pollutant, and a discharge of pollutants: unless
otherwise qualified in meaning." C.W.A. § 502(16), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16) (empha-
sis added). For an in-depth analysis in construing the terms "navigable waters" and
.pollutant," see generally Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990); National
Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (1982).
The D.C. Circuit had occasion to interpret the term "discharge of a pollutant"
in National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693
F.2d 156, 161 (1982). The issue before the D.C. Circuit was whether dam induced
water quality changes were in fact "discharges of a pollutant." Id. In this case,
Wildlife Federation and the state of Missouri (collectively WF) requested a declara-
tion that EPA must regulate dams under CWA section 402(a). See id. at 161. EPA
and various electric utilities and water agencies (collectively EPA) appealed the
district court decision ordering EPA to require dam operators to obtain NPDES
permits. See id. EPA argued that dams were not required to be regulated under
NPDES. See id. The crux of the issue was the scope of the term "discharge of a
pollutant" in section 402(a). See id. EPA argued for a narrow reading of the term
in this case. See id.
First, the D.C. Circuit clarified the language of CWA they must interpret. See
id. at 164-65. Quoting.section 402(a), they observed that this section gives EPA
discretion to issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant. See id. Further, they
noted that pursuant to section 301 (a), the discharge of a pollutant is illegal with-
out an NPDES permit. See id. (quoting C.W.A. § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)).
The National Wildlife court referenced the statutory definition of the term "dis-
charge of a pollutant" and concluded, "Thus, for dams to require NPDES permits,
five elements must be present: (1) a pollutant must be (2) added (3) to navigable
waters (4) from (5) a point source." Id. The parties conceded that the dam could be
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a point source, and that the discharge would occur in navigable waters. See id. The
elements in dispute narrowed the issue to whether pollutants, low dissolved oxygen,
cold, and supersaturation, had been added, from the dam. See id. The National Wild-
life court did not address whether the "discharge of a pollutant" would emanate
from a point source. Cf id. (declining to focus analysis on terms "point source" or
'navigable waters").
Second, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the arguments before them. See id. WF ar-
gued that a pollutant results when there is any change in water quality, and that
the release of these changed waters, which go from the reservoir through a pipe
into a downstream river, constitutes an addition of a pollutant from a point
source. See id. EPA did concede that water quality changes from dams are pollu-
tion, but argued that low dissolved oxygen, cold, and supersaturation are not "pol-
lutants" as defined by the Act. See id. (referencing CWA's definition of
"pollutant"). Further, an "addition" requires the pollutant to come "from the
outside world," not pass through a dam from one waterbody to another as in this
case. Id. The National Wildlife court concluded that the water quality changes in
question, "[1] ow dissolved oxygen, cold, and supersaturation, do not fall within the
statutory lists of pollutants ... [and are] water conditions not substances added to
water," further noting heat is the only water condition specified in "discharge of a
pollutant's" definition. Id. at 171.
In reaching this conclusion, the D.C. Circuit determined as a threshold issue
how much deference was due EPA's interpretation because the language of the
Act and legislative history could support either argument before them, and con-
cluded that, in this case, EPA's interpretation "deserve[d] great deference." See id.
at 166-70. The National Wildlife court based their conclusion in part on Congress's
express intent that EPA have "at least some power to define the specific terms
'point source' and 'pollutant.'" Id. at 167. In so holding, the D.C. Circuit rejected
WF's argument EPA's narrow interpretation of the terms "pollutant" and "addi-
tion" in this case was contrary to their interpretation of these same terms in other
contexts. See id. at 168 ("We, however, find no inconsistency in EPA's taking a
broad view of its statutory mandate in some situations and a narrower view here,
even though the same statutory terms are involved.").
Lastly, the D.C. Circuit analyzed whether EPA's interpretation of the statute
was reasonable. See id. at 170-83. The National Wildlife court set forth the statutory
construction they would follow to resolve this issue: (1) an analysis of the plain
language of the statute; and (2) analysis of legislative history. See id. at 171. The
National Wildlife court specifically noted that the Supreme Court mandates that
interpretation of CWA must include reference to the legislative history to deter-
mine the purpose and policy of the Act. See id. (citations omitted).
Turning first to whether low dissolved oxygen, cold, and supersaturation fall
within the definition of "pollutant," the National Wildlife court focused on how the
term "means" within a statutory definition operates. See id. at 171-72. The National
Wildlife court observed that CWA provides a statutory definition for both the terms
"pollution" and "pollutant." See id. (discussing distinction between these two
terms). The D.C. Circuit noted that while the term "pollutant," prior to 1972, had
used the word "means," its definition was not exclusive because the phrase "but is
not limited to" followed the word "means." Cf id. at 173 (concluding ambiguity in
definitional language required analysis of legislative history to resolve issue). In a
footnote, the National Wildlife court gave the terms "point source," "oil," and "dis-
charge" from CWA section 311, as terms which use the "looser phrase" includes.
Cf id. at 172 n.49 (providing examples of terms using language "means... but not
limited to") (quoting C.W.A. § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (defining point
source); C.W.A. § 311(a) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (a) (1) (defining term "oil"); C.W.A.
§ 311(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2) (defining term "discharge"))). The words
"but is not limited to," however, was removed from the definition of the term "pol-
lutant" in 1972. See id. at 173 (stating change to definition supported not equating
terms "pollutant" and "pollution"). The National Wildlife court, stated that, "[a] s a
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general rule, "'[a] definition which declares what a term 'means' . . . excludes any
meaning that is not stated.""' Id. at 172 (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 392 n. 10 (quoting C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.07
(4th ed. Supp. 1982))). WF argued that, logically, the water changes must be pol-
lutants if they meet the statutory definition of "pollution" under CWA. See id. The
National Wildlife court, however, rejected this argument, stating that the pollution
in question not only was not specifically listed in the 1972 definition of "pollutant,"
but that the most recent "wording of [section] 506(6) [made them] cautious in
adding new terms to the definition [because] Congress used restrictive phrasing-
'[t]he term "pollutant" means dredged spoil, [etc.]'-rather than the looser phrase
'includes,' used elsewhere in the Act." Id.
Thus, the D.C. Circuit determined that the plain language did not clearly sup-
port WF's proposition and, thus, turned to the legislative history to aid in deter-
mining the definitional term's scope. Cf id. at 172, 172 n.50 (distinguishing Tenth
Circuit's decision in Earth Sciences). They concluded that the legislative history sup-
ported their holding that EPA's interpretation was reasonable. See id. at 172. The
D.C. Circuit reasoned that Congress's separate use of these two terms must be
presumed to be intentional, particularly when the terms were given their own dis-
crete definitions. See id. (citations omitted). Further, the National Wildlife court
noted that Congress did not specifically require permits for dam induced pollu-
tion, as it did for industrial waste, and did not evidence any intent to equate the
broader term "pollution" with the narrower term "pollutant." See id. at 172-73.
Indeed, the National Wildlife court noted that Congress would have no need of a
definition section if this were the case. See id. at 173 (explaining although Con-
gress did not elaborate on how inclusive "pollutant" should be, definitional lan-
guage, particularly section 502, has "specific and technical meaning" which must
be carefully considered). The D.C. Circuit observed that the language of the Act
and the legislative history were not "entirely consistent." See id. Thus, Congress
did not clearly intend to consider pollution from dams as pollutants for purposes
of the Act, and as EPA's interpretation was reasonable, the D.C. Circuit concluded
that it must defer to EPA's determination of what constitutes a pollutant. See id. at
173. The court found support for this deference in the reasonableness of EPA's
interpretation and Congress's intent that EPA be given power to interpret defini-
tions under CWA, including the term "pollutant." See id. at 174.
Next, the National Wildlife court examined what an "addition" of a pollutant
"from," constituting a "discharge of a pollutant," is. See id. The term "addition" is
not defined by the Act. See id. WF argued that the redepositing of water through
the pipes from the dam constitute an addition from a point source. See id. In
contrast, EPA asserted that an addition only occurs the first time a pollutant enters
the water, not when it is simply moved from one body of water to another. See id.
at 174-75. The National Wildlife court further noted that EPA would regulate a
point source which does not come "from" a point source, but "merely passes
through it from land to navigable water." Id. at 175 n.58. They observed that this
position was inconsistent with EPA's existing regulation. See id. (citing EPA regula-
tion 40 C.F.R. section 122.3(1981) which regulates surface runoff collected and
channeled by as a point source). The D.C. Circuit concluded, however, that while
"the language of the statute permits either construction," because Congress gave
EPA authority to define two terms that are integral to section 402, point source
and pollutant, that "it [is] likely that Congress would have given EPA similar discre-
tion to define 'addition' had it expected the meaning of the term to be disputed."
Id. at 175. Thus, the court deferred to EPA's interpretation which they found to
be reasonable. See id.
The National Wildlife court also addressed WF's argument that a broad reading
of the term "addition" and "pollutant," placing dams under NPDES regulation, was
appropriate due to Congress's view that this program was its preferred water pollu-
tion control method. See id. However, the D.C. Circuit rejected this broader read-
ing, stating "it does not appear that Congress wanted to apply the NPDES system
35
Frankino: The Ninth Circuit's Decision in Oregon Natural Desert Association
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
466 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. X: p. 431
Under this definition, a pollutant from surface runoff will be con-
sidered discharged if it is "collected or channeled by man. ' 51 The
discharge of a pollutant without a permit that certifies the dis-
charge is in compliance with water quality regulations violates
CWVA. 52
2. Point and Nonpoint Sources Defined
a. CWA
The Act categorizes pollution into either nonpoint or point
sources.53 The Act defines a point source as:
[Any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including
but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,
well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concen-
trated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other float-
ing craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.
wherever feasible. Had it wanted to do so, it could easily have chosen suitable
language, e.g., 'all pollution [as opposed to the narrower term "pollutant"] re-
leased through a point source.' Instead, as we have seen, the NPDES system was
limited to 'addition' of 'pollutants' 'from' a point source." Id. at 176. Reviewing
the 1970, 1977 and 1987 Amendments' legislative history, the D.C. Circuit ac-
knowledged that nonpoint and point sources of pollution are regulated separately
under the Act, preferring to leave regulation of nonpoint sources to the states
through state pollution control programs. See id. at 175-77. The National Wildlife
court nonetheless asserted that Congress also intended to leave certain pollution
problems to the states "to give the states a chance to show that they could do the
job." Id. at 176. Thus, the National Wildlife court held that EPA's choice not to
regulate dam pollution under the NPDES permit program was a reasonable one.
See id. at 176-83 (determining EPA's interpretation also did not contravene CWA's
purpose and Congress's policy considerations in enacting CWA).
51. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. EPA is responsible for setting the guidelines for
issuance of NPDES permits and has elaborated on the permissible characteristics
of what constitutes a discharge. See C.W.A. § 402(a) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1).
Thus, EPA's "definition includes additions of pollutants into waters of the United
States from: surface runoff which is collected or channeled by man." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.
(emphasis added). For judicial decisions interpreting the meaning of the phrase
"collected or channeled by man," see infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
52. See C.W.A. § 402(a) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (a) (1). For the relevant statutory
language of section 401(a) (1), see supra notes 28 & 38.
53. See Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834
F.2d 842, 849, 849 n.12 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting distinction in regulation of two
pollution sources); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 176 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) ("In 1972, Congress made a clear and precise distinction between point
sources, which would be subject to direct Federal regulation, and nonpoint
sources, control of which was specifically reserved to State and local governments
through the Section 208 process."); Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp.
623, 630 n.Il (D.R.I. 1990) (noting Congress distinguished between nonpoint and
point sources of pollution in 1972 CWA Amendments (quoting ONRC, 834 F.2d at
849)).
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This term does not include agricultural stormwater dis-
charges and return flows from irrigated agriculture. 54
CWA does not provide a specific definition of nonpoint source,
although the term is mentioned in its provisions.
55
b. Legislative history
The legislative history of CWA suggests that a nonpoint source
is "one that does not confine its polluting discharge to one fairly
specific outlet, such as a sewer pipe, a drainage ditch, or a con-
duit. '56 Specifically, Congress noted that "agricultural runoff" falls
within the purview of this definition.5 7 In addition, other authori-
54. C.W.A. § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., C.W.A. § 208(b) (2) (f), 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(f) (stating re-
quirement for creating areawide waste treatment management plans include "a
process to (i) identify, if appropriate, agriculturally and silviculturally related
nonpoint sources of pollution, including ... runoff from manure disposal areas,
and from land used for livestock and crop production"); CWA § 402(1) (2), 33
U.S.C. § 1342(1)(2) (exempting several types of stormwater runoff from NPDES
permit requirements); CWA § 313 (a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2) (requiring fed-
eral entities "engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the dis-
charge or runoff of pollutants" to comply with state water quality standards); see
also Frank, supra note 6, at 1287 & n.149 (noting, although "nonpoint sources are
referred to in sections [of CWA] .... [a]pparently, Congress felt that the charac-
ter of nonpoint sources was sufficiently vague and amorphous as to render any
attempt to define the term futile"); Zaring, supra note 8, at 516 (stating CWA does
not define nonpoint pollution sources "though phrase often appears in its text").
For example, in discussing the allotments of funds to states regulating nonpoint
source pollution, section 319 requires the Federal Government to consider giving
grants to states "which have implemented or are proposing to implement manage-
ment programs which will - (A) control particularly difficult or serious nonpoint
source pollution problems, including, but not limited to, problems resulting from
mining activities." C.W.A. § 319(h)(5)-(h)(5)(A), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1329(h)(5)-1329
(h) (5) (A).
56. See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 3668 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3760 (explaining that pollution flowing from agricultural endeavors is from
nonpoint sources); see also Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F.Supp.
1168, 1173 (D. Mont. 1995) (defining nonpoint source pollution as "uncollected
runoff water which is difficult to ascribe to single polluter" (citing Trustees for
Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984)); cf. Environmental Protection
Agency, Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7854 (1991) (noting nonpoint
source pollution "is characterized by the widespread nature of its sources"). For
EPA's characterization of nonpoint sources, and nonpoint source pollution, see
supra note 6 & 8.
57. S. REP. No. 92-414, at 3668 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3676. This Amendment emphasized the need for states to develop procedures
under areawide waste treatment management programs to control "agricultural
runoff, surface and underground mine runoff, construction runoff, and disposal
of pollutants on land or in excavations." See id. at 3676 (recognizing difficulty in
controlling pollution from nonpoint sources "such as agricultural runoff' and
need for more effective ways of regulating such pollution). "Agricultural runoff"
falls within the definition of nonpoint sources. See id. at 3676. Senator Bob Dole
noted that the Act set out to address the pollution from agriculture problems in
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ties have asserted that activities such as livestock grazing fall within
the definition of nonpoint sources. 58
C. Case law
1. What Comprises a Discharge?
CWA's definition of the term "discharge" includes a "discharge
of a pollutant."59 In applying and interpreting the definition of the
term "discharge" under section 401, many courts focus exclusively
on the requirements set forth in the definition of the term "dis-
charge of a pollutant. '60 Thus, discharge for purposes of this sec-
particular, the pollution which primarily comes from nonpoint sources. See id. at
3759-60. Senator Dole stated,"a major new thrust of this bill is in the field of agri-
cultural pollution. Most of the problems of agricultural pollution deal with non-
point sources." Id; see also Environmental Protection Agency, Pollution Prevention
Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7854 (1991) ("Agricultural pollution, like other types of
nonpoint sources pollution, is characterized by the widespread nature of its
sources."). For the Ninth Circuit's characterization of nonpoint sources and
nonpoint source pollution, see infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. Forjudi-
cial decisions distinguishing between point and nonpoint sources, see infra notes
64-85 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 6, at 1270 ("Riparian areas scourged by
'nonpoint pollution sources,' in this case livestock grazing, merit federal statutory
protection.") (citation omitted).
59. See C.W.A. § 502(16), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16). For the text of section 502's
discharge definition, see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist.,
13 F.3d 305, 309 (9th Cir. 1993) (establishing liability under CWA includes ele-
ment of "discharging a pollutant"), cert. denied sub nom. Members of Cal. Reg'l
Water Quality Control Bd. v. Committee to Save Mokelumne River, 513 U.S. 873
(1994); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir.
1990) (concluding term "discharge" only references point sources); Rybachek v.
EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1990) (defining discharge as "any 'addition[ ]
to navigable waters from any point source"'); Oregon Natural Resources Council v.
United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 848-50 (9th Cir. 1987) (construing CWA
section 301); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 171 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (analyzing scope of terms "pollutant" and "addition" in "discharge of a pol-
lutant" definition); Idaho Conservation League v. Caswell, No. CV 95-394-S-MHW,
1996 WL 938215, at *9-*10 (D. Idaho Aug. 12, 1996) focusing on term "discharge
of pollutant" in holding discharges only emanate from point sources); see also
North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 112 F.3d 1175, 1187 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (declining to interpret CWA section 502 as offering specific definition
of discharge). But see generally Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F.
Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996) (focusing on definition of term "discharge" in holding
discharges emanate from both point and nonpoint sources of pollution), rev'd sub
nom. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL
407711, at *1 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998).
For example, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA (NRDC), the Ninth
Circuit concluded that CWA's establishment of NPDES, limiting discharges, ap-
plied to point source discharges only, because discharges are defined by CWA as
"discharges of pollutants." 915 F.2d at 1316. The NRDC court supported its con-
clusion by reference to the language of the Act. Section 301 (a) of CWA, while
appearing to ban all discharges wholesale, in reality "sounded bolder than it really
38
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol10/iss2/5
OREGON NATURAL DESERT ASSOCIATION
tion requires five elements: "(1) a pollutant must be (2) added (3) to
navigable waters (4) from (5) a point source."'6 1 Judicial interpretation
of these elements often vary. For example, some courts interpret
discharge as requiring the addition of something external to the
water, while others allow merely an alteration of the water.6 2 Re-
was." Id. at 1316; see also C.W.A. § 301 (a), 33 U.S.C. § 301 (a) ("Except in compli-
ance with this section and [other provisions] of this title, the discharge of any
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful."). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
definition of "discharge of any pollutant" in section 301(a) excluded nonpoint
sources by reference to section 502(12), defining "discharge of a pollutant." See
NRDC, 915 F.2d at 1316. The circuit court stated, "[t]he term 'discharge of any
pollutant' was a statutorily defined term meaning, 'any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source."' Id. (quoting C.W.A. § 502(12), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12)). The NRDC court further justified its rationale by noting that
nonpoint sources were addressed by another provision of the Act which did not
limit emissions but offered incentives to polluters to reduce nonpoint source pollu-
tion. See id. at 1316 n.3. (citing C.W.A. § 208, 33 U.S.C. § 1288).
Indeed, section 502 is a guideline as to what could constitute a discharge. See
North Carolina, 112 F.3d at 1187 ("That section does not provide an express defini-
tion of the term 'discharge' but rather provides a statement of inclusion .... ."). In
North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the D.C. Circuit concluded
that the definition of discharge required the addition of a pollutant and held that
withdrawal of water from a lake is not a discharge under section 401 of CWA. See
id. at 1187-88 ("Obviously, the withdrawal of water.., will add nothing .... ). The
North Carolina court reasoned that discharge was defined by reference to the action
of "discharging of a pollutant." See id. at 1187. Turning to the definition of "dis-
charge of a pollutant," the D.C. Circuit further concluded that the wording "any
addition of a pollutant" is a threshold requirement to meet the meaning of dis-
charge contemplated by Congress. See id. at 1187, 1187-88 n.4. In conclusion, the
D.C. Circuit stated that "if 'discharge of a pollutant' requires addition, then the
inclusive understanding of 'discharge' also requires an addition." Id. at 1187-88
n.4.
61. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982); cf
United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 645 (2d Cir. 1992) (constru-
ing definition to show four elements: "added," "pollutant," "to navigable waters,"
"from any point source"), cert. denied by United States v. Villegas, 512 U.S. 1245
(1994). The number of elements to be analyzed under the term "discharge" may
vary even within the same circuit. For example, within the Ninth Circuit, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found five elements while the District Court of
Montana has divided discharge into four elements. Compare Committee to Save
Mokelumne River, 13 F.3d at 308 (establishing violation requires proof "that defend-
ants (1) discharged, i.e., added (2) a pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from (5)
a point source.") (citing National Wildlife, 693 F.2d at 165) with Beartooth Alliance
v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 1172-73 (D. Mont. 1995) (dividing dis-
charge into four elements: added, pollutant, to navigable waters, from a point
source).
62. Compare PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology,
511 U.S. 700, 725 (1994) (Thomas,J., dissenting) (disagreeing reduction in stream
flow constitutes discharge) and National Wildlife, 693 F.2d at 175 (deferring to
EPA's assertion "discharge" requires addition of substances) and North Carolina,
112 F.3d at 1187 n. 4 (focusing on exact wording of statute in construing defini-
tion of discharge to require addition) and Save Our Community v. EPA, 971 F.2d
1155, 1167 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding draining of wetlands not "per se" discharge of
effluent) with PUD, 511 U.S. at 725 (focusing on pollutant emanating from tailpipe
not whether pollutant was external) and Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1285
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(9th Cir. 1990) (holding pollution from placer mines and redepositing of pollu-
tants are additions to water) and United States v. M.C.C. of Fla., Inc., 772 F.2d
1501, 1506 (11 th Cir. 1985) (holding redeposit of sediment was addition of pollu-
tant); and Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding
pollution from placer mines was from point source) and Avoyelles Sportsmen's
League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897. 923 (5th Cir. 1983) (concluding term "rede-
posit" was encompassed by "addition" in "discharge" definition).
For example, in Save Our Community v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency(SOC), the Fifth Circuit held that the withdrawing of water from a pond did
not meet the definition of discharge under CWA. 971 F.2d 1155, 1165 (5th Cir.
1992). In SOC, a private company, Trinity Valley Reclamation, Inc. (Trinity), pro-
posed to drain several ponds in order to expand a landfill, using a mechanical
pump. See id. at 1158. The Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), EPA, and the Fish
and Wildlife Service determined that Trinity did not need a permit because the
draining of water would not "discharge a pollutant." See id. at 1158 n.6. Appel-
lants, collectively SOC, sued Trinity seeking a preliminary injunction and a declar-
atory judgment "that Trinity violated [CWA] by failing to obtain a permit pursuant
to section 404 of the Act before starting to drain the ponds." Id. at 1157 (internal
citation omitted). SOC claimed that draining the ponds would cause a "discharge
of a pollutant," thus, the appellees violated CWA by failing to obtain a permit. See
id. Section 404 requires a permit for activities that discharge dredge and fill mate-
rial. See C.W.A. § 404(a),33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). The appellants further asserted that
the Corps and EPA erred in failing to require a permit because draining ponds is
an activity regulated by CWA. See SOC, 971 F.2d at 1157.
The district court held that the draining activity required a permit as a matter
of law and issued a permanent injunction. See id. The district court declined to
address whether a discharge had occurred, andjustified its decision by focusing on
the purpose of the statute. See id. at 1159. The district court reasoned that the
activity could not be allowed because draining the pond would destroy the wet-
lands by eliminating the water, soil and surrounding vegetation. See id. at 1158 n.5.
Thus, allowing the activity would "be a direct subterfuge of section 404." Id. at
1159.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that a discharge required a discharge, i.e.
an addition, to a navigable water. See id. at 1163. The SOC court rejected the
district court opinion and remanded the case because the district court failed to
address whether an unpermitted discharge had occurred. See id. at 1167-68. The
Fifth Circuit found support for its position in the Act's language, stating that it was
clear that "[t]he existence [sic] of a discharge is critical." Id. at 1163.
The Fifth Circuit addressed whether the removal of water was a discharge re-
quiring a permit. See id. at 1165. Noting that the specific issue of whether draining
water from wetlands constitutes a discharge had never been decided by the court,
the SOC court concluded that draining activity was not "per se" a discharge of a
pollutant. See id. at 1165, 1167. Recognizing that precedent established that the
redepositing of polluted waters could constitute a discharge, the Fifth Circuit re-
manded to determine whether the activity would redeposit the materials drained
from the wetlands, and thus require a permit. See id. at 1168.
The District of Columbia Circuit addressed whether the withdrawal of water
constituted a "discharge of a pollutant" in North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 112 F.3d 1175, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In North Carolina, the Corps
issued the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia a permit to build a pipeline and dam. See
id. at 1175. Construction of the pipeline and dam would result in the discharge of
a pollutant, sediment. See id. at 1181. Upon completion, the pipeline would with-
draw 60 million gallons of water a day from Lake Gaston in order to supply the city
with daily water, and generate electricity. See id. at 1180. Lake Gaston is located in
two states, Virginia and North Carolina. See id. While the reduction of water flow
would affect the water in both states, the sediment from construction would only
occur in Virginia. See id. The water utilized for generation of electricity would,
[Vol. X: p. 431
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gardless, the term "discharge" does not traditionally include
nonpoint sources of pollution.63 Thus, the most controversial of
the elements is what constitutes a point source for purposes of de-
termining a discharge under section 401.
2. Distinguishing Between Point and Nonpoint Sources of
Pollution
While CWA gives a list of those sources considered point
sources, it is not exhaustive. 64 Courts, therefore, often set the pa-
however, be redeposited into waters within North Carolina's boundaries. See id. at
1181.
The Corps required Virginia Beach to obtain a state water quality certification
from the state of Virginia pursuant to section 401 of CWA for the discharge of
sediment, and then issued a section 404 permit. See id. Virginia Electric Power
Company (VEPCO) subsequently requested the dredge and fill permit be
amended to allow the withdrawal of water. See id. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (Commission) overseeing the power project, determined that a state
water quality certification was not required from the state of North Carolina be-
cause no discharge resulted from the redepositing of water. See id. at 1175, 1182.
North Carolina petitioned the Commission for review, arguing that a discharge
occurred from the dam turbines when electrical generation deposited water in
North Carolina. See id. at 1175, 1186. The Commission rejected the claim. See id.
at 1182.
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the project would only
result in a discharge of sediment from construction in the state of Virginia. See id.
at 1187. Addressing the operation of the dam upon completion, the North Carolina
court concluded that "neither the withdrawal of water... nor the reduction in the
volume of water passing through the dam turbines 'results in a discharge' for pur-
poses of Section 401(a)(1)." Id. at 1187. Looking to the Act's plain language, the
District of Columbia Circuit noted that section 401 (a) (1) does not expressly define
discharge "but rather provides a statement of inclusion, . . . [particularly] 'dis-
charge of a pollutant"' which requires "'any addition of any pollutant."' Id. at
1187 (quoting C.W.A. §§ 502 (12), (16), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(12),(16)). The North
Carolina court reasoned that the withdrawal of the water and subsequent release
from the dam turbines would not add anything to Lake Gaston and, further, con-
cluded, "the existence of certification rights under Section 401 (a) (1) does not de-
pend on whether a discharge is 'altered."' Id. at 1188. The court in North Carolina
distinguished PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, not-
ing the Supreme Court did not address the definition of discharge or indicate that
an alteration of water from a dam was a discharge requiring certification under
section 401(a)(1). See id. at 1188.
63. See, e.g., Idaho Conservation League v. Caswell, No. CV 95-394-S-MHW,
1996 WL 938215, at *9 (D. Idaho Aug. 12, 1996) (holding section 401 does not
address nonpoint sources). But see Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F.
Supp. 1534, 1541 (D. Or. 1996) (holding term "discharge" encompasses nonpoint
sources), rev'd sub nom. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065,
97-35112, 1998 WL 407711, at *1 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998). For a discussion of the
facts and court analysis in Idaho Conservation, see supra note 47 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the facts and court rationale in ONDA I, see infra notes 99-
106 and accompanying text.
64. See C.W.A. § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). This list includes "pipe,
ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, con-
centrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft." Id. For the
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rameters of what constitutes a "discernable, confined and discrete
conveyance." 65 The traditional view of point source encompasses
pollutants discharging from industrial equipment, which are easily
identifiable, 66 such as "a pipe spewing wastes into a body of
water. '67 In contrast, nonpoint source pollution is water pollution
which is not from a discrete conveyance. 68 Thus, when courts deter-
mine that pollution does not emanate from a point source, they
conclude by default that the pollution emanates from a nonpoint
source.
69
statutory definition of the term "point source," see supra note 54 and accompany-
ing text.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 646 (2d Cir.
1993) (addressing examples in point source definition, stating, "Although by its
terms the definition of 'point source' is nonexclusive, the words used to define the
term and the examples given . . . evoke images of physical structures and instru-
mentalities that systematically act as a means of conveying pollutants from an in-
dustrial source to navigable waterways"), cert. denied by United States v. Villegas, 512
U.S. 1245 (1994); see also id. at 651 (Oakes, J., dissenting) (stating, "the classic
point source is something like a pipe").
67. Frank, supra note 6, at 1287.
68. See, e.g., Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Lyng, 882 F.2d 1417, 1424
n.8 (9th Cir. 1989) (describing nonpoint sources other than agricultural and silvi-
cultural activities).
69. See RODGERS, supra note 10, at 303 (1993) (discussing 1972 CWA Amend-
ments, stating, "Conceivably, sources satisfying this end-of-pipe vision were point
sources; everything else was a nonpoint source"); Gould, supra note 8, at 472 (stat-
ing CWA "does not define 'nonpoint source,' but theoretically this would include
any water pollution not caused by a point source"); cf, e.g., Lyng, 882 F.2d at 1424,
1424 n.8 (defining nonpoint source pollution as water pollution which is not from
discrete conveyances, such as "runoff from fields, forests, mining and construction
activities"); Oregon Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Forest
Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 849 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting nonpoint source pollution is
not specifically defined by CWA "but is pollution that does not result from the
'discharge' or 'addition' of pollutants from a point source"). Nonpoint source
pollution is diffuse, not "'result[ing] from a discharge at a specific, single location
(such as a single pipe) but generally results from land runoff, precipitation, atmos-
pheric deposition, or percolation."' Gould, supra note 8, at 472 (quoting Office of
Water, EPA, Nonpoint Source Guidance 3 (1987)); see also Conway, supra note 8, at 87
(defining nonpoint source pollution as pollution which "occurs when water runs
over land or through the ground, picks up pollutants, and deposits them in surface
waters or groundwater (citing EPA, Final Report on the Federal/State/Local Nonpoint
Source Task Force and Recommended National Nonpoint Source Policy 2 (1985))). For
EPA's definition of nonpoint source, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
For example, the Ninth Circuit has generally considered runoff to be a
nonpoint source of pollution which usually results from agricultural, silvicultural,
mining and construction activities. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA,
915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990) (giving "runoff of pesticides from farmlands"
as example of nonpoint source pollution); Lyng, 882 F.2d at 1424 n.8 (giving run-
off from fields, forests, mining and construction activity as examples of nonpoint
source pollution); ONRC, 834 F.2d at 849 n.9 (giving irrigated agriculture and silvi-
cultural activities as examples of nonpoint sources of pollution) (citing Trustees
for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also O'Aha'ino v. Galiher,
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28 F. Supp.2d 1258, 1261 (D. Haw. 1998) (concluding point source agricultural
exception included farming roads). But see Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass'n,
Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1321 (D. Or. 1997) (conclud-
ing unlined brine pond was point source because "discharger collected the dis-
charge material prior to the discharge," stating, "The fact that those pollutants
now migrate through dirt with the help of.. . rain water and gravity... does not
change the old brine pit's status") (citing as support Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at
549 (defining point source broadly and emphasizing distinction between point
and nonpoint source seen in manner discharged); Beartooth Alliance v. Crown
Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 1173 (D. Mont. 1995) (holding uncollected runoff
from unidentifiable source is nonpoint source of pollution)); Beartooth, 904 F.
Supp. at 1173-74 (concluding mining drainage pits were point sources because
polluter was identifiable). The Ninth Circuit has specifically characterized a
nonpoint source as "any source of water pollution or pollutants not associated with
a discrete conveyance." Lyng, 882 F.2d at 1424 n.8 (citing W. RODGERS, Environmen-
tal Law, 375 (1977)); see also O'Aha'ino, 28 F. Supp.2d at 1261 (concluding farming
roads are nonpoint sources of pollution) (quoting Lyng, 882 F.2d at 1424 n.8)); cf.
also Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at 1321 (defining point source as "any discernible, con-
fined and discrete conveyance" (quoting C.W.A. § 502(14), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(14))); Beartooth, 904 F. Supp. at 1173-74 (characterizing nonpoint source
polluters as unidentifiable and concluding mine pits were point sources because
pits were "discernible, confined and discrete" conveyances). Thus, runoff that em-
anates from a "discrete confined conveyance" may be deemed a point source for
purposes of regulation. See Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at 557-558 (finding fact
term "runoff' is located in separate provisions of CWA for control of nonpoint
sources immaterial for distinguishing between point and nonpoint sources of pol-
lution); cf also Lyng, 882 F.2d at 1424 n.8 (defining nonpoint source); O'Ahaino,
28 F. Supp.2d at 1261 (defining nonpoint source pollution (quoting Lyng, 882
F.2d at 1424 n.8)); Beartooth, 904 F. Supp. at 1173 (construing Trustees for Alaska to
mean nonpoint pollution sources must be unidentifiable) (citing Trustees for
Alaska, 749 F.2d at 558). Runoff, then, may emanate from either a point, or
nonpoint, source. See Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at 558; Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at
1320 (quoting Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at 558 (discussing, and adopting, Tenth
Circuit's conclusion United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.)) ("[P]oint and nonpoint
sources are not distinguished by the kind of pollution they create or by the activity
causing the pollution, but rather by whether the pollution reaches the water
through a confined, discrete conveyance."). While runoff which is hard to trace to
a specific source cannot, by definition, emanate from a "discrete confined convey-
ance," runoff from a source that is identifiable may emanate from a "discrete con-
fined conveyance." See Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at 558 (noting Tenth Circuit in
Earth Sciences observed Congress characterized runoff as not traceable "to any iden-
tifiable point of discharge"); Beartooth, 904 F. Supp. at 1173 ("The non-point
source designation is limited to uncollected runoff water which is difficult to
ascribe to a single polluter.") (citing Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at 558); NRDC,
915 F.2d at 1316 (presuming CWA did not focus on nonpoint source polluters
because they are difficult to identify and regulate). Further, the Ninth Circuit
adopted the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., in
concluding that the fact that CWA specifically mentions the control of runoff in
separate provisions than point sources, does not in itself preclude runoff from be-
ing considered having emanated from a point source. See Trustees for Alaska, 749
F.2d 549 at 557-558 (rejecting this argument in supporting exempting mining ac-
tivities from NPDES permits by adopting reasoning of Tenth Circuit in United States
v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 372 (10th Cir. 1978) (reviewing legislative his-
tory and agreeing with observation "Congress rejected an amendment that would
have explicitly regulated mining discharges from point sources, because it was du-
plicative of the Act's general regulatory provisions")); see also Umatilla, 962 F. Supp.
at 1320-21 (explaining Ninth Circuit's adoption of Earth Sciences court's reasoning
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Nonpoint sources traditionally include any type of activity caus-
ing runoff, including agricultural, mining and silvicultural activi-
ties.70 Some courts, however, apply the definition of point source
in their Trustees for Alaska decision supported holding brine ponds point sources);
Beartooth, 904 F. Supp. at 1173 (finding reasoning of Tenth Circuit in Earth Sciences
persuasive, noting Ninth Circuit adopted Earth Sciences court's reasoning in Trustees
for Alaska, in concluding mining pits are point sources because broadly interpret-
ing point sources "effectuate[s] the remedial purposes of [ CWA") (citing Earth
Sciences, 599 F.2d at 373).
70. See Shanty Town Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 789 n.10
(4th Cir. 1988) (defining nonpoint source pollution as "runoff from agriculture,
silviculture, mining, construction, roads, urban development, and other diffuse
sources."); United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 652 (Oakes,
J., dissenting) ("Nonpoint source pollution is, generally, runoff."), cert. denied by
United States v. Villegas, 512 U.S. 1245 (1994).
Some courts, however, focus on the actual physical entity which released the
pollution, generally referred to as the "end of the pipe" emission, such that runoff,
for example, down a hill, would be deemed coming from a nonpoint source. See,
e.g., Hughey v.JMS Dev. Corp., 78 F.3d 1523, 1530 (1lth Cir. 1996) (ruling runoff
from construction sight down a hill from nonpoint source), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
993 (1996). But see O'Aha'ino v. Galiher, 28 F. Supp.2d 1258, 1262 (D. Haw. 1998)
(excluding from NPDES permit requirements all construction activities within five
acre area beyond planned construction site (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.26 (b) (14) (x)
(1992))); Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. Arcuri, 862 F. Supp. 73, 76 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (stating abandoned housing construction runoff emanated from point
source).
Looking instead to the source of the pollution, though farther both temporally
and in proximity from actual physical entrance of the pollutant into navigable wa-
ters, some courts have found runoff to be from point sources. See, e.g., Rybachek v.
EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1990) (identifying sluice box as source of pollu-
tant); Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1980) (rul-
ing mining spoil basins' surface runoff during rainfall overflowed from point
sources); cf. also Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 373 (holding congressional intent and
legislative history require regulation of "any activity that emits pollution from an
identifiable point"). Thus, the focus shifts from the nature of the source as dis-
charge or runoff, to whether the source is identifiable. See Frank, supra note 6, at
1300-02 (demonstrating means by which cattle may be become controllable and
identifiable and thus point sources). These sources of pollution were identifiable
and controllable, thus point sources of pollution. See, e.g., NRDC, 915 F.2d at 1316
(presuming Act focused on point source pollution because, unlike nonpoint
source pollution, point source pollution is easily regulated and identifiable); see
also Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 371 (noting lack of permit requirement for nonpoint
sources due to difficulty in identifying specific polluter).
Indeed, Congress meant to exempt only "runoff pollution.. . that is not trace-
able to a confined and discrete source." See Robin L. Greenwald, What's the "Point"
of the Clean Water Act Following United States Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc. ?: The Sec-
ond Circuit Acts as a Legislator Rather Than as a Court, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 689, 707
(1994) (noting Congress's express intent "'point source' be broadly interpreted by
including specific, limited examples of what is not a point source"). The National
policy of Congress regarding Pollution Prevention is that "pollution should be pre-
vented or reduced at the source whenever feasible." EPA Memo. on the Definition of
Pollution Prevention, (BNA) No. 5-924, at 113 (May 28, 1992) (adopting Congress's
policy enunciated in Pollution Prevention Act of 1990). Further, courts have also
held that Congress intended for states to regulate runoff pollution, leaving pollu-
tion from an identifiable point source to be regulated under CWA. See Greenwald,
supra, at 707 n.86 (providing as example Abston Construction Co., Inc., 620 F.2d at 44
[Vol. X: p. 431
44
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol10/iss2/5
1999] OREGON NATURAL DESERT ASSOCIATION 475
broadly.7' Thus, a "discernable, confined and discrete conveyance"
("'The focus of this Act is on the "discernible, confined and discrete" conveyance
of the pollutant, which would exclude natural rainfall drainage over a broad
area.'")); see also Wood, supra note 17, at 576 ("Section 402 establishes a permit
program which is directed toward identifiable sources of pollution."); Saperstein,
supra note 10, at 889-90 (noting nonpoint sources are not identifiable). Some
commentators, noting Congress's emphasis on controlling identifiable sources,
have asserted that "point sources should include natural as well as artificial convey-
ances . . . as long as it is possible to trace the pollutants back to an identifiable,
originating point of discharge." Wood, supra note 17, at 577.
In United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., however, the Second Circuit
noted CWA's emphasis on industrial polluters in holding that a human being,
although identifiable, could not be a point source of pollution. See Unites States v.
Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d at 643, 646-49 (2d Cir. 1993) (reviewing CWA's
language, structure, legislative history, regulatory scheme, and EPA's definition of
point source) cert. denied by United States v. Villegas, 512 U.S. 1245 (1994). The
Second Circuit concluded that, although unclear whether CWA's definition of
point source included a human being, a human being subject to criminal liability
could not be a "discernible, confined and discrete conveyance." Cf id. at 646 (con-
cluding CWA "was never designed to address the random, individual polluter"). In
support of its reading of the term "point source," the Plaza Health court specifically
referenced EPA's definition of point source, which they interpreted to emphasize
industrial means of release. Cf id. at 649 ("The EPA stresses that the discharge be
,through pipes, sewers, or other conveyances ... '" (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.2
(1992))).
In contrast, the dissent in Plaza Health focused on EPA's emphasis that
nonpoint source pollution is not easily attributable to a specific source. See id. at
652 n.3 (Oakes, J., dissenting) (quoting EPA's definition of nonpoint source pollu-
tion from EPA Office of Water, Office of Water Regulations and Standards,
Nonpoint Source Guidance 3 (1987)). Judge Oakes, noting that the differentiation
between point and nonpoint sources hinged on whether that pollution was "easily
attributable . . . to any particular responsible party," concluded that in this case the
source, a human being, was a point source because he was identifiable and control-
lable. Id. at 652-53 (discussing controllability theory posited by noted environ-
mentalist Professor William H. Rodgers, Jr. (citing 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.10 at 150 (1986))).
For a critical discussion of the Plaza Health decision, and analysis of the rea-
sons to include, or to exclude, human beings from the definition of point source,
see generally Stephanie L. Hersperger, Comment, A Point Source of Pollution Under
the Clean Water Act: A Human Being Should Be Included, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
97 (1996). For further discussion of the Second Circuit's decision in Plaza Health,
see infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
71. See Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d
114, 118 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[T] he definition of a point source is to be broadly inter-
preted."), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082 (1995) (citation omitted); Plaza Health, 3 F.3d
at 652 (Oakes,J., dissenting) (asserting broadly interpreting point source "is essen-
tial to fulfill the mandate of [CWA]" (quoting Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 373));
Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1355 (2d Cir. 1991) (defining culvert
transferring water from one pond to another as point source in absence of direct
addition of pollutants) rev'd in part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); Trustees
for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting nonpoint sources not
determined by activity "but rather by whether the pollution reaches the water
through a confined, discrete conveyance"); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 612
F.2d 1232, 1243 (10th Cir. 1979) (noting because not all point sources could be
enumerated, Congress deliberately broadly defined term "point source"); Earth Sci-
ences, 599 F.2d at 373 (explaining means of determining point source should in-
clude "broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance"); Umatilla, 962
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includes "an organized means of channeling and conveying indus-
trial waste. ' 72 For example, animal feeding farms, abandoned min-
F.Supp. at 1320 ("The Ninth Circuit has given this definition a broad scope.");
Beartooth, 904 F. Supp. at 1173 (citing Earth Sciences, 559 F.2d at 373 (noting "'point
sources' must be interpreted broadly to effectuate the remedial purposes of the
CWA")). But see Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 646 (stating, "[iut is elemental that con-
gress [sic] does not add unnecessary words to statutes," in declining to include
human beings among point sources); cf E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train
430 U.S. 112, 116-121 (1977) (applying effluent limitation regulatory scheme to
chemical manufacturing industry); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d
156, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (deferring to EPA's narrow interpretation of point
source).
For example, after reviewing the case law on point sources, the Second Circuit
in Plaza Health recognized that the term "point source" has been broadly inter-
preted, particularly in civil and licensing cases. See Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 648-49
(discussing CWA's penalty provisions); see also National Wildlife, 693 F.2d at 172
(noting "point source" is term to be read expansively); Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at
373 (noting Congress intended to regulate all possible identifiable sources of pol-
lution); Kennecott Copper v. EPA, 612 F.2d 1232, 1246 (10th Cir. 1979) (interpret-
ing language defining point source as reflective of congressional intent that many
sources of pollution fall within definition). This principle is also reflected in the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Trustees for Alaska v. EPA. 749 F.2d 549 (9th Circuit
1984). In that case, the Ninth Circuit determined that placer mines are point
sources of pollution. See id. at 558. Specifically, the court rejected the argument
that because mining activities were referenced in section 304(f) (2) (B), and activi-
ties under this provision are not subject to NPDES permit requirements, that all
mining activities are point sources of pollution. See id. at 557-58. The Ninth Cir-
cuit, while recognizing that Congress had rejected Amendments which duplicated
regulatory provisions for point and nonpoint sources of pollution, distinguished
the present context based on the fact that Congress characterized nonpoint source
as "runoff (that] could not be traced to any identifiable point of discharge." Id.
(citing Earth Sciences, 559 F.2d at 373). The court concluded that "when mining
activities release pollutants from a discernible conveyance, they are subject to
NPDES regulation, as are all point sources." Id. In this case, a sluice box con-
tained the water prior to its release and, thus, fell within the definition of point
source. See id.
72. Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 651 (Oakes, J., dissenting). The dissent in Plaza
Health gave a review of the applicable case law, and concluded, "courts have
deemed a broad range of means of depositing pollutants in the country's navigable
waters to be point sources." Id. This includes redepositing of water, churning and
resettlement of water dirt, and contaminated runoff from strip mines. See id. (cita-
tions omitted). Thus, if pollutants "reach navigable waters by human effort," the
pollution may emanate from a point source. See id. For a discussion of judicial
debate regarding withdrawal, redepositing or alteration of water as being an addi-
tion of a pollutant for purposes of the Act, see supra note 60; supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
Further, in focusing on the manner in which pollutants are gathered, human
effort in creating a potential discharge meets the definition of point source. See
id.; see, e.g., Abston Contr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d at 45 (holding coal miners' activity,
gathering waste into piles, constituted point sources); Appalachian Power Co. v.
Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding regulation of channeled run-
off, but not unchannelled runoff, permissible).
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ing sites, logging operations and dams have been considered "point
sources."
73
In Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm
(Southview Farm),74 the Second Circuit determined that the liquid
manure spreading processes and trucks used to dump and spread
manure onto agricultural fields functioned as point sources of pol-
lution for purposes of the Act. 75 The Southview Farm court reasoned
that the pollution was collected and conveyed by human effort, and
73. See, e.g., Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 34
F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994) (considering large animal farm as point source), cert. de-
nied, 514 U.S. 1082 (1995); Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1285-86 (9th Cir.
1990) (categorizing mining activity as point source because runoff originated from
sluice box); Abston Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d at 45 (holding contaminated strip
mining runoff originated from point source); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle,
604 F.2d 239, 247, 251 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating pollution from abandoned and
active mining point sources must be regulated); Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 374
(stressing overall pollution from mining activities may be from point source); Ap-
palachian Power, 545 F.2d at 1372 (observing rainfall runoff from storage area may
have originated from point source); Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass'n, Inc. v.
Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1321 (D. Or. 1997) (concluding
brine pond where pollutants were deposited was point source); United States v.
Frezzo Bros., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 713, 718 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding mushroom com-
posting runoff, emitted from pipe, result of non agricultural point source activity),
affd, 703 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1983) (per curium), and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983);
O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F.Supp. 642, 655 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding
collected and channeled landfill surface runoff resulting from rain and gravity
constituted discharge by point source). But see Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v.
Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting logging operation as point
source); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d
842, 849 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding nonpoint source pollution of logging operation
was not required to have state certification); Idaho Conservation League v. Cas-
well, No. CV 95-394-MHW, 1996 WL 938215, at *9 (D. Idaho Aug. 12, 1996) (con-
cluding logging activities were not point source).
74. 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994).
75. See Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d
114, 115 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082 (1995). In Southview Farm, the
manure originated from a farm located on 1,100 acres of land which had 2,200
cattle. See id. at 116. The Southview Farm noted that the operation fell within the
point source category, which includes concentrated animal feeding operations. See
id. at 115. Under CWA, a concentrated feeding animal operation (CAFO) is not
exempt from obtaining an NPDES permit, despite being considered an agricul-
tural activity. See C.W.A. § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) ("The term 'point
source' means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.., including...
concentrated animal feeding operation[s] ... ."). Liquid manure from housed
cattle located on the farm was transferred to a lagoon via a pipe. See Southview
Farm, 34 F.3d at 116. These liquids were then spread on fields as fertilizer by pipes
connected to either an irrigation system or spray hoses. See id. Solid manure waste
was transported by trucks, dumped and then spread on the fields. See id. The
liquid and solid waste polluted a nearby waterway in the form of runoff from the
fields when it rained. See id.
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that the pipes and trucks were "'the means by which the pollutants
[were] ultimately deposited into a navigable body of water."' 76
Conversely, in Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers (Newton
County),77 the Eighth Circuit declined to expand the definition of
point source. 78 The Newton County court held that proposed log-
ging activities, including the building of roads, were not point
sources as defined by CWA.79 The court looked to the plain lan-
guage of the Act and the list of exempt silvicultural activities in
EPA's regulations in reaching its decision, noting that Congress did
76. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 119 (quoting Abston Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d at
45). Referring to previous decisions, the Southview Farm court stressed that the
definition of a point source should be interpreted broadly. See id. at 118 (citations
omitted).
Next, the court adopted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Sierra Club v.
Abston Construction Company, Inc. and categorized the spray hoses and irrigation
system as point sources. See id. at 119. In Abston Construction Company, Inc., the
Fifth Circuit held that a point source can be defined as one that results in a dis-
charge when human effort "collect[s] and channell[s]" pollutants. See id. at 47; cf.
also Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 785 n.2(4th Cir.
1988) (noting unchannelled and uncollected runoff is excluded from point source
definition) (citation omitted).
In applying the Fifth Circuit's rationale, the Second Circuit reasoned that the
liquid manure was purposefully transferred to the lagoon and to the fields by the
farmers. See Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 119. Further, the Southview Farm court held
that the means used (pipes, irrigation systems and trucks) constituted point
sources. See id.
77. 141 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1998). USFS sold four parcels of land located in
the Ozark National Forest. See id. at 806. USFS prepared Environmental Impact
Statements and Environmental Assessment Reports for the road construction and
logging activities, which would accompany timber harvesting on the land, and con-
cluded that nearby waters would not be significantly effected. See id. at 806-07.
Several environmental groups and individuals, collectively the Wildlife Association
(WA), sued under CWA's citizen suit provision "to enjoin or set aside" the four
timber sales. Id. at 806. WA alleged that failure of USFS to require the buyers to
obtain a state certification violated CWA. See id. at 810 (citing C.W.A. §§ (301 (a) &
404, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) & 1344).
78. See Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir.
1998) (declining to categorize logging and construction activity as point sources).
79. See id.; see also Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest
Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 849 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987) (declining to require state certification
for logging roads) (citing as support Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558
(9th Cir. 1984) (referencing CWA section 304(f) (2) (B))). For a discussion of the
ONRC court's use of Trustees for Alaska as support for their holding, see supra note
38; infra note 175 and accompanying text. In Newton County, USFS, charged with
overseeing national forests, sold timber land from Ozark National Forest to private
companies for logging activities. See Newton County, 141 F.3d at 806. Roads were
subsequently built, and timber harvested for sale. See id. at 807. The environmen-
tal group WA argued that the sales violated CWA because USFS did not obtain
NPDES permits for discharging of pollutants that would result from activities prior
to allowing the construction and harvesting to commence. See id. at 810.
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not list logging and road construction among point sources for pur-
poses of the Act.80
Other courts have also deferred to EPA's guidelines in inter-
preting the provisions of CWA.8' For example, in United States v.
80. See Newton County, 141 F.3d at 810 ("EPA regulations do not include the
logging and road building activities cited by the [WA] in the narrow list of silvicul-
tural activities that are point sources requiring NPDES permits."); see also ONRC,
834 F.2d at 844 (concluding logging road and bridge construction are not point
sources subject to NPDES regulation); O'Aha'ino v. Galiher, 28 F. Supp.2d 1258,
1261-62 (D. Haw. 1998) (concluding farming roads in case at bar were analogous
to logging roads recognized by Ninth Circuit to be excluded from NPDES permit
process) (citing as examples ONRC, 834 F.2d at 844; Newton County, 141 F.3d at
810). Section 301 (a) of CWA provides that any discharges of pollutants are illegal
"except in compliance with ... section [401] ... of this title." C.W.A. § 301(a), 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a). Section 402 states in relevant part that "the Administrator may
... issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant... upon condition that such
discharge will meet.. . such conditions as the Administrator determines are neces-
sary." Id. C.W.A. § 402(a) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1) (B). Further, the Eight
Circuit noted that section 404 exempts logging construction activities from dredge
and fill permit requirements if in compliance with specified best management
practices. See Newton County, 141 F.3d at 810. The Newton County court found that
USFS had promulgated regulations to protect the land in question through appro-
priate best management standards, and that the activities were conducted in com-
pliance with these standards. See id.
81. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 173 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (noting "Congress generally intended that EPA would exercise substantial
discretion in interpreting the Act").
As administrator of CWA, EPA has the authority to regulate the discharge of
pollutants from point sources under NPDES. See National Wildlife, 693 F.2d at 165-
66 (quoting C.W.A. § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)). States, however, have control
over nonpoint source pollution. See id. at 176 (discussing CWA's 1972 Amend-
ments). EPA's role in nonpoint pollution control is primarily limited to issuing or
withdrawing grants. See Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. EPA, 843 F.2d
782, 791-92 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding EPA has regulatory powers over specific
nonpoint source pollution when state regulation is not possible). This authority
over federal grants, however, gives EPA a powerful role in the regulation of
nonpoint source pollution. In Shanty Town Associates Ltd. Partnership v. EPA, the
Worcester County Sanitary Commission (Sanitary Commission) of West Ocean
City Maryland petitioned to build a wastewater system to contain and treat sewage
from developments on nearby flood plains. See id. at 786. EPA determined that
any new development would increase the likelihood of waste runoff contamination
in nearby waters. See id. at 786. To discourage new development on these lands,
EPA restricted federal funding to developments in existence at the time of the
grant, and lots already part of a planned development prior to EPA's restrictions
on the federal grant. See id. The Sanitary Commission agreed to EPA's restric-
tions, which culminated in a consent order, and established a permit system, in-
cluding appointing various city and state agencies as appeals panels, for those
receiving services from the wastewater system. See id. at 787. Shanty Town Associ-
ates Ltd. Partnership (Shanty Town) planned to develop land they owned in this
protected area subsequent to the consent order. See id. Their proposed businesses
would increase wastewater discharges from 5,200 gallons per day to approximately
30,000 gallons per day. See id. Shanty Town's application request for service from
the sewage collection facility to cover these additional discharges from their pro-
posed businesses was denied. See id. Upon exhausting all local and state appeals
under the permit system, Shanty Town brought an action against EPA and the
1999]
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state and local agencies who denied their application to set aside the grant condi-
tions. See id. Shanty Town argued that EPA did not have the authority to regulate
nonpoint source pollution, or alternately, that EPA's authority in this particular
case to restrict the use of the federal sewage collection facility was arbitrary and
capricious. See id. They further argued that CWA's lack of direct regulation for
nonpoint source pollution, and Congress's policy recognizing states' rights to con-
trol water pollution, is evidence that Congress "intend[ed] to prevent EPA from
taking any action designed to reduce nonpoint source pollution." Id. at 791. The
Fourth Circuit characterized Shanty Town's argument, stating, "The argument, in
essence, is that the grant conditions conflict with Congress' deliberate decision, in
[CWA], to allocate control over nonpoint source pollution and land use in the
coastal floodplains area to the states." Id. at 790.
EPA responded that CWA gives EPA authority to place conditions on the use
of public wastewater treatment systems if necessary to assure compliance with
CWA's goals, and thus, it did have authority to deny the permit because any new
waste additions would preclude the wastewater treatment facility from meeting
water quality standards set by the state. See id. at 789. The Fourth Circuit observed
that EPA had concluded that "the challenged use restrictions, which would mini-
mize the nonpoint source pollution caused by the new facility by limiting the
amount of new development it can support, are necessary to insure that the West
Ocean City grant is consistent with [CWA's] water quality goals." Id.
The Shanty Town court held that EPA has both direct and indirect authority to
use conditional funding to reduce the amount of nonpoint sources of pollution.
See id. at 792. The court based this conclusion on the construction of the statute,
legislative history, and deference to EPA's broad grant of authority. See id. EPA,
and thus the federal government, have "substantial control over the regulation of
nonpoint source pollution" by administering the grant program pursuant to CWA
section 208 and "using the threat and promise of federal financial assistance" to
compel states to control nonpoint source pollution. See id. at 791. Further, the
court held that the legislative history supports the view that section 208's grant
program was intended as a means "to encourage the construction of wastewater
treatment facilities that will carry out the goals of the Act, which are, as indicated,
to protect water quality from both point and nonpoint source pollution." Id. at
792. In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the restrictions placed on
the use of the sewage collection facility were within the scope of EPA's authority.
See id.
One way that EPA has the power to regulate nonpoint source pollution, then,
is withholding of grants; thus, EPA's denying a permit and attached grant in Shanty
Town was a permissible use of EPA's power under the Act. See id. at 792. In con-
trast to point source pollution regulation, nonpoint source pollution programs are
not compulsory. See supra note 10. Thus, EPA does not have the authority to estab-
lish such programs for the individual states. See generally C.W.A. § 303, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313. The courts, however, generally defer to the interpretive guidelines
promulgated by EPA in interpreting the provisions of CWA. See, e.g., National Wild-
life, 693 F.2d at 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (considering whether water flowing through
dam was "discharge of a pollutant" as defined by CWA). For example, in National
Wildlife, the D.C. Circuit addressed EPA's categorization of a dam as a nonpoint
source. See id. at 165. Both parties conceded that a dam may be a point source.
See id. EPA, however, argued that no discharge occurred when water flowed
through the dam into a reservoir. See id. at 168. The D.C. Circuit concluded that,
based on CWA's plain language and legislative history, EPA's interpretation of the
term was not unreasonable, and thus must be deferred to. See id. at 171 ("We
conclude that EPA's interpretation of the specific provisions of the Act is reason-
able and not inconsistent with the legislative purposes and so must be upheld.").
For further discussion of the facts, rationale and holding in National Wildlife,
see supra note 50.
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Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc. (Plaza Health),82 the Second Circuit ex-
amined the language, structure and regulatory scheme of the Act,
legislative history, relevant case law, and interpretative statements of
EPA, applied the rule of lenity, and concluded that a human being
was not a point source.8 3 The Plaza Health court reasoned that the
definition of point source "evokes images of physical structures and
instrumentalities that systematically act as a means of conveying pol-
lutants from an industrial source to navigable waterways," and that
Congress declined to include a human being among the enumer-
ated list of point sources.8 4 In addition, the legislative history and
EPA guidelines focus on preventing pollution from industrial
dischargers. 85
82. 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied by United States v. Villegas, 512 U.S.
1245 (1994).
83. See United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 646-50 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied by United States v. Villegas, 512 U.S. 1245 (1994). In Plaza
Health, the defendant, an employee of Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., deposited
vials of blood into the Hudson River. See id. at 644. The trial court convicted the
defendant of knowingly discharging pollutants. See id. The defendant, on appeal,
argued that a human being cannot be categorized as a point source as defined by
CWA, or in the alternative, that it is unclear whether humans can be point sources.
See id.
84. Id. at 646. The Second Circuit addressed the scope of the term "point
source." See id. (summarizing proper statutory analysis). First, the Plaza Health
court noted that the term "point source" does not include or exempt human be-
ings, but rather gives a "lengthy definition" by way of examples. Id. (construing
examples to limit type of point sources). Second, the Plaza Health court deter-
mined that Congress intended point sources to apply to "industrial and municipal
sources of pollution," based on the presence of the term "point source" in sections
referencing "industrial and municipal sources of pollution," the absence of the
word "person" from the definition of "discharge of a pollutant," and section
301 (a)'s prohibition against adding pollutants from point sources as opposed to the
addition of pollutants by persons. See id. at 646-47 (stressing nonsensical meaning of
term "point source" were human being included in definition).
85. See id. at 646-49. The Second Circuit in Plaza Health criticized the district
court for relying solely on the broad purpose of the statute. See id. at 647. Though
recognizing the value in considering a statute's purpose for interpretation of provi-
sions, the Second Circuit nonetheless concluded CWA's purpose could not, in this
particular case, be dispositive. See id. The Plaza Health court stated, "[The pur-
pose] 'is only suggestive, not dispositive of [the issue before us]. Caution is always
advisable in relying on a general declaration of purpose to alter the apparent
meaning of a specific provision."' Id. (quoting National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch,
693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). The Second Circuit reviewed relevant legisla-
tive history, and, although noting Congress's emphasis on controlling industrial
polluters, concluded that there is "no suggestion either in the act itself or in the
history of its passage that congress intended the CWA to impose criminal liability
on an individual for ... random acts of human waste disposal." Id. Further, Con-
gress's policy against broadly construing the provisions of a statute to impose crimi-
nal sanctions argued against imposing criminal liability in this case. See id. at 647-
48 (discussing Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 upon which CWA was modeled).
After reviewing the case law on point sources, the Plaza Health court recog-
nized that the definition of point source has been broadly interpreted, particularly
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in civil and liability cases. See id. at 648-49; see also National Wildlife, 693 F.2d at 172
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting "point source" is inclusive term to be read expansively);
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 612 F.2d 1232, 1243 (10th Cir. 1979) (interpret-
ing language defining point source as reflective of congressional intent that many
sources of pollution fall within definition); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.,
599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979) ("The concept of a point source was designed
to further this scheme by embracing the broadest possible definition of any identi-
fiable conveyance from which pollutants might enter the waters of the United
States."). The Second Circuit, however, declined to apply the principle advocating
broad interpretation of point source to further CWA's remedial goals because judi-
cial decisions applying this principle involved civil-penalty cases. See Plaza Health, 3
F.3d at 649. Further, the Plaza Health court found that EPA's definition of point
source supported their narrow reading. See id. at 649 (noting EPA's emphasis "dis-
charge[s] be 'through pipes, sewers, or other conveyances'" (quoting 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.2 (1992))).
Lastly, finding the Act ambiguous as to whether a human being is a point
source, the Second Circuit applied the rule of lenity to the case before them, re-
versing the defendant's conviction and remanding the case to dismiss the indict-
ment. See id. at 649-50 (describing rule of lenity which favors resolution of
statutory ambiguities in defendant's favor (citations omitted)). Thus, the rule of
lenity was the only basis upon which the Second Circuit concluded that a human
being was not a point source. See id. The Plaza Health court specifically limited its
holding, stating, "[W]e conclude that the criminal provisions of the CWA did not
clearly proscribe [the defendant's] conduct and did not accord him fair warning
of the sanctions the law placed on that conduct. Under the rule of lenity, therefore,
the prosecutions against him must be dismissed." Id. at 649 (emphasis added); see
also Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 119
(2d 1994) (agreeing with argument Plaza Health did not preclude holding ditch
where manure was collected and channeled point source of pollution because
Plaza Health court "simply refused to treat a human being as a 'point source' under
the criminal provisions of the Act by virtue of the rule of lenity") (citation omit-
ted), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082 (1995).
In contrast to the majority, the dissent focused on the identifiability, and con-
trollability, of a source of pollution as the defining characteristics of a point
source. See Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 652 n.3 (Oakes,J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Following this characterization, the dissent concluded that, in this case, the source
was identifiable and controllable and could therefore be a point source. See id. at
653. Indeed, it has been noted that the jury in Plaza Health only considered
whether the defendant's car was a point source. See Greenwald, supra note 70, at
701-03 (criticizing majority's failure to address jury instructions). Thus, the Sec-
ond Circuit never decided whether a human being could be a point source. See id.
(stating jury was never informed persons could be point sources). Human beings,
however, do meet the definition of point source. See id. at 705 (applying CWA's
plain language and general rules of statutory construction). Case law has shown
that a point source need not be "the last step in the polluting process." Id. at 702
(citing as support Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1355 (2d Cir. 1991)
(stating leaching from landfill entering navigable waters via pond, and then cul-
vert, was from point source)) rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); see, e.g.,
Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 119 (noting manure spreading vehicles were point
sources). Further, human beings are conveyances because they are "identifiable
and capable of taking objects from one place to another." See Greenwald, supra
note 70, at 704 (analyzing meaning of word "conveyance" in point source
definition).
For a critical analysis of the majority's opinion in Plaza Health, see generally
Greenwald, supra note 70; Mark J. Dorval, Note, Discharge of Pollutants Into the Na-
tion's Waters: What Does the CWA Prohibit? - - United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories,
Inc., 3F.3D 643 (2D Cir. 1993), 13 TEMP. ENVrL. L. & TECH.J. 121 (1994); Deborah
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III. FACTS
In July of 1993, Robert and Diana Burril received a permit to
graze fifty head of cattle from the United States Forest Service
(USFS) in Oregon's Malheur National Forest.86 The permit limited
the grazing to a specific site located on this federal land.8 7 Here,
USFS issued the permit without first requiring state certification.88
The cattle grazing site is located near the Middle Fork of the
John Day River (the John Day River) and Camp Creek, a tributary
of the John Day River. 89 The cattle caused pollution in both water-
ways by runoff created from grazing and by directly depositing their
waste into Camp Creek.90 This waste increased sedimentation and
water temperature. 91
E. Niehuus, Casenote, Diluting the Clean Water Act: Will Muddy Waters Flow From
United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc. ? 11 T.M. COOLEY L. Rv. 911 (1994).
For a discussion of Southview Farm, see supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
For examples of judicial decisions holding that human effort in channeling waste
is a "discernible, confined and discrete conveyance," see supra note 72 and accom-
panying text. For examples ofjudicial decisions recognizing that human effort in
channeling waste is a "discernible, confined and discrete conveyance," see supra
note 72 and accompanying text.
86. See Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, (ONDA 1), 940 F. Supp. 1534,
1537 (D. Or. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos.
97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL 407711, at *1 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998); Brief for Ap-
pellees, Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998
WL 407711 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998) (Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115). The per-
mit, "Term Grazing Permit # 01607 for the Camp Creek allottment," allowed the
Burrils access to the federal lands four months a year, until the year 2003. Appel-
lees' Brief, ONDA II (Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115).
87. See ONDA 1, 940 F. Supp. at 1537.
88. Cf id. ("The permit was issued without [section] 402 certification."); see
also Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, (ONDA I]), Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112,
1998 WL 407711, at *1 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998), revg Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n
v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996). Under CWA, certain activities which
potentially affect the water quality standards of state waters require certification
from the state prior to commencement. See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *1. Sec-
tion 401 of CWA requires that any activity which may cause a discharge obtain state
certification before a federal agency issues a permit. See C.W.A. § 401 (a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (a).
89. See ONDA I, 940 F. Supp. at 1537.
90. See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *7. It was undisputed by the parties that
cattle grazing is an activity that may cause water pollution. See ONDA I, 940 F.
Supp. at 1541. Further, the district court concluded that there was also undis-
puted evidence that the Burrils' cattle grazing on the Camp Creek allotment
caused pollution in the John Day River and Camp Creek. See id.
91. See ONDAII, 1998 WL 407711, at *1. In addition, the pollution has caused
an increase in "turbidity, soil compaction, and the reduction of shade and riparian
vegetation, and the addition of fecal coliform and fecal streptococci." Appellees'
Brief, ONDA II (Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115). For further discussion of the
known potential environmental effects of cattle grazing on federal lands, see supra
notes 8 & 10 & 11 & 17.
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Several environmental groups, including Oregon Natural De-
sert Association (collectively ONDA), filed suit against USFS under
the citizen suit provision of CWA.92 ONDA alleged that USFS vio-
lated CWA by failing to require the Burrils to obtain state certifica-
tion.93 ONDA argued that the pollution resulting from the grazing
constituted a discharge and, therefore, applicants for grazing per-
mits were required to obtain state certification. 94 The specific issue
before the District Court of Oregon was "whether the reference to
'any discharge into navigable waters' under [section] 401 is limited
to point sources. 95
92. See ONDA I, 940 F. Supp. at 1537. Plaintiffs submitted a notice of intent to
file a citizen suit under CWA on March 3, 1994 against USFS for failure to comply
with CWA section 401 prior to issuing the Burrils a grazing permit. See id.; Appel-
lees' Brief, ONDA II, (Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115). USFS asserted that pol-
lution from the permitted grazing activity would emanate from a nonpoint source
of pollution and, thus, not be subject to state certification. See Appellees' Brief,
ONDA II, (Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115). ONDA subsequently filed suit in
the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. See Appellees' Brief,
ONDA II, (Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115).
The civil suit against USFS was filed pursuant to CWA section 505 and section
702 of the Administrative Procedure Act. See ONDA I, 940 F. Supp. at 1537. CWA's
citizen suit provision states, "any citizen may commence a civil action on his own
behalf.., against any person (including(i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency ... who is alleged to be in violation of
[CWA]." C.W.A. § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
The Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon (the
Tribe) entered the suit as plaintiff-intervenor. See ONDA I, 940 F. Supp. at 1536.
Grant County, Eastern Oregon Public Lands Coalition, and Robert Burril (defend-
ant-intervenors) entered the suit as defendant-intervenors. See id. at 1537; Brief for
Appellees, Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112,
1998 WL 407711 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998) (Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115).
ONDA and the Tribe (plaintiffs) sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive
relief suspending the grazing activity, and summary judgment. See ONDA I, 940 F.
Supp. at 1536-37. In response, USFS file a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
or in the alternative, summary judgment. See id. at 1537. The defendant-interven-
ors sought either a dismissal or summary judgment. See id.
93. See ONDA I, 940 F. Supp. at 1537. The plaintiffs sought a declaratoryjudg-
ment that any person applying for a federal grazing permit is required to obtain a
state certification stating that the grazing will comply with state water quality stan-
dards, prior to commencing the activity. See id. Further, plaintiffs sought "a decla-
ration that the USFS is violating [section] 401 (a) of the CWA by issuing grazing
permits without requiring the permittee to first obtain certification from the state
of Oregon establishing that the grazing will not violate state water quality stan-
dards." Id. Lastly, plaintiffs requested an injunction to suspend the Burril's graz-
ing permit until state certification was obtained. See id.
94. See id. at 1536-37.
95. Id. at 1539. The district court in ONDA I explained that the issue would
be resolved under a summary judgment standard. See id. Before discussing the
specific issue, the district court addressed, "[a]s a preliminary matter," defendants'
three assertions in their motion to dismiss on alternative grounds that plaintiffs
"lack [1] standing, [2] the right to judicial review, [3] and/or jurisdiction to bring
this suit." Id. at 1537. First, the district court concluded that plaintiffs had stand-
ing because the three part test for standing requirements, as described in the
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Looking to the plain meaning of the term "discharge," the
presence of the word "includes" within CWA's definition of dis-
charge, and CWA's legislative history, the district court concluded
that Congress did not intend the term "discharge" in section 401 to
apply to point sources only.9 6 The district court then held that the
grazing activity and resulting pollution fell within the ambit of sec-
United States Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, was satis-
fied. See id. at 1537-38 (quoting three part test of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Defendant-intervenors argued that the plaintiffs
lacked standing because (1) plaintiffs did not suffer an injury (2) there was "no
connection between the issuance of the permit without state certification and dele-
terious grazing practices," and no harm to the Tribe's treaty rights, and (3) that
there was "no redressability because ordering state certification will not guarantee
that water quality impacts will be prevented . . .[and] no evidence that the harm
will cease if [USFS] orders state certification." Id. at 1538. The district court, how-
ever, rejected these assertions, stating that ONDA "satisf[ied] the Lujan standing
test, having established [1] an injury in fact because plaintiffs live and recreate in
the area of the challenged action .. .[2] traceability, in light of [USFS's] admis-
sion that cattle grazing contributes to water pollution, and the showing that pollu-
tion in Camp Creek is related to cattle grazing ... [and 3] redressability ... since
plaintiffs need not establish that following the required procedures will lead to a
different result." Id. (internal citations omitted). Further, the Tribe had standing
because they also "live and recreate in the challenged area" and have "treaty rights
in the John Day River Basin [which were] injured by the alleged violations." Id.
Second, the district court rejected USFS's argument that the plaintiffs could
not enforce water quality standards under CWA's citizen suit provision because
citizens can only sue for effluent limitation violations, which issue from point
sources. See id. (observing argument was based on Ninth Circuit's decision in
ONRC which held there is no right to citizen suit for water quality standard viola-
tions) (citing Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834
F.2d 842, 849 (9th Cir. 1987)). Further, the district court rejected defendant-inter-
venors' argument that the Tribe failed to notify them of the suit. The district court
held that section 505 of the Act permitted citizens to sue to enforce water quality
standards, and that an intervenor "did not have to provide separate notice under
the CWA... [because] notice from [the] environmental organizations was suffi-
cient under the CWA ... thus plaintiffs provided adequate notice." Id. at 1538-39
(citing Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F. 3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding, contrary to ONRC, section 505 of CWA allows citizens to enforce water
quality standards violations), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 1995), and cert. de-
nied, 518 U.S. 1018 (1996); Lykins v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 27 E.R.C. 1590,
1599 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (holding no separate notice required for intervenor under
CWA); Environmental Defense Fund v. Tidwell, 837 F. Supp. 1344, 1352-53
(E.D.N.C. 1992) (holding two environmental groups of five sufficient notice under
CWA)).
Third, the district court concluded that, contrary to Robert Burill's assertion,
the Tribe did properly allege jurisdiction because the district court can hear all
claims arising from federal or treaty law. See id. at 1539.
96. See id. at 1539, 1541 ("The proposed narrower reading of [section] 401 is
rejected by this court, based on the plain meaning of the word 'discharge' as used
in [section] 401, the statutory definition of 'discharge,' and the legislative history
of CWA [thus] [t]his Court holds that [section] 401 applies to all federally permit-
ted activities that may result in a discharge, including discharges from nonpoint
sources."). For the analysis of the ONDA Icourt's decision based on the Act's plain
meaning and legislative history, see infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
1999]
55
Frankino: The Ninth Circuit's Decision in Oregon Natural Desert Association
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
486 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
tion 401 of CWA and required a state permit.97 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that (1) section 401 of the Clean
Water Act only regulates the discharge of pollutants from point
sources, and (2) the waste generated from the activity in question
did not emanate from a point source.98
IV. ANALYSIS
A. District Court Reasoning
1. Plain Meaning of Discharge
The district court in Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas
(ONDA 1),99 first addressed the defendant's argument that the term
"discharge" encompasses point sources, nonpoint source with a
conveyance, or nonpoint source activity that "fall[s] within the stat-
utory definition of point source."100 The ONDA Icourt rejected this
argument and concluded that this interpretation conflicted with
the plain meaning of the term "discharge. '"10 1
97. See id. at 1541 ("This court finds that pollution caused by cattle grazing
constitutes a 'discharge... into navigable waters' within the meaning of [section]
401 of the CWA. Therefore, state certification under [section] 401 was required
before the USFS issued a cattle grazing permit on the Camp Creek allotment.").
98. See Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-
35112, 1998 WL 407711, at *1 (9th Cir.July 22, 1998), rev'kOregon Natural Desert
Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996). USFS and defendant-intevenors
appealed the ONDA I court decision. The appelees, ONDA, and appellee-inter-
venor, the Tribe (collectively ONDA for discussion of the issues on appeal) filed a
joint response brief on July 16, 1997. See Brief for Appellees, Oregon Natural De-
sert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL 407711 (9th Cir. July 22,
1998) (Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115). The Ninth Circuit rejected ONDA's
argument on appeal that the plain language of section 401 and its legislative his-
tory "both support the conclusion that Congress, through [section] 401, has au-
thorized states to regulate all pollution arising from federally permitted activities."
Appellees' Brief, ONDA II, (Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115); see generally ONDA
II, 1998 WL 407711, at *1.
99. 940 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996).
100. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534, 1540 (D. Or.
1996), rev'd sub nom. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-
35112, 1998 WL 407711, at *1 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998).
101. See id. at 1540 ("The term 'including' in the discharge definition permits
additional, unstated meanings." (citations omitted)). The district court narrowed
its analysis to the term "discharge," defined by CWA as including a "discharge of a
pollutant." Cf id. at 1539-40 (citing C.W.A. § 502 (16), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16)). The
ONDA Icourt held that the cattle grazing polluting Camp Creek and the John Day
River were discharges requiring state certification, and that the term "discharge"
was not limited to point sources. See id. at 1534. The ONDA I court rejected the
defendant's argument that the term only included point sources, and reasoned
that a narrow reading of the term contradicted the word's plain meaning. See id. at
1540. Given the definition's inclusive nature, nonpoint sources could fall within
the ambit of "discharge." See id. at 1540 (citing case law interpreting "includes" as
word of expansion) (citations omitted). For case law recognizing a broad interpre-
[Vol. X: p. 431
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tation of statutory definitions based on the presence of the word "includes," see
supra note 45.
The district court first noted the relevant statutory language pertinent to their
analysis. See id. at 1539 (quoting C.W.A. §§ 502(14), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(14) (defin-
ing point source), 1362(16) (defining discharge), 1362(12) (defining "discharge
of a pollutant")). Next, the district court addressed the interpretation of the term
"discharge" within section 401. USFS argued that only point sources or "nonpoint
sources with a conveyance" fall within the plain meaning of discharge. See id. at
1540. The defendant-intervenors argued that only nonpoint sources that "fall
within the statutory definition of point source" are discharges. Id. The district
court rejected these arguments and reasoned that a narrow reading of the term
"contradict[ed] the plain meaning of the term 'discharge."' Id. Given the defini-
tion's inclusive nature, nonpoint sources of pollution could fall within the ambit of
the term "discharge." See id. (citing as support "National Wildlife Federation v. Gor-
such, 693 F2d 156, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that the term 'includes' in the
CWA allows for additional, unstated meanings); Exxon Corp. v. Lujan, 730 F. Supp.
1535, 1545 (D. Wyo. 1990) (holding that the word 'includes' instead of 'means'
indicates that what follows is a non-exclusive list that can be enlarged); Chemehuevi
Indian Tribe v. California St. Bd. of Equalization, 757 F.2d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1985)
('includes' is a term of enlargement, not of limitation) rev'd on different grounds 474
U.S. 9)." The district court concluded, "[T]he plain meaning of 'discharge' does
not restrict the definition to point sources or nonpoint sources with conveyances."
Id. For a discussion of National Wildlife, which recognizes the broader interpreta-
tion of a statutory definition utilizing the word "includes," see supra note 50.
The district court then rejected defendants' assertion that USFS's interpreta-
tion of discharge under section 401 should be deferred to. See id. Noting the two
part analysis in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984), the district court concluded that, even were the language of the statute
ambiguous and Congressional intent unclear, deference would not be given to
USFS, but to EPA as administrators of CWA. See id.
One commentator had pointed out that EPA drafted a revision to the imple-
menting regulations for section 401 following the ONDA I decision. See Miles,
supra note 4, at 194 (citing Special Report: Despite Possibility of DOJ Court Case Appeal
EPA Staff Drafts Regulations for Nonpoint Sources on Federal Lands, INSIDE EPA's WATER
POL'Y REP., Feb. 26, 1997, at 2). Miles discusses the circumstances surrounding.
EPA's draft guidelines for section 401 and the subsequent recission of that draft.
See id. The EPA draft clearly stated that the term "discharge" includes nonpoint
sources of pollution. See id. However, this draft came before the Department of
Justice (DOJ) had made a decision whether or not to appeal on behalf of USFS. See
id. (citing Agencies Delay Appeal on Water Quality Certification Ruling, INSIDE EPA's
WATER POL'Y REP., Jan. 29, 1997, at 19). It appears that EPA suspended its pro-
posed amendment because of criticism from other agencies for failing to wait until
DOJ had made their decision. See id. (citing EPA Suspends Rulemaking on Runoff
from Federal Lands, INSIDE EPA's WATER POL'Y REP.,July 9, 1997, at 8). Before DOJ
could make its decision, and EPA could act pursuant to that decision, Miles notes
that "the Clinton Administration decided to appeal the ONDA decision despite
opposition from EPA." Id. (citing Despite EPA Opposition Administration Fights Court
Ruling on Water Quality Certification, INSIDE EPA's WATER POL'Y REP., July 9, 1997, at
8). She goes on to conclude in a footnote:
It is interesting to observe that had the EPA draft implementing regula-
tions for section 401 been finalized prior to the OADA litigation, proper
judicial review by the Ninth Circuit might have entailed the two-step anal-
ysis required by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). If the court found 1) that Congress did
not express clear intent on this issue in the CWA, and 2) that the EPA
interpretation of discharge was reasonable, the EPA interpretation would
be entitled to deference. However, since EPA did not clearly express its
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2. Legislative History
The ONDA I court looked to the legislative history of CWA for
support. 10 2 First, the district court noted and rejected the defend-
ant's argument that the Amendments to CWA, particularly those of
1972, show an emphasis on effluent limitations, which replace water
quality standards.1 0 3 Second, the district court reviewed section
401(a)'s history, noting that the language of the section remained
consistent through the Amendments to CWA. 10 4 Consequently, the
ONDA I court found that in enacting CWA, Congress intended for
all pollution to be regulated through water quality standards and
federal activities to be conducted only in a manner consistent with
state water quality standards. 10 5 The ONDA I court reasoned that
Congress, by not expressly stating that nonpoint source pollution
should not fall within the ambit of section 401, did not intend for
intent before the ONDA litigation began, the Ninth Circuit has no agency
interpretation to which it may defer and the issues in ONDA cannot be
resolved using a Chevron analysis. Therefore, the EPA perspective on the
matter is not binding, although it should probably have some persuasive
power.
Id. at n.16. For an in-depth discussion of the Ninth Circuit's subsequent decision,
without any reference to EPA's agency interpretation, see infra notes 107-43 and
accompanying text. For a critical discussion of the Ninth Circuit's failure to con-
sider EPA's interpretation, see infra note 152.
102. See ONDA I, 940 F. Supp. at 1540-41. The district court rejected defend-
ants' assertion that CWA's legislative history supports a narrow reading of the term
"discharge." See id. at 1541 ("The 1970 amendments illustrate the broadness of
[section] 401; the 1972 amendments support this."). Defendants' asserted that
Congress intended CWA to regulate point sources because the 1970 and 1972
CWA Amendments emphasize effluent limitations, and fail to mention nonpoint
sources of pollution. See id. at 1540 (citation omitted). The ONDA I court, how-
ever, noted that the 1972 Amendments did not replace Congress's intent that all
federal activities comply with water quality standards. See id. at 1540-41 (quoting
Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 1995) (in-
terpreting 1972 Amendments), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 945 (9th cir. 1995), and cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1018 (1996)). For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of CWA's 1972 Amendments in Northwest Environmental Advocates v. City of Port-
land, see supra note 34.
103. See id. at 1540 (citing S. REP. No. 92414 at 69 (1971)). The defendants
stressed the absence of discussion on nonpoint sources, and focus on controlling
discharges of pollutants, in the legislative history. See id.
104. See id. The district court stated, "Section 401(a) originated as 21(b)
under the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970. The language of this section is
identical to the current Act." Id. For further discussion of this argument, support-
ing a broader interpretation of the term "discharge" in section 401, see supra note
45.
105. See id. at 1541 (quoting 115 CONG. REc. H28970 (1969) (statement of
Senator Cooper) (noting 1970 Amendments emphasized maintenance of water
quality standards regardless of pollution source).
[Vol. X: p. 431
58
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol10/iss2/5
OREGON NATURAL DESERT ASSOCIATION
the Amendments to displace regulation of nonpoint source pollu-
tion under 401.106
B. Ninth Circuit Reasoning
1. Proper Interpretation of the Term "Discharge"
In ONDA II, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by setting forth
section 401, the definitions relevant to interpreting the term "dis-
charge" under section 401, and the proper analysis for determining
whether nonpoint sources of pollution fall under section 401 re-
view. 107 The ONDA II court acknowledged that CWA does not de-
106. See id. The ONDA I court found support for its reading of the 1972
Amendments by referencing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Northwest Environmental
Advocates v. City of Portland. See id. Specifically, the ONDA I court noted that in
Northwest Environmental Advocates the Ninth Circuit "held that 'nowhere does Con-
gress evidence an intent to preclude the enforcement of water quality standards
that have not been translated into effluent discharge limitations."' Id. (quoting
Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 1995),
reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 1995), and cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1018 (1996). The
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the 1972 Amendments as a means to "improve
enforcement of pollution from point sources, not supplant the old system," led the
ONDA I court to conclude that CWA's legislative history "supports the conclusion
that [section] 401 applies to all federally permitted activities that might result in
water pollution." Id. (citing Northwest Environmental Advocates, 56 F.3d at 986).
107. See Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112,
1998 WL 407711, at *3 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998), rev'g Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n
v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996). The ONDA Il court characterized the
issue as "whether the Burril's Forest Service grazing permit requires certification
from the State of Oregon." Id. ONDA argued before the ONDA II court that the
ONDA I court was correct in holding that the cattle grazing was a discharge under
section 401's plain language. See Brief for Appellees, Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n
v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL 407711 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998)
(Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115) ("Cattle grazing is an 'activity' that results in
'discharges' to waters of the United States."). Section 401 prohibits the federal
government from issuing a permit where "any discharge" may result, thus "the
qualifier 'any' clarifies that all 'discharges' are subject to [section] 401." Id. The
term "discharge" is not limited to point sources, as asserted by USFS, because the
definition of the term "discharge" in CWA "includes (but is not limited to) point
sources." Id. (noting distinction between definitions of discharge and "discharge
of a pollutant" in CWA section 502). ONDA further argued that even if the term
"discharge" is limited, the presence of the word "any" immediately preceding it in
section 401 clearly indicates that the term "discharge" as used in section 401 is
"without qualification" and should be interpreted broadly. See id. (noting Con-
gress intended discharge to have two meanings as evidenced by its presence in two
separate definitions).
As a preliminary matter, the ONDA II court addressed whether ONDA had
standing; and if so, whether ONDA could bring suit under CWA's citizen suit pro-
vision. See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *1-*2 (concluding ONDA had standing
and could bring suit pursuant to CWA section 505). First, applying the three
prong standing test from the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, the ONDA II court held that ONDA's claim satisfied the requirements for
standing because ONDA's right to recreational use of the John Day River was com-
promised, and this injury was redressable under CWA. See id. (setting forth, and
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fine a nonpoint source, but nevertheless distinguished nonpoint
from point sources of pollution by comparing examples of each
source. 108
applying, Lujan elements to facts at issue) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). The ONDA 11 court stated that the water pollution
caused by the grazing cattle had injured some of ONDA's members because the
members live by, and use, the John Day River's polluted water. See id. at *1 (satisfy-
ing element requiring "causal connection between the injury and defendant's
conduct").
Appellants argued, however, that the injury was procedural, not concrete, be-
cause ONDA's suit sought to compel a procedural requirement, certification,
would not improve ONDA's use of the John Day River. See id. Appellants further
argued ONDA did not have a redressable injury because ONDA's suit would not
focus on establishing that "the state would deny certification or that certification
would necessitate a change in the grazing operation," thereby resulting in abate-
ment of the water pollution. Id. at *2. The Ninth Circuit first concluded that the
water pollution interfering with the use of the river was a concrete interest. See id.
at *1 (observing enforcement of state certification, although procedural, impacts
environment, hence concerns concrete interest (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572)).
The ONDA II court specifically referenced their decision in Salmon River Concerned
Citizens v. Robertson to define, and determine, what constitutes a "concrete inter-
est." See id. In Salmon River, the Ninth Circuit held that "threatened harm to
'health, recreational use, and enjoyment' from the use of herbicides constitute [d]
an impairment of a concrete interest." Id. (quoting Salmon River Concerned Citi-
zens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1355 (9th Cir. 1994)). The harm in ONDA Ilwas
already apparent, and thus, clearly met the threshold of "threatened harm" estab-
lished by the Salmon River court. Cf id. (analogizing harm in ONDA II to concrete
interest in Salmon River and concluding, "Certainly, ONDA has demonstrated a
concrete interest where its members reside and engage in recreational activities
along polluted waterways"). The Ninth Circuit then stated that "[f]or similar rea-
sons, the appellants' argument that there is no redressable injury must fail." Id. at
*2. They concluded ONDA was not required to prove that the state would con-
clude their review for certification in a manner beneficial to ONDA. See id. (citing
as support Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1518 (9th Cir.
1992)). In addition, the ONDA I court determined that ONDA's burden of proof
for "immediacy and redressability" was reduced because they asserted a procedural
right similar "to the hypothetical plaintiff, discussed in Lujan, who lives adjacent to
the construction site for a federally-licensed dam." Id. The Ninth Circuit noted
that in Lujan the hypothetical plaintiff, living next to a dam construction site,
would not have to prove that requiring an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
would change the dams construction plans in order to file suit because a federal
agency failed to prepare an EIS. See id. (comparing ONDA's procedural ight to
section 401 review with procedural right to preparation of EIS).
Second, the ONDA II court held that CWA's citizen suit provision "authorizes
suits for violation of certification requirements," a certification can be violated
even if not granted, and that a permit issued without the required state certifica-
tion violates "the certification requirement under [section] 401 and therefore [is]
in violation of an 'effluent standard or limitation' under [section 505]." Id. ONDA
had a valid claim against USFS because they alleged a violation of the certification
requirement: that USFS issued a permit without first obtaining certification. Cf id.
(rejecting appellants argument citizen suits can only seek to enforce "the dis-
charge limitations already contained within state certifications"). For the district
court's analysis in ONDA I, concluding ONDA had standing and the right to bring
a citizen suit, see supra note 95.
108. See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *3. The ONDA II court first character-
ized "discernible, confined and discrete conveyances" as including such things "as
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The Ninth Circuit next reviewed two statutory interpretations
of the term "discharge." First, the ONDA II court briefly reviewed
the arguments before the district court, and the district court's de-
cision. 10 9 The plaintiffs in ONDA Iargued that the term "discharge"
in section 401 encompasses both point and nonpoint sources of
pollution.110 The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court found
this construction compelling upon analyzing CWA's definitions of
"discharge" and "discharge of a pollutant."111 In doing so, the dis-
trict court rejected USFS's argument that the term "includes"
within the definition of discharge should be interpreted as "limited
to point sources but includ[ing] both polluting and nonpolluting
releases." 112 Second, the Ninth Circuit noted that the district
court's holding relied on the definitional language of discharge
and concluded that the district court improperly interpreted sec-
tion 401 by focusing on one word of the definition. 1 3 Instead,
a pipe, ditch, or machine." Id. (defining point source) (citing C.W.A. § 502(14),
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)). The Ninth Circuit looked to its own characterization of
nonpoint source in concluding that runoff from agricultural and grazing activities
are nonpoint sources of pollution. See id. (citing C.W.A. § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362
(providing statutory definitions); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United
States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 849 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Nonpoint source pollu-
tion is not specifically defined in the Act, but is pollution that does not result from
the 'discharge' or 'addition' of pollutants from a point source. Examples of
nonpoint source pollution include runoff from irrigated agriculture and silvicul-
tural activities." (citing as support Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th
Cir. 1984))).
109. See id. For the ONDA I court's analysis and holding, see supra notes 99-
106 and accompanying text.
110. See id.
111. Cf id. ("In accepting this argument below, the district court relied ex-
clusively on [section] 502 of the Act.") (citing C.W.A. §§ 502(12),(16), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1362(12), (16) (1994)). The ONDA Hcourt further noted that the district court
reasoned that, because the term "discharge" when unqualified is not limited to
point sources but rather includes the term "discharge of a pollutant" which refer-
ences point sources, a discharge must include nonpoint source releases as well as
point source releases. See id. Thus, the ONDA II court recognized that, based on
this reasoning, the district court "concluded that the term 'discharge' encom-
passed nonpoint source pollution like runoff from grazing" and had reasoned that
the word "includes" demonstrates Congress's intent to allow additional sources of
pollution, not just those from point sources, to fall under the definition of dis-
charge. Id. For the statutory language of section 502(12) and (16) defining "dis-
charge" and "discharge of a pollutant," see supra notes 48-5.0 and accompanying
text.
112. Id.
113. Cf Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112,
1998 WL 407711, at *3 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998) ("We examine 'the language of the
governing statute, guided not by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but
look[ing] to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.'"), revg
Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996) (cita-
tions omitted). In contrast, the ONDA H court made two determinations which
were relevant to its subsequent interpretation of discharge and holding, by refer-
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proper interpretation of language within, a statute is gleaned from
its relation to all its provisions, its purpose and its underlying pol-
icy. 114 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the correct statutory inter-
pretation of the term "discharge" in section 401 does not include
nonpoint sources of pollution. 1 5
encing all the provisions of the Act together, its purpose, and policy. Cf id. at *6-*7
(concluding term "discharge" within CWA refers to releases from point sources
while term "runoff' refers to releases from nonpoint sources), *4-*5 (concluding
point and nonpoint sources are regulated by completely separate provisions of
CWA without overlap).
For an in-depth discussion of the ONDA I court's analysis of the term "dis-
charge," see supra notes 99-106. For a discussion of section 401 as interpreted by
the ONDA I court, and the ONDA I court's subsequent conclusion that the word
"includes" within the definition of discharge refers to including a "discharge of a
pollutant" as opposed to including polluting and nonpolluting releases, see supra
notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
114. See id. at *3 (citing John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and
Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1993) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 51 (1987)).
The Ninth Circuit next briefly stated its holding, which reflects application of
these principles, as follows: "The Clean Water Act, when examined as a whole,
cannot support the conclusion that [section 401] applies to nonpoint sources." Id.
For a list of authorities relied on by the ONDA II court, which focused statutory
interpretation on definitional language, see infra notes 148-67.
115. See id. at *7. Appellees argued that the term "discharge" should include
both nonpoint and point sources of pollution. See id. They asserted that the defi-
nition of "discharge" is broader than the definition of the term "discharge of a
pollutant." Id. Thus, the term "discharge" must include nonpoint source pollu-
tion. See id. On appeal, ONDA argued that the existence of the word "discharge"
in two definitions supported its position that the word discharge in section 401 is
not limited to point sources. See Brief for Appellees, Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n
v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL 407711 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998)
(Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115). Only the definition "discharge of a pollutant"
is limited to point sources. See Appellees' Brief, ONDA II, (Nos. 97-35065, 97-
35112, 97-35115). In contrast, the term "discharge," because it includes a "dis-
charge of a pollutant," reflects congressional intent that the term "discharge" not
be limited to point sources. See id. (citing Power Authority v. Williams, 101 A.2d
659, 660 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (construing congressional intent in using word "in-
cludes" in discharge definition); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156,
172 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting operation of word "includes" in definitions not re-
strictive like word "means")).
The Ninth Circuit rejected this position relying on National Wildlife Federation
v. Gorsuch. See ONDA I, 1998 WL 407711, at *7 ("'Discharge' is the broader term
because it includes all releases from point sources, whether polluting or nonpollut-
ing.") (citing Natural Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
The Ninth Circuit in ONDA I/interpreted National Wildlife as standing for the prop-
osition that the term "discharge" is a release from a point source, whether pollut-
ing or nonpolluting. See id. Once a point source has discharged, whether the
discharge is added and is a pollutant is a separate issue. Cf id. The ONDA II court,
referring to National Wildlife, stated, "[In National Wildlife], the court interpreted
'discharge' in [section 502] (16) of the Act to include the release from a point
source of turbid water that did not contain any pollutant. This is the logical inter-
pretation of [section 502] (16) that comports with the structure and lexicon of
[CWA]." Id. For an alternate reading of the National Wildlife court's analysis, argu-
ing against the Ninth Circuit's position in ONDA II, see infra notes 150-52 and
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2. Distinction in Regulatory Scheme
The Ninth Circuit next discussed the enactment of CWA, fo-
cusing on the regulatory framework established for sources of pol-
lution. 116 The ONDA H court found that the 1972 Amendments to
the Act shifts pollution prevention regulation away from maintain-
ing permissible levels of pollution within a particular body of
water.117 Instead, the Act focuses on limiting the amount of pollu-
tant emissions from point sources of pollution.1 1 8 In addition, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that effluent flows from point sources are
accompanying text. For a further discussion of the relevant facts, procedural his-
tory, and the D.C. Circuit's rationale in National Wildlife, see supra note 50.
116. See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *3-*4. ONDA argued on appeal that the
1970 legislative history, not the 1972 legislative history, is relevant to interpreting
section 401. See Brief for Appellees, Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck,
Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL 407711 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998) (Nos. 97-35065,
97-35112, 97-35115). ONDA asserted that "[t]he contemporary legislative history
of [section] 401 . . . makes clear that Congress intended [section] 401 to apply to
all federally permitted pollution generating activities, regardless of how the
'source' of that pollution is classified." Id. Section 401 was adopted in 1970 when
there was no distinction between point and nonpoint sources of pollution, and
because the relevant language of section 401 has not been amended, only the legis-
lative history prior to section 401's enactment is relevant. See id. First, the legisla-
tive history shows section 401 (a) was intended to apply to all federal activities that
might result in water pollution. See id. (citations omitted). Second, supporters of
the Amendment recognized "that the Federal government was a significant cause
of the nation's water pollution problems, and stressed the broad scope of [section
401]." Id. (citations omitted). From this survey of the legislative history, ONDA
asserted, "Members of both the Senate and House, then, saw [section] 401 as a
significant check on any and all federally permitted activities, without distinction as
to the 'source' of the pollution." Id.
The ONDA II court, however, asserted that the current regulatory scheme,
addressing point and nonpoint sources of pollution in separate provisions, "sup-
planted the 1970 Water and Environmental Quality Improvement Act by replacing
water quality standards with point source effluent limitations." ONDA II, 1998 WL
407711, at *3-*4 (emphasis added). For a general discussion of the 1972 CWA
Amendments' impact on water pollution regulation, see supra note 34.
117. See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *4 (quoting Natural Resources Defense
Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing EPA v. California ex
rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 203 (1976) (explaining flaws
in prior regulatory scheme which focused on water quality standards))). For a
discussion of CWA's indirect regulation of nonpoint sources, see supra notes 10 &
34 and accompanying text.
118. See id. (citing precedent in NRDC, 915 F.2d at 1316 (footnote omitted)).
The ONDA H court quoted language from their 1990 opinion in Natural Resources
Defense Council v. EPA where they discussed the impact of the 1972 Amendments to
CWA. See id. The ONDA 11 court noted that in that decision, they concluded,
[The 1972 Act,] "'which made important amendments to the water pollu-
tion laws . . . . [and] placed certain limits on what an individual firm
could discharge, regardless of whether the stream into which it was
dumping was overpolluted at the time .... [,] banned only discharges
from point sources. The discharge of pollutants from nonpoint sources-
for example, the runoff of pesticides from farmlands-was not directly pro-
hibited. The Act focused on point source polluters presumably because
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directly regulated by CWA and require approval through the
NPDES program. 119 Nonpoint pollution, however, is regulated in-
directly through federal grants to states with EPA approved waste-
water treatment plans.' 20 Further, the ONDA II court noted that
the 1987 Amendments to the Act require states to implement man-
agement programs for nonpoint source pollution. 12'
The Ninth Circuit stated that this differentiation in the regula-
tion supported its position in Oregon Natural Resources Council v.
United States Forest Service (ONRC). 122 The ONDA H court reviewed
they could be identified and regulated more easily than nonpoint source
polluters.'"
Id. In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit stated, "The Clean Water Act thus overhauled
the regulation of water quality." Id. For a discussion of the 1972 Amendment's
impact on water regulation as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit subsequent to their
NRDC decision, see supra note 34.
119. See id. (citing C.W.A. §§ 301, 402, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342). In summary,
the ONDA // court stated, "The Act prohibits the release of pollutants from point
sources except in compliance with an NPDES permit." Id. (citing C.W.A. § 301, 33
U.S.C.§ 1311).
120. See id. In support of this proposition the ONDA I court analyzed section
208 which regulates nonpoint source pollution. See id. The ONDA H court briefly
explained this indirect regulation, which is accomplished through CWA section
208. See id. The Ninth Circuit noted, first, that under section 208(b) (2), each
state is required to create a wastewater treatment plan containing "procedures for
the identification and control of nonpoint source pollution." Id. (citing C.W.A.
§ 208(b) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)). Second, the state must submit the plan to
EPA for approval, and if EPA approves the plan "it may make grants to the state to
defray the costs of administering the plan, see 33 U.S.C. § 1288(f), or to construct
facilities, 33 U.S.C. § 1288(g)." Id. From this analysis, the ONDA II court con-
cluded, "Thus, the Act provides no direct mechanism to control nonpoint source
pollution but rather uses the 'threat and promise' of federal grants to the states to
accomplish this task." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. Part-
nership v. EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 791 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating, "[I]t is true that [CWA]
contains no mechanism for direct federal regulation of nonpoint
source pollution")). The ONDA IIcourt specifically noted the absence of penalties
for noncompliance with nonpoint management as additional support for the no-
tion that nonpoint source pollution falls outside NPDES permit requirements. See
id. (explaining section 208 does "not penalize nonpoint source polluters") (citing
NRDC, 915 F.2d at 1316 n.3).
121. See id. (citing NRDC, F.2d at 1318 ("CWA section 319, 33 U.S.C. [section]
1329, requires states to submit for federal approval nonpoint source reports and
management programs [but] does not require states to penalize nonpoint source
polluters who fail to adopt best management practices; rather it provides for grants
to encourage the adoption of such practices. . . .")). Thus, the ONDA II court
found the 1987 Amendments lent further support to its conclusion that nonpoint
sources of pollution are regulated indirectly stating, "Section [319], added to the
Act in 1987, requires states to adopt nonpoint source management programs and
similarly provides for grants to encourage a reduction in nonpoint source pollu-
tion." Cf id. (including section 319 in discussion of CWA provisions regulating
nonpoint source pollution) (citing NRDC, 915 F.2d at 1318).
122. See Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112,
1998 WL 407711, at *5 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998) (ruling in Oregon Natural Resources
Council v. United States Forest Service nonpoint source releases are not required to
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the relevant facts and arguments before them in ONRC, and com-
mented that in ONRC they held that all provisions of CWA section
301 applied to point sources exclusively.1 23 Without discussing
their analysis in ONRC, the ONDA II court observed that the "struc-
ture and plain language of the Act" led them to conclude that the
provision as a whole regulates only point source pollution. 124
In ONDA , the Ninth Circuit adopted the ONRC court's analy-
sis in reaching their conclusion "with regard to the scope of the
term 'discharge' in [section 401]."125 The ONDA I!court reasoned
that limiting the scope of the term "discharge" in section 401 is
consistent with congressional intent to focus the Act on effluent
obtain state certification), revg Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F.
Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996). The ONRC decision was of importance to the ONDA II
court because in ONRC, the Ninth Circuit "recognized the Act's separate treatment
of point and nonpoint source pollution." Id.
123. See id. The facts the ONDA H court set forth were similar to the case
before them because ONRC involved an environmental group suing under CWA's
citizen suit provision. See id. After noting that the plaintiffs in ONRC tried to use
the citizen suit provision to enjoin a logging operation which caused nonpoint
source pollution, the ONDA II court stated that CWA does allow a citizen suit "for
the violation of an effluent limitation under... [section 301]." Id. (citing C.W.A.
§ 505(f)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(2)). Next, the ONDA II court stated that the
plaintiff in ONRC "argued that the effluent limitations of [section 301] applied to
nonpoint sources by virtue of [section 301](b)(1)(C), which referenced state
water quality standards." Id. USFS argued on appeal that the district court erred
in not recognizing that the Ninth Circuit in ONRC concluded that section 401 does
not encompass nonpoint source pollution. See Brief for Appellees, Oregon Natu-
ral Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL 407711 (9th Cir.
July 22, 1998) (Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115) (citing USFS brief). ONDA
asserted that ONRC was not applicable because it did not address section 401, thus
never concluded section 401 does not apply to nonpoint source pollution. See id.
Instead, "[p]laintiffs in ONRC challenged the Forest Service's violation of State
water quality standards under [section] 303 of the CWA." Id. (citing ONRC, 834
F.2d at 848-49).
124. See OADA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *5. The ONDA I/ court concluded its
discussion of ONRC by quoting their language in ONRC that led them to construe
ONRC as basing their decision on the "structure and plain language of the Act...:
'The title and construction of section [301] (b) (1) lead us to the logical conclusion
that the limitations set forth in section [301] (b) (1) (C) are "effluent limitations"
and, therefore, by definition, applicable only to point sources." Id. (quoting
ONRC, 834 F.2d at 850 (citing C.W.A. § 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11))). For the
proposition that the ONRC court's analysis of section 301 was overruled by the
Court's decision in PUD, see supra note 42. For the Supreme Court's analysis of
section 301, see generally PUD, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
125. Id. Specifically referencing their decision in ONRC, the ONDA II court
stated, "In [ONRC] we held that the reference to water quality standards in [sec-
tion 301] (b) (1) (C) did not sweep nonpoint sources into the scope of [section
301]. For similar reasons, [section 303] does not sweep nonpoint sources into the
scope of [section 401]." Id. For an in-depth discussion of the Ninth Circuit's opin-
ion in ONRC, see supra note 38.
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limitations. 126 Specifically, any discharge from a licensed activity
must comply with sections 301, 302, 303, 306 and 307 of the Act.127
All of these provisions referenced in section 401 "relate to the regu-
lation of point sources."1 28
126. See id. The ONDA II court again discussed the shift in emphasis from
water quality standards to effluent limitations after the 1972 Amendments. See id.
Whereas prior to 1972, state certification of a licensed activity focused on ensuring
the activity would not violate state water quality standards, section 401 now re-
quires that the activity comply with effluent limitations which are aimed at eliminat-
ing the discharge of pollutants. See id. (citing Pub. L. 91-224, § 21 (b) (1), 84 Stat. 91
(1970); S. REP. No. 414, at 69 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3764, 3735).
If section 401 focuses on regulating discharges of pollutants, it logically follows that
the term "discharge" in section 401 must only limit discharges which emanate from
point sources. Cf id. (eluding to definition of "discharge of a pollutant" which
specifically means pollution from point sources). The ONDA II court therefore
concluded, "The term 'discharge' in [section 401] is limited to discharges from
point sources." Id.
127. See id. (citing C.W.A. § 401 (a) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (a) (1)). For the rele-
vant statutory language of section 401(a)(1), see supra notes 28 & 38.
128. Id. The ONDA I court thus agreed with the arguments of the interven-
ors and rejected ONDA's assertion that section 303, which is cross referenced in
section 401 involves water quality standards, not point sources. See Brief for Appel-
lees, Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL
407711 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998) (Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115) (noting sec-
tion 303 incorporates section 208 which addresses area-wide waste management
plans). The current version of the Act requires compliance with sections 301, 302,
303, 306 and 307 in order to obtain state certification. See ONDA II, 1998 WL
407711, at *5 (quoting C.W.A. § 401(a) (1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (a) (1)). The ONDA II
court concluded without discussion that sections 302, 306 and 307 regulate only
point sources of pollution. See id. The Ninth Circuit's decision in ORNC estab-
lished that section 301 only applies to point source pollution. See id. The ONDA II
court concluded that the water quality standards in section 303 may be applied
once the effluent limitations are met. See id. Section 303 requires states to estab-
lish water quality standards and create plans to ensure water quality standards are
met. See id. Appellees argued that section 303 regulates nonpoint sources of pollu-
tion because it addresses water quality standards. See id. The ONDA II court, how-
ever, concluded, similar to section 301 discussed in ONRC, the fact that 303
references water quality standards does not mean it regulates nonpoint source pol-
lution. See id. Water quality standards do not just regulate nonpoint source pollu-
tion, but can be established to regulate point source pollution. See id. Like the
water quality standards in section 301(b) (1) (C), as referenced in section 401,
water quality standards "provide 'a supplementary basis ... so that numerous point
sources, despite individual compliance with effluent limitations, may be further
regulated to prevent water quality from falling below acceptable levels.'" Id. (quot-
ing EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205
n. 12 (1976)).
The Ninth Circuit observed that water quality standards were held by the
Court to be allowable supplemental measures under section 401 in PUD No. 1 of
Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology. See id. at *6. Citing PUD, ONDA
noted that the Court concluded water quality standards may be maintained by
means other than effluent limitations, which are for point sources of pollution,
and construed PUD as an example of a Supreme Court decision that "has held that
the state's power under [section] 401 to address polluting activities on federal
lands is quite broad, and plainly includes the power to regulate all federally per-
mitted sources of pollution, even if they are not point sources." Brief for Appellees,
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3. Characterization of Point Source Within CWA
a. Point sources release of effluent, not runoff
The Ninth Circuit next addressed the use of the terms "dis-
charge" and "runoff' within CWA to support the proposition that
the term "discharge" encompasses only point sources. 129 The
ONDA II court found that Congress did not intend to include the
term "runoff' in section 401, as it had in other provisions of
CWA.a3 0 Further, Congress characterized nonpoint source pollu-
Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL
407711 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998) (Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115).
In rejecting appellees reliance on PUD, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the propo-
sition that PUD broadened the meaning of the term "discharge" under section 401.
See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *6. First, the Ninth Circuit discussed the relevant
facts of PUD. See id. In that case, the State of Washington conditioned a state
permit on an applicant for a federal licence to build a dam complying with "mini-
mum stream flows in order to protect fisheries." Id. (citing PUD, 511 U.S. at 712).
Distinguishing PUD on its facts, the ONDA H!court specifically pointed out that the
parties in PUD conceded that discharges would occur from building and operating
the dam. See id. (citing PUD, 511 U.S. at 711). Second, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the release of dredge and fill material and the release of water from a
tailrace "would involve point sources; the tailrace is a conveyance and the dredge
and fill material would presumably involve a conveyance or rolling stock." Id.
Lastly, recognizing that the water quality conditions in PUD were not related to the
discharges, the Ninth Circuit noted that the PUD court held the limitations to be
appropriate under section 401 because "a state is free to impose such water-quality
limitations 'once the threshold condition, the existence of a discharge, is satis-
fied."' Id. (quoting PUD, 511 U.S. at 712). Thus, the Ninth Circuit construed PUD
as supporting its interpretation that discharges only include point sources because
the water quality conditions were allowable since the discharges in PUD emanated
from a point source. See id.
For a further discussion of the Court's decision in PUD, see supra notes 35-42
and accompanying text.
129. See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *6-*7. The ONDA H court found fur-
ther support for rejecting appellee's argument that nonpoint source pollution,
such as runoff from grazing, falls under the term "discharge," by surveying all pro-
vision of CWA. Cf id. The Ninth Circuit observed that the term "discharge" is
referred to throughout CWA as the "release of effluent from a point source," while
the term "runoff" is used in provisions that address wastewater plans and manage-
ment of nonpoint sources of pollution. See id. at *6 (providing CWA sections 208
("describing urban wastewater plans") and 404(0 ("providing guidelines for iden-
tification of nonpoint sources of pollution") as examples of CWA provisions refer-
encing runoff). The Ninth Circuit further distinguished the use of discharge from
runoff by noting the absence of a specific reference to discharge as nonpoint pol-
lution, and the absence of the term "runoff' in section 401. See id. ("Neither the
phrase 'nonpoint source discharge' nor the phrase 'discharge from a nonpoint
source' appears in the Act [and] [s]ection [401] contains no reference to
runoff.").
130. See id. at *6. The Ninth Circuit cited section 313 in support of its posi-
tion. See id. First, the ONDA H1 court quoted the relevant language of section
313(a), "[Section 313] ... directs federal agencies 'engaged in any activity which
may result in the discharge or runoff of pollutants' to comply with applicable water
quality standards." (quoting C.W.A. § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)) (emphasis ad-
ded). Second, the Ninth Circuit construed this provision as "plainly appl[ying] to
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tion as runoff. 3 1 The Ninth Circuit concluded that "[t]he termi-
nology employed throughout the Clean Water Act cuts against
ONDA's argument that the term 'discharge' includes nonpoint
source pollution like runoff from grazing." 132
b. Cows are not point sources
The Ninth Circuit then considered intervenor and appellees'
argument that grazing cattle are similar to point sources of pollu-
tion and should be included within the ambit of a "discernable,
confined and discrete conveyance."' 3 3 First, as a threshold matter,
the court noted that Congress did not include animals among the
enumerated point sources of pollution.13 4 The ONDA Ilcourt then
analogized grazing cattle to human beings, noting that the Second
Circuit refused to characterize human beings as point sources of
pollution for purposes of CWA.135 The Ninth Circuit concluded
that grazing cattle do not fall within the definition of point
source. 13 6 Second, the ONDA II court addressed the intervenor's
nonpoint sources of pollution on federal land." Id. Lastly, the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that "[h]ad Congress intended to require certification for runoff as well as
discharges, it could easily have written [runoff into section 401] to mirror the lan-
guage of [section 313] . . . ." Id. (citing C.W.A. § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)).
131. See id. at *6-*7 (quoting Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558
(9th Cir. 1984)). Looking to its previous decisions, the ONDA Icourt discussed
how the Ninth Circuit characterized nonpoint source pollution, and asserted they
"recognize[d] the distinction between the terms 'discharge' and 'runoff.'" See id.
(quoting Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d
842, 849 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987) (giving examples of nonpoint source pollution, irri-
gated agricultural and silvicultural activity runoff); Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at
558 (characterizing runoff as untraceable "to any identifiable point of
discharge")).
132. Id. at *6.
133. See id. at *7. The intervenor and appellees argued that the cattle resem-
ble a point source as defined by CWA because they are normally confined by man-
made fences, and directly deposit their waste into the stream. See id.
134. See id. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-
35112, 1998 WL 407711, at *7 (9th Cir.July 22, 1998) (citing C.W.A. § 502(14), 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14)), revg Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp.
1534 (D. Or. 1996). For the statutory language of section 502(14) defining the
term "point source," see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
135. See id. (citing United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 649
(2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied by United States v. Villegas, 512 U.S. 1245 (1994)). The
Ninth Circuit "agree[d] with the Second Circuit that the term 'point source' does
not include a human being, or any other animal." Id. (citing Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at
649). For a discussion of the Second Circuit's decision in Plaza Health, see supra
notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
136. See id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, like human beings, grazing cat-
tle roam freely. Cf id. (refusing to consider grazing cattle point source based on
fact they may potentially be "controlled by manmade structures such as fences").
Thus, the court concluded that "[i]t would be strange indeed to classify as a point
source something as inherently mobile as a cow." Id.
[Vol. X: p. 431
68
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol10/iss2/5
OREGON NATURAL DESERT ASSOCIATION
argument that these grazing cattle "may constitute a 'concentrated
animal feeding operation.' ,,13 7 The Ninth Circuit, though declin-
ing to reach a decision on this question because it was not properly
before the court, nonetheless stated that "[t]his position is not
tenable."1 3 8
4. ONDA II Court's Expansion of Its Decision
Recognizing the potential importance of this issue, the ONDA
II court expressly expanded their holding from the facts of the
case. 139 The Ninth Circuit provided: "The Clean Water Act, when
examined as a whole, cannot support the conclusion that [section
401] applies to nonpoint sources."'140 Thus, the ONDA II court
stated, "[W]e hold that certification under [section 401] is not re-
quired for grazing permits or other federal licenses that may cause
pollution solely from nonpoint sources. 141 In classifying all graz-
ing activity as nonpoint source pollution, the Ninth Circuit at-
tempted to convey that its holding should be applied to all
traditional sources of nonpoint source pollution, regardless of
whether it emanates from a conveyance or falls within the defini-
tion of the term "point source. ' 142 The ONDA Hcourt reversed the
judgment of the district court and remanded for entry ofjudgment
in favor of USFS. 143
137. Id. The intervenors argued that the cattle constituted a "concentrated
animal feeding operation" (CAFO), which is included in the definition of point
source. Id. (citing C.W.A. § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)).
138. Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument without discussion, noting
that the determination of what constitutes a CAFO lies with the Director of the
NPDES program and was not at issue before the court. See id. (citation omitted).
139. See id. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-
35112, 1998 WL 407711, at *7 (9th Cir.July 22, 1998), rev'gOregon Natural Desert
Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996). For a critical discussion of
ONDA Ils expansive holding, see infra notes 144-93 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the implications of the ONDA II court's expansive holding, see infra
notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
140. Id. at *3. In their brief submitted to the Ninth Circuit, ONDA re-
sponded to the intervenor's argument that deference was due USFS's interpreta-
tion of section 401. See Brief for Appellees, Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v.
Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL 407711 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998) (Nos.
97-35065, 97-35112, 97-35115). ONDA asserted that section 401 is regulated by
EPA, and thus EPA's interpretation is due deference. See id. ONDA states, "EPA
agrees with plaintiffs interpretation of [section] 401, and has so informed the Jus-
tice Department, although the Justice Department has elected not to inform this
Court of EPA's position." Id. Neither the Intervenor's argument asserting defer-
ence to USFS, nor EPA's position on this issue, is mentioned by the Ninth Circuit
in ONDA II. See generally ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *1.
141. ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *7.
142. See id.
143. See id. at *8.
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C. Critical Analysis
In ONDA I the Ninth Circuit incorrectly concluded that all
"nonpoint sources of pollution" are excluded from regulation
under section 401 of CWA.144 By adopting a narrow definition of
discharge, the Ninth Circuit undermined the goals of CWA. 1
45
Moreover, the court improperly applied the definition of point
source, and ignored their own characterization of nonpoint
sources. 146 As a result, the Ninth Circuit has incorrectly narrowed
the scope of pollution which falls under section 401 in concluding
that grazing cattle, and any source of runoff, cannot potentially be
deemed a point source of pollution subject to regulation under sec-
tion 401.14 7
1. The Two Discharges in ONDA II
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly concluded that it chose a broad
reading of the term "discharge."'148 The ONDA II court contended
144. See id. at *6-*7; see also Miles, supra note 4, at 219 (discussing federal
water pollution control policy in asserting term "discharge" should be interpreted
based on policy).
145. See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *7 (adopting narrow definition of dis-
charge). CWA's primary goal is to eliminate identifiable sources of pollution from
the nation's waters. See United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373
(10th Cir. 1979) (asserting all pollution must be regulated to achieve CWA's
goals); Wood, supra note 17, at 580 ("Limiting the class of sources subject to the
NPDES system frustrates the purposes of the CWA .... "). For a discussion of
possible means to include nonpoint point source pollution within the ambit of
section 401, see supra notes 16 & 17 & 64-85 and accompanying text. For a list of
cases, including decisions from the Ninth Circuit, characterizing pollution sources
based on the trait of identifiability, and whether the pollution source is a "discerni-
ble, confined and discrete conveyance," regardless of the type of pollution, see
supra note 69 & 70. For CWA's statutory purpose and goals, see supra notes 1-4 &
24-25 and accompanying text.
146. For a discussion of the means used by courts to distinguish between
point and nonpoint sources, see supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
147. Cf ONDA I, 1998 WL 407711, at *7 (refusing to include cattle as point
sources of pollution). For a further discussion of the ONDA II court's determina-
tion that grazing cattle are not point sources, see infra notes 168-88 and accompa-
nying text. In holding that nonpoint sources with a conveyance or nonpoint
sources which fall within the definition of point source, are excluded from 401
review, Ninth Circuit ignores their own decisions, which clearly allow runoff which
emanates from a "discrete, confined conveyance" to fall within the definition of
point source and recognize that point sources should be broadly interpreted to
meet CWA's goals. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. Further, the
ONDA II court expanded its decision beyond the issue before them because the
defendants conceded that nonpoint sources with a conveyance do fall within the
plain meaning of discharge. See supra note 101.
148. Cf ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *7 (relying on case law interpreting
"discharge of a pollutant" as opposed to language "any discharge" within section
401(a)). For a list of cases specifically analyzing the term "discharge of a pollu-
tant," including Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Service, Natural
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that its interpretation of discharge was broad because it included all
releases only from point sources. 149 In support of this rationale, the
Ninth Circuit relied on a distinguishable case. In National Wildlife
Federation v. Gorsuch (National Wildlife) ,150 the D.C. Circuit's reason-
ing supports the proposition that "discharge" and "discharge of a
pollutant" are discrete terms based on the plain language of the
Act.151 Further, the National Wildlife court specifically analyzed the
Resources Defense Council v. EPA and National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch relied on
by the ONDA II court, see supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
149. See id. at *7; supra note 115.
150. 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982). For the facts, holding and rationale in
National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, see supra note 50.
151. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 172 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (differentiating definitions based on use of "means" or "includes" in analyz-
ing working of "pollutant" definition). The D.C. Circuit in National Wildlife re-
jected the argument that the terms "pollutant" and "pollution" should be equated,
because Congress gave the terms two discrete definitions. See id. at 172-73 ("Thus,
while Congress did not specifically exclude dams from the NPDES program, it ex-
pressed neither specific intent to include them nor general intent to equate 'pollu-
tant' and 'pollution."'). Although the term "pollution" uses the word "means," it
encompasses a wide range of substances which can be categorized as "the man-
made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radio-
logical integrity of water." C.W.A. § 502(19), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19). The term "pol-
lutant," however, is defined by an extensive list of examples. See C.W.A. § 502(6),
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). In analyzing the "pollutant" definition, the D.C. Circuit rea-
soned that the definition of pollutant used the "restrictive phrasing... 'means' ...
rather than the looser phrase 'includes,' used elsewhere in the Act." Id. at 172.
Thus, while the pollution in question in National Wildlife may have fallen within the
.pollution" definition, it did not fall within the narrower, more limited and precise
pollutant" definition. See National Wildlife, 693 F.2d at 173.
The National Wildlife court specifically listed "discharge" in section 311 as a
term which uses a "looser" phrase. Cf id. at 172 n.49 (construing "pollutant" defi-
nition as restrictive based on presence of word "means"). The definition of the
term "discharge" in CWA section 311 employs the language "means ... but is not
limited to." See C.W.A. § 311(a) (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2). Similarly, the defini-
tion of the term "discharge" in section 502 uses the word "includes;" however,
nowhere does the more limiting word "means" appear. See C.W.A. § 502(16), 33
U.S.C. § 1362(16) (defining discharge as "includ[ing] a discharge of a pollutant,
and a discharge of pollutants" (emphasis added)). In contrast to the term "dis-
charge" in section 502, the term "discharge of a pollutant's" definition uses the
word "means" without the qualifying language "but is not limited to" used in CWA
section 311's discharge definition. See C.W.A. § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12); see
also National Wildlife, 693 F.3d at 172, 172 n.49 (providing CWA definitions using
non-exclusive phrasing "means... but is not limited to"). Thus, "discharge of a
pollutant," like "pollutant," which Congress limited by the use of the word
"means," only encompasses the stated meaning. Cf National Wildlife, 693 F.3d at
172 (explaining general rules of statutory construction) (quoting Colautti v. Frank-
lin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 n. 10 (quoting C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 47.07 (4th ed. Supp. 1982))). Under the National Wildlife rationale,
Congress intended the term "discharge" in CWA section 502 to include, but not be
limited to, point source discharges. Cf id. at 172 n.49 (highlighting words "in-
cludes, but is not limited to . . ." in discharge definition); see also Donahue, supra
note 8, at 230 ("If Congress had intended otherwise, it would simply have said, one
more time, 'discharge means .... ').
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elements of the term "discharge of a pollutant" under section 402,
which it considered to be the narrower term, and not the term "dis-
charge" as used in section 401, which would arguably have a
broader meaning under the National Wildlife analysis. 15 2
For other Ninth Circuit judicial decisions differentiating terms based on the
presence of the word "includes," see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Ninth Circuit split); supra notes 38 (discussing Oregon Natural Resources
Council v. United States Forest Service) & note 62 (discussing North Carolina v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission); supra notes 99-143 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing ONDA I and ONDA I1).
152. Cf National Wildlife, 693 F.2d at 171 ("The statutory question is whether
any or all of these conditions constitute the 'addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source' so as to require EPA to issue NPDES permits for
dams under [section] 402." (quoting "discharge of a pollutant" definition, C.W.A.
§ 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12))). For the relevant statutory language of CWA
section 401(a), see supra notes 28 & 38. For the relevant statutory language of
CWA section 402, see supra note 26. The ONDA H court's reliance on National
Wildlife for the proposition that the broader reading of the term "discharge" in-
cludes polluting and nonpolluting pollutants is inaccurate. Compare ONDA II, 1998
WL 407711, at *5 (stating National Wildlife court interpreted CWA section 502 term
"discharge") with National Wildlife, 693 F.2d at 171 (restating issue resolution re-
quired interpretation of term "discharge of a pollutant"). First, the National Wild-
life court was determining whether an activity required a federal permit, or should
be left to state regulation. See id. at 171. In contrast, ONDA H addressed whether
an activity which already had a federal permit should be subject to state review. See
ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *1.
Second, the National Wildlife court focused on interpreting the meaning and
scope of the terms "pollutant," "addition," and "from" in the definition of "dis-
charge of a pollutant." See National Wildlife, 693 F.2d at 156. Focusing on a narrow
reading of "discharge of a pollutant" would require an addition of a pollutant. See
id. at 176. In contrast, a broader reading of the phrase would allow all pollution
added to navigable waters from a point source to fall within the definition, not
simply those additions that are pollutants. See id. at 175-76. But this elaboration
on what a broader reading of section 402 entails was limited in context to analyz-
ing the term "discharge of a pollutant" under section 402, and did not address the
language "any discharge" or the operation of the term "discharge" as used in sec-
tion 401. See National Wildlife, 693 F.2d at 171. The D.C. Circuit held that the
pollution at issue was not a "pollutant" because of the narrower phrasing of the
term's definition, which utilizes the word "means." See id. at 171-72. Further, un-
like the ONDA II court's analysis of the terms "discharge" and "discharge of a pollu-
tant," the National Wildlife court concluded that the presence of two discrete
definitions weighed against equating the terms "pollutant" and "pollution." Com-
pare ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *3 (declining to focus on statutory definitional
language in construing term "discharge") with National Wildlife, 693 F.2d at 173
(discussing textual changes in "pollutant" definition during CWA's 1972 Amend-
ments). Thus, the term "pollution" would not include all pollutants. See National
Wildlife, 693 F.2d at 173. In contrast, the ONDA II court appears to have applied
the National Wildlife court's analysis of words within a different definition, "dis-
charge of a pollutant," in construing the meaning of the term "discharge." Cf
ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *7 (explaining National Wildlife holding). The ONDA
H court reasoned that because "discharge of a pollutant" excludes pollution which
does not meet the "pollutant" definition, that the term "discharge" includes pollu-
tion not meeting the "pollutant" definition. Cf id. at *7 ("[In National Wildlife], the
court interpreted 'discharge' in [CWA section 501] (16) . . . to include the release
from a point source of turbid water that did not contain any pollutant."). The
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National Wildlife court, however, did not address the term "discharge" from section
502(16) and the ONDA II court's reasoning supports the proposition that because
the term "pollutant" in "discharge of a pollutant" does not include pollution
sources which do not meet the definition of point source, that the term "dis-
charge" includes sources not meeting the definition of point sources, i.e. nonpoint
pollution sources. Cf id. (inferring inclusion in "discharge" definition what is ex-
cluded from "pollutant" definition). While analyzing the term "pollutant's" scope,
the National Wildlife court noted that Congress expressly recognized that analysis of
the terms in section 502, particularly consideration of the precise wording com-
prising the definitions, was essential to understanding the Act. See National Wildlife,
693 F.2d at 173 n.52. The Congressional language quoted by the National Wildlife
court offered both "discharge" and "discharge of a pollutant" as terms whose defi-
nitional language should be carefully considered in analyzing their particular
meaning. See id. The ONDA II court did not accurately apply the principles of
statutory construction utilized by the National Wildlife court in determining the
broader interpretation of the term "discharge." Cf ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at
*3 (explaining, and declining to follow, analysis of ONDA Icourt which more accu-
rately reflects the National Wildlife court's rationale by focusing on definitional
words "means" and "includes"). Applying the reasoning of the National Wildlife
court, the term "discharge" is the broader term, as was the term "pollution," be-
cause Congress chose to include a "discharge of a pollutant," which only encom-
passes point source pollution and excludes all other pollution releases, but not
exclude something other than a "discharge of a pollutant."
Third, the D.C. Circuit noted that the legislative history supported a finding
on either side of the interpretations for what constitutes a "pollutant" and an "addi-
tion," and specifically deferred to EPA's interpretation. See National Wildlife, 693
F.2d at 173 (discussing term "pollutant") & 175 (discussing word "addition"). This
deference, in effect, exempted a point source of pollution, the dam, from regula-
tion under section 402. See id. at 176. Indeed, although recognizing the dual regu-
latory schemes for point versus nonpoint sources of pollution, the National Wildlife
court nonetheless noted that some point sources were arguably intended to be
regulated by the states. See id. Thus, National Wildlife does not support the ONDA
H court's assertion that regulation of point and nonpoint sources of pollution are
always regulated separately by dictates of CWA, and thus nonpoint source pollu-
tion could not be subject to section 401 review. Cf id. Further, it can be argued
that the two conflicting views regarding the scope of the term "discharge" dis-
cussed in ONDA I and ONDA II, similar to the opposing statutory interpretations
considered in National Wildlife, are equally valid statutory interpretations, and that
policy should be considered in determining which to adopt. See Donahue, supra
note 8, at 238 (noting validity of both interpretations); see generally Miles, supra
note 4, at 219-221 (giving policy reasons in favor of broad reading of discharge).
For a discussion of differing ways to interpret the plain language of the term "dis-
charge," as used in section 401's phrase "any discharge," (broadly v. narrowly) see
supra note 45. For the operation of the terms "includes" and "means" within a
statutory definition for purposes of analysis and interpretation, see supra notes 45
& 50.
It is interesting to note that the ONDA II court relied on judicial decisions
whose holdings were based in part on deference to EPA's interpretation of CWA.
See supra notes 38 (discussing Oregon Resources Defense Council v. United States Forest
Service) & note 50 (discussing National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch); supra notes 70
& 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories,
Inc.). In contrast, although EPA did not issue an official statement concerning the
issue before the ONDA II court, the ONDA II court chose not to address EPA's
interpretation of the term "discharge" in section 401 made known to them by
ONDA, which supported the ONDA Icourt's analysis and conclusion regarding the
scope of the term "discharge." See supra notes 101 & 140.
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In contrast, the Ninth Circuit specifically addressed the scope
of the term "discharge," from the language "any discharge," in sec-
tion 401, and rejected any alternate interpretation of the term "dis-
charge.' 5 3  Further, in analyzing the statutory definition of
discharge, the ONDA H court equated the terms "discharge" and
"discharge of a pollutant.' 54 The distinction is an important one:
in concluding that the broader reading of the term "discharge"
means all releases of pollution from point sources, the ONDA II court
significantly narrowed the coverage of section 401 by focusing on
one type of discharge regulated under CWA. 155
In distinguishing between nonpoint and point sources of pol-
lution, again, the Ninth Circuit inappropriately focused on the
term "discharge of a pollutant.' 56 The ONDA II court relied on its
decision in ONRC, which specifically addresses section 301 of
CWA. 157 The Ninth Circuit's analysis and decision in ONRC, inter-
153. See Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112,
1998 WL 407711, at *7 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998) (asserting correct interpretation of
term "discharge" is inclusion of polluting and nonpolluting releases), rev' Oregon
Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996). For an analysis
of the Ninth Circuit's rationale in ONDA II, overturning the OADA I court's opin-
ion, see supra notes 107-43 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the varying
interpretations of the term "discharge" in CWA section 401, see supra notes 43-47
& 99-143 and accompanying text.
154. Cf id. (referencing National Wildlife in support of position term "dis-
charge" in CWA includes only point sources, and, failing to distinguish between
operation of word "includes" versus "means" within statutory definition). For the
ONDA II court's rationale in equating the terms "discharge" and "discharge of a
pollutant," see supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
155. Compare ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *1 (excluding all nonpoint source
pollution from certification requirement of section 401) with Oregon Natural De-
sert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534, 1541 (D. Or. 1996) ("This court holds that
[section] 401 applies to all federally permitted activities that may result in a dis-
charge, including discharges from nonpoint sources."), rev'd sub nom. Oregon Nat-
ural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL 407711, at *1
(9th Cir. July 22, 1998).
156. See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *5-*7 (failing to accurately distinguish
between discharge and "discharge of a pollutant"). For an overview of activities
and water pollution potentially exempt from CWA regulation as a result of this
failure, see supra notes 6 & 8 & 11 & 17; supra note 70 and accompanying text.
157. See id.; see also Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest
Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating issue before court was whether
water quality standards may be enforced absent NPDES permit under section
301 (b) (1) (c) of CWA). In addition, contrary to the ONDA II court's observation,
the ONRC decision is distinguishable because the plaintiffs in ONRC did not sue
under CWA's citizen suit provision. See ONRC, 834 F.2d at 851 (agreeing with
plaintiffs argument claim was brought pursuant to Administrative Procedure Act).
The ONRC court determined that the plaintiffs sought a determination that the
timber harvesting activities violated state water quality standards under CWA sec-
tion 303. See id. (concluding plaintiff's claim did not seek damages under citizen
suit provision). The ONRC court expressly stated that the "plaintiffs [were] not
attempting to enforce the Act pursuant to the citizen suit provision." Id. For dis-
[Vol. X: p. 431
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preting section 301 as prohibiting only point sources of pollution,
was called into doubt by the Supreme Court's decision in PUD. 158
Further, the ONRC court's analysis focuses on the term "discharge
of a pollutant.' 1 5 9 In contrast, the issue in ONDA I!focuses on CWA
section 401, which prohibits "any discharge."' 60 Under section 401,
an activity which may result in "any discharge" from a federal activ-
ity must comply with numerous provisions, including section 301 .161
The Ninth Circuit, thus, inappropriately supported its interpreta-
tion of discharge by analogizing the term "discharge" to the inter-
pretation of one CWA section, using the narrower term "discharge
of a any pollutant," that the broader phrase "any discharge" in CWA
section 401 must comply with. 162
cussion of the ONDA II court's incorrect reading of their decision in ONRC, see
supra note 123.
158. Compare PUD No. 1 ofJefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology,
511 U.S. 700, 711-12 (1994) (holding CWA section 301 encompasses water quality
standards regardless if related to discharge) with ONRC, 834 F.2d at 850-51 (hold-
ing section 301 of CWA applies exclusively to point sources of pollution, stating
citizen suit provision cannot be used to enforce nonpoint source water quality stan-
dards). For the proposition that the Ninth Circuit's holding and analysis in ONRC
of section 301 were overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in PUD, see supra
note 42. For the Ninth Circuit's recognition that the PUD decision called into
question their holding in ONRC, see infra note 189 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of the facts, reasoning and holding in the Ninth Circuit's ONRC
decision, see supra note 38. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation,
and subsequent application, in ONDA II of its decision in ONRC, see supra notes
122-28 and accompanying text.
159. See ONRC, 834 F.2d at 849-50 (analyzing term "discharge of a pollutant"
under section 301). The ONRC court supported its position referencing section
301's title, "Effluent limitations" in concluding effluent limitations are limited to
point sources of pollution. See id. at 849. CWA section 301(a), defining the scope
of section 301, qualifies the "discharge of any pollutant." See C.W.A. § 301(a), 33
U.S.C. § 1311 (a). For the relevant statutory language of section 301(a), addressing
"discharge of pollutants," see supra note 26. Further, CWA section 401 (a) ad-
dresses "any activity ... which may result in any discharge." C.W.A. § 401 (a), 33
U.S.C. § 1341(a). The narrower term "discharge of a pollutant" does not appear
in this section. See C.W.A. § 401(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a).
160. For the relevant statutory language of CWA section 401(a), defining the
scope of section 401, see supra notes 28 & 38. For ONDA's arguments that the
ONRC decision was not relevant because of this distinction, see supra note 123.
Section 401's title, in contrast to section 301's title, is entitled "Certification." See
id. C.W.A. §§ 301 & 401, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311 & 1341.
161. See id. C.W.A. § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341. For the list of CWA provisions
which must be complied with, see supra note 38.
162. For a discussion of the distinction between the terms "discharge of a
pollutant" and CWA section 401's "discharge," recognizing the narrower scope of
the former, see supra note 45; Donahue, supra note 8, at 229-32 (discussing section
401's broad language, "any discharge"). For an explanation of how the court in
ONDA II inappropriately equated the two "discharge" terms, see supra note 151-54
and accompanying text. For an elaboration on an appropriately broad reading of
the term "any discharge," see supra note 45.
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Further, ONCR never directly addressed whether the activity in
question was a point source or a nonpoint source of pollution,
merely relying on another Ninth Circuit case, Trustees for Alaska v.
EPA (Trustees for Alaska), 163 in assuming the activity in question was
a nonpoint source of pollution. 164 The Trustees for Alaska decision,
however, contradicts, rather than supports, the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in ONDA H!in two critical ways. First, in Trustees for Alaska, the
Ninth Circuit specifically adopted the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in
United States v. Earth Sciences Inc., (Earth Sciences) 16 5 which found un-
supportable the proposition that in distinguishing between
nonpoint and point sources of pollution, runoff could never ema-
nate from a point source simply because the term "runoff' was ref-
erenced in provisions relating to the control of nonpoint sources of
pollution. 166 Second, the Trustees for Alaska court recognized that
163. 749 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1984).
164. See Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834
F.2d 842, 848-49, 849 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating plaintiffs conceded point source
discharges not at issue because section 301(a) refers to point source discharges,
and providing definition of nonpoint source from Trustees for Alaska). Similarly,
the PUD court and the National Wildlife court did not address whether the dis-
charges at issue emanated from point or nonpoint sources. See supra notes 42 (dis-
cussing PUD) & 50 (discussing National Wildlife). For the characterization of
nonpoint sources by Trustees for Alaska, and a list of Ninth Circuit cases addressing
nonpoint sources and nonpoint source pollution, see supra notes 68-73.
165. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1978).
166. See Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 557-58 (9th Cir. 1984) (not-
ing Tenth Circuit found Congress's rejection of a CWA Amendment, which pro-
posed to regulate mining point sources separately because of overlapping general
regulatory provisions, supported conclusion gold mining operations discharging
runoff was point source). In adopting the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, the Ninth
Circuit in Trustees for Alaska implicitly agreed with the conclusion that activities
causing runoff may cause either point or nonpoint source discharges. Cf id.
(holding mining activity was point source although also regulated in section
304(f) (2) (B) discussing nonpoint sources). For the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
reaching this conclusion in Trustees for Alaska, see supra note 71. The ONDA H
court, however, explicitly precluded any overlapping or duplicative regulation,
maintaining a strict division between regulation of point and nonpoint sources.
For the ONDA II court's narrow reading of CWA's dual regulatory scheme, see
supra notes 116-28 and accompanying text. Further, the ONDA I court, in specifi-
cally concluding all runoff emanates from a nonpoint source, failed to consider
prior decisions which hold that runoff may emanate from a point source where the
source is a "discernible, discrete and confined conveyance." See, e.g., Oregon Natu-
ral Resources Council v. Lyng, 882 F.2d 1417, 1424 n.8 (9th Cir. 1989) (defining
nonpoint source). Forjudicial decisions, including Ninth Circuit decisions, recog-
nizing runoff from a "discrete, confined conveyance" may emanate from a point
source, see supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. For ONDA Ifs review of
CWA's use of the words "discharge" and "runoff' within CWA's provisions, sup-
porting the proposition the term "discharge" only encompasses point sources, see
supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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point sources of pollution must be interpreted broadly in order to
effectuate the remedial goals of CWA.167
2. Is There a "Point" in Grazing Cows?
The Ninth Circuit may have impermissibly broadened the
scope of its holding by inadequately addressing the Supreme
Court's ruling in PUD.168 Further, in narrowly construing the term
"point source," the ONDA II court incorrectly applied precedent in
evaluating whether grazing on federal land constitutes a point
source. 169 Most importantly, the Ninth Circuit undermined CWA's
goal to regulate all identifiable sources of pollution by excluding
nonpoint sources of pollution with a conveyance from section
401.170
167. Cf id. at 559 (adopting Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Earth Sciences, which
provides point sources should be interpreted expansively); see also United States v.
Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979) (asserting regulating all
source of pollution requires broad reading of term "point source"). For a discus-
sion of the Trustees for Alaska court's application of the principle that the term
"point source" should be broadly construed, see supra note 71.
168. See ONDA /, 1998 WL 407711, at *6 (interpreting PUD as concluding all
nonpoint sources of pollution are excluded from regulation under section 401);
see also Donahue, supra note 8, at 219 (suggesting PUD implied that a wide variety
of federal permits fall within section 401's authority regardless of pollution
source). The ONDA 1I court concluded that the parties in PUD conceded the dam
and tailrace pipe would result in a discharge, thus were point sources, and by infer-
ence nonpoint sources were excluded. See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *6. The
parties in PUD, however, only conceded that the emissions could be possible dis-
charges. See supra note 36. As a result, the issue of whether the dam and tailrace
were point sources was not an issue before the Court. See supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text. In contrast, the ONDA Icourt concluded that the two releases
were from point sources, failing to recognize that this was never addressed and
asserted in PUD. See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *6. In fact, one of the sources
may not have been a point source. See supra notes 40-42. Indeed, the language in
the ONDA H court's decision reflects uncertainty as to the inevitability these re-
leases in PUD would emanate from point sources; the court stated, "The dredge
and fill operation presumably would involve a conveyance or rolling stock." ONDA
II, 1998 WL 407711, at *6 (emphasis added). For a further discussion of PUD,
reflecting a broader application of section 401, see supra note 42.
169. See ONDA , 1998 WL 407711, at *7 (rejecting argument grazing cattle
are point source). For a discussion of ONDA If s implicit adoption of precedent
advocating a broad interpretation of the term "point source," see supra note 67.
For the ONDA IIcourt's analysis and conclusion regarding what constitutes a point
source of pollution, see supra notes 129-38. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's
broader characterization of nonpoint sources and nonpoint source pollution, see
supra notes 69-71.
170. See id. (excluding from section 401's phrase "any discharge" pollution
sources not specifically listed in point source definition). For Ninth Circuit deci-
sions recognizing that identifiable sources may be point sources, regardless of pol-
lution type, see supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
appropriateness in focusing on an identifiable source of pollution in distinguish-
ing between point and nonpoint sources, and defining a point source, see supra
notes 64-85 and accompanying text.
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a. "Yes," because cows aren't "runoff"
The Ninth Circuit asserts that effluents are discharges because
they emanate from a point source, while runoff is not a discharge,
emanating from nonpoint sources of pollution. 171 The fifty grazing
cattle in ONDA II, however, do not meet the Ninth Circuit's charac-
terization of nonpoint sources excluded from section 401.172 First,
the cattle's grazing activity in ONDA H directly deposited pollution
into the stream.1 73 Second, the cattle are an identifiable and con-
171. See id. at *6-*7 (discussing use of term "runoff" in CWA). Runoff, how-
ever, can in some cases be recognized as emanating from a point source. See, e.g.,
Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 119 (2d
Cir. 1994) (holding liquid manure emanates from point source), cert. denied, 514
U.S. 1082 (1995). It is interesting to note that the D.C. Circuit in National Wildlife,
which the ONDA II court relied on as support for its reading of the scope of the
term "discharge" in section 401, specifically rejected the proposition that runoff can-
not emanate from a point source. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d
156, 175 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In rejecting EPA's assertion that an addition must
be "from" a point source, the National Wildlife court observed that a "discharge of a
pollutant" includes runoff which is collected or channeled by man. See id. at 175
n.58. In addition, the ONDA // court relied on their decision in Trustees for Alaska,
as quoted in ONRC, which not only recognizes a broad interpretation of point
source, but also emphasizes the ability of identifying polluters as the means to
differentiate between point and nonpoint source pollution. See supra, notes 69-71;
see also Wood, supra note 17, at 577 (giving Trustees for Alaska as example of court
decision categorizing sources based on identifiability of polluter). For judicial de-
cisions determining runoff to be from a point source, see supra notes 68-73 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the facts, holding, and court rationale in
Southview Farm, see supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
172. For the Ninth Circuit's characterization of nonpoint sources, and
nonpoint source pollution, see supra notes 68-73. For judicial decisions holding
that runoff which is channeled and collected by man emanates from a point
source, see supra notes 68-71. See also Gould, supra note 8, at 472 (defining
nonpoint source). The Ninth Circuit in ONDA H characterized nonpoint pollu-
tion as runoff caused primarily by rainfall, from an unidentifiable source. See
ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *6-*7 (quoting Oregon Natural Resources Council v.
United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 849 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); Trustees for Alaska,
749 F.2d at 558). In ONDA II, it is conceded that the cattle cause a significant
amount of pollution. See id. at *1. Further, the Ninth Circuit noted that examples
of runoff exempted from NPDES certification requirements include irrigated agri-
culture and silvicultural activities. See id. at *6-*7 (citation omitted). This, how-
ever, does not equate with livestock grazing. Nonpoint source pollution is diffuse,
not "'result[ing] from a discharge at a specific, single location.., but generally
results from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, or percolation.'"
Gould, supra note 8, at 472 (quoting Office of Water, U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, NONPOINT SOURCE GUIDANCE 3 (1987)); see also Saperstein, supra note
10, at 889-890 (defining nonpoint source pollution). The cattle in ONDA II con-
gregate daily in the same area, and could easily be fenced in to preclude them
from wading in the waters. See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *7.
173. See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *1. Because the Ninth Circuit relied on
its decisions in ONRC and Trustees for Alaska, reference to Earth Sciences is appropri-
ate in distinguishing between point and nonpoint sources of pollution. See supra
note 69; supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text. The Earth Sciences court specif-
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trollable source. 174 Last, unlike irrigated agriculture, and the silvi-
cultural activities at issue in ONRC, grazing is not expressly exempt
from NPDES permitting requirements. 175 The ONDA II court thus
ically stated that in order to further Congress's goal to eliminate all pollution from
the nation's waters,
[t]he concept of a point source was designed . . .[to] embrac[e] the
broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance from which
pollutants might enter the waters of the United States. It is clear from the
legislative history Congress would have regulated so-called nonpoint
sources if a workable method could have been derived .... We believe it
contravenes the intent of [CWA] and the structure of the statute to ex-
empt from regulation any activity that emits pollution from an identifi-
able point.
Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 373. EPA defines point sources as pollutants that "are
discharged directly from the conveyance into a waterbody. You can stand by the
river bank and point to the discharge and tell others where the flow is coming
from." Environmental Protection Agency, Nonpoint Source Program Information for
Kids (visited Jan. 19, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/3wpl3/nonpoint/
kids.htm>. Grazing cattle despositing dung and sediment from the banks into
waterbodies reflects this notion of a point source.
174. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 6, at 1300-02 (demonstrating means by which
cattle may be become controllable and identifiable and thus point sources). For
discussion of cattle grazing, and other nonpoint sources of pollution, falling within
the definition of point source, see supra notes 11 & 17; supra notes 69-73 and ac-
companying text.
175. See generally C.W.A. § 304(f)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2) (listing nonpoint
sources subject to mandatory publication requirement of information regarding
pollution control methods); C.W.A. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (listing activities ex-
empt from NPDES permit program). The ONDA H court quoted ONRC and Trust-
ees for Alaska in support of its assertion that runoff cannot be a point source of
pollution. See supra note 131. Neither the ONRC court, nor the Trustees for Alaska
court, however, precluded all runoff from being point source pollution, but rather
referenced section 304(f) (2)'s list of nonpoint source pollution specifically to de-
termine those activities expressly exempt from NPDES permit requirements. See Or-
egon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 849
(9th Cir. 1987) (addressing argument nonpoint sources of pollution affecting
water quality standards subject to citizen suit provision); Trustees for Alaska, 834
F.2d at 557-58 (establishing types of mining activity exempt from NPDES permit
requirements). Each court only referenced the 304(f) (2) subsection pertinent to
the activity at issue in the case before them, and thus, did not address whether all
activities which result in runoff are point or nonpoint sources of pollution. Cf
ONRC, 834 F.2d at 849 n.9 (eluding only to CWA subsection (f) (2) (A)), citing as
support Trustees for Alaska); Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at 558 (addressing subsec-
tion pertaining to mining activities (quoting C.W.A. § 304(f) (2) (B), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(f) (2) (B))).
For a discussion of the ONRCcourt's reasoning in citing Trustees for Alaska, see
supra note 38. For Ninth Circuit decisions recognizing the exemption of these
sources of pollution, see supra notes 38 & 69. For cases within the Ninth Circuit
relying on a section 402 exemption in concluding activities related to logging and
road construction do not fall within the definition of point source, see generally
ONRC, 834 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987); O'Ahaino v. Galiher, 28 F. Supp.2d 1258 (D.
Haw. 1998); Idaho Conservation League v. Caswell, No. CV 95-394-S-MHW, 1996 WL
938215, at *1 (D. Idaho Aug. 12, 1996). For a list of discharges not regulated
under the NPDES permit program, see supra note 26.
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improperly analogized cattle grazing to agricultural and silvicul-
tural activities. 176
In addition, the Ninth Circuit again relied on a distinguishable
case in concluding that animals cannot be point sources of pollu-
tion.1 77 Contrary to the ONDA II court's assertion, the Second Cir-
cuit's holding in Plaza Health did not preclude all animals from the
definition of point source.1 78 In Plaza Health, the Second Circuit
determined that a human being could not be a point source. 179 First,
the Second Circuit recognized that the definition of point source
has been appropriately broadly interpreted in civil and licensing
cases.180 Second, the Plaza Health court found the term "point
source" to be ambiguous as to whether a human being could be a
point source because the definition does not either include, or ex-
clude, a human being. 181 The Second Circuit specifically based its
holding on the rule of lenity for a criminal conviction of a human
being.1 82 The action before the ONDA II court, however, was
176. Cf ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *6 (referencing exempted activities in
concluding livestock grazing is nonpoint source of pollution not meeting defini-
tion of point source).
177. See id. at *7 (citing United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643,
649 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied by United States v. Villegas, 512 U.S. 1254 (1994)).
For the facts, holding and court rationale in Plaza Health, see supra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text.
178. For the Plaza Health court's narrow holding, excluding human beings
from the definition of point source based on the rule of lenity, See supra note 85.
179. See United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 649-50 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied by United States v. Villegas, 512 U.S. 1254 (1994). For a com-
plete analysis of the Plaza Health court's reasoning and holding, see supra notes 70-
72; supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. For a critical discussion of the Plaza
Health decision, asserting human beings are point sources, see supra note 85.
180. See id. at 648-49 (declining to apply broad interpretation principle in
criminal case).
181. See id. at 646 (analyzing point source definition).
182. See id. at 648-49. The court in Plaza Health specifically noted that the rule
of lenity, and not the definition of point source, precluded finding a human being
a point source. See id. at 649-50. Similar to persons, cattle are not specifically ex-
empted or included as point sources. See generally C.W.A. § 502, 33 U.S.C § 1362.
Thus, it can be argued that the Ninth Circuit erroneously assumed that grazing was
an exempted activity like irrigated agriculture and silvicultural activities. Cf. ONDA
II, 1998 WL 407711, at *7 (analogizing grazing activities to examples of specific
exempted activities under CWA). In addition, recognizing a broad interpretation
of point source in civil cases may well include activities such as cattle grazing.
Some commentators assert that livestock grazing is more appropriately a nonpoint
source of pollution. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 6, at 1300-02 ("[T]he Clean Water
Act specifically recognizes the need for protection of waters associated with 'land
used for livestock' in its nonpoint regulatory program.") (citing C.W.A.
§ 208(b) (2) (F), 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F)(1990)). Livestock grazing, however,
may be considered point source pollution in particular situations, such as when
cattle wade in waters. See id. (giving example of appropriate point source regula-
tion of livestock grazing as "when cattle physically enter a body of water"). The
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brought pursuant to a civil citizen suit and would not result in a
criminal conviction against the fifty grazing cattle.183 In analogizing
to Plaza Health, therefore, the ONDA II court failed to consider the
limitation of the holding.
b. "No" point may be okay
The Ninth Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court's decision
in PUD based on the presence of a point source. 184 The ONDA II
court used this basis to support its conclusion that section 401 does
not encompass nonpoint sources. 185 The Court in PUD, however,
did not address whether the sources of pollution in question were
in fact point sources. 186 Instead, the Court focused more broadly
on the allowable scope of state authority in the presence of a dis-
charge.' 8 7 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in presuming that one of
the sources, the tailrace, was a "conveyance" under the Act, incor-
rectly inferred a limitation in section 401 to point sources. l88 In
addition, the Ninth Circuit neglected to address its own precedent
interpreting the impact of the 1972 Amendments to CWA. In rely-
ing on ONRC to interpret the meaning of the 1972 Amendments,
dissent in Plaza Health pointed out that the focus on distinguishing between point
and nonpoint sources of pollution is based on what is identifiable and controlla-
ble. See Plaza Health, 3 F.3d at 653-54. It can be inferred that the Second Circuit
may have included nonpoint sources that are identifiable, such as the cattle graz-
ing in ONDA II, in its definition of point source if they had not been addressing an
issue which would result in a criminal conviction. For the statutory definition of
point source, see supra note 54 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
facts, holding and rationale in Plaza Health, see supra notes 81-85 and accompany-
ing text.
183. See Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Dombeck, Nos. 97-35065, 97-
35112, 1998 WL 407711, at *1 (9th Cir. July 22, 1998) (explaining lower court's
holding which required USFS to obtain state certification), revg Oregon Natural
Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996).
184. See id. at *6. For the Ninth Circuit's analysis and conclusion that the
Court's decision in PUD supported their holding that discharges only include
point sources of pollution, see supra note 128.
185. See supra note 128.
186. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text; see Donahue, supra note 8,
at 217 (construing PUD as supporting proposition that discharge type is irrelevant
for section 401).
187. For the text of the issue before the PUD court, see supra note 35; see also
Donahue, supra note 8, at 217 (noting PUD court did not address type of source
two discharges emanated from).
188. See ONDA II, 1998 WL 407711, at *6 ("Both of these releases, however,
would involve point sources; the tailrace is a conveyance . . . ."); see also Donahue,
supra note 8, at 238-39 n.205 (noting tailrace can be point source but only when
water contains pollutants) (citing National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693
F.2d 156, 165 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
For a critical discussion of the implications of the PUD decision for coverage
of nonpoint sources under section 401, see supra notes 41-42.
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the Ninth Circuit failed to consider its decision in Northwest Environ-
mental Advocates v. City of Portland (Northwest Environmental Advo-
cates) 189 The ONRC court found the establishment of a
"concomitantly created" dual regulatory system by Congress to ad-
dress water pollution dispositive of congressional intent to exclude
nonpoint source pollution from NPDES regulation. 190 In contrast,
the Ninth Circuit expressly stated in Northwest Environmental Advo-
cates, that the Amendments were intended to improve enforcement
of compliance with water quality standards, not supplant the old sys-
tem.191 Looking at the plain language of the Act, in conjunction
with legislative history as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, the
Ninth Circuit should have recognized that the term "discharge"
within section 401 is an expansive term, or alternately, can reason-
ably be interpreted several ways. 192 Further, given the conflicting
189. 56 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 1995), and
cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1018 (1996). The ONRC court stipulated that state water qual-
ity standards cannot be enforced if affected by nonpoint sources of pollution. See
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 849-
50 (9th Cir. 1987). Reviewing the relevant case law pertinent to the issue before
them, the Northwest Environmental Advocates court, however, observed that the
Supreme Court's decision in PUD "cast[s] into considerable doubt our holding...
that citizens do not have standing under the Clean Water Act to enforce water
quality standards unless they have been translated into end-of-the-pipe effluent
limitations." See id. at 981. The Northwest Environmental Advocates court construed
the Court's decision in PUD as supporting their view that "Congress intended to
confer citizens standing to enforce water quality standards." Id. at 987. The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that, even though PUD addressed CWA section 401 as opposed to
CWA section 402, both provisions require compliance with CWA section 301,
which incorporates CWA section 303's water quality compliance requirements. See
id. at 988 (disagreeing PUD decision was not relevant to issue before Northwest Envi-
ronmental Advocates court).
For a discussion of the facts, holding and the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
CWA's 1972 Amendments supporting its holding in Northwest Environmental Advo-
cates, see supra note 34. For the proposition that the ONRC decision was also called
into question by the Supreme Court's ruling in PUD, see supra note 42. For the
proposition that the Supreme Court's PUD decision supports the argument that
nonpoint sources of pollution fall within the ambit of the term "discharge" in sec-
tion 401, see supra note 42.
190. See ONRC, 834 F.2d at 849-50. For an in-depth discussion of the Ninth
Circuit's ONRC decision, see supra note 38. For a discussion of how the ONDA II
court misinterpreted, and misapplied, the court's analysis and holding in ONRC,
see supra notes 156-67 and accompanying text. For an overview of CWA's dual
regulatory system, see supra notes 10-11 & 33-34 and accompanying text; supra note
38 (discussing ONRC); supra note 81 (discussing Shanty Town Associates Ltd. Partner-
ship v. EPA); supra notes 116-28 and accompanying text (presenting analysis of
ONDA 11).
191. See Northwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 986. For a discussion of the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the 1972 Amendments' impact, see supra note 34.
192. For the varying interpretations of the term "discharge," see supra notes
43-45 and accompanying text; see also Miles, supra note 4, at 225 (recognizing valid-
ity of arguments for and against broad reading of discharge); Hersperger, supra
note 70, at 112 ("Focusing on the broad statutory language and objectives of the
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views within the Ninth Circuit regarding the impact of CWA's 1972
Amendments, the ONDA IIcourt should have looked to the overrid-
ing purpose of CWA in addressing the issue before them. 193
V. IMPACT
The ONDA II decision has immediate practical implications, as
well as policy implications. The Ninth Circuit's broad decision goes
beyond excusing USFS for failing to require a state certification for
the fifty grazing cattle 9 4 and possibly stifling the broad impact of
ONDA L195 First, the Ninth Circuit specifically excluded all animals,
including the grazing cattle, from the definition of point source;
thus, the judicial courts of states located within the Ninth Circuit
are precluded from broadly interpreting a point source to include
animals.' 96 Second, the decision exempts all activities on federal
lands from state regulation under section 401 in the absence of
point source pollution.19 7 Determining whether an activity requires
state certification should, in theory, depend upon how broadly or
Clean Water Act would result in a more sensible interpretation of the Celan Water
Act.").
193. For a discussion of the conflicting views regarding the impact of the 1972
Amendments to CWA, see supra notes 34 & 45. For a general discussion of the
impact of nonpoint source pollution, and possible policy considerations the Ninth
Circuit failed to consider in their ONDA H decision, see supra notes 8-17 and ac-
companying text. For the purposes and goals of CWA the Ninth Circuit failed to
adequately address in their ONDA H decision, see supra notes 1-3 & 24-25 and ac-
companying text.
194. Cf Egelko, supra note 10, at A-14 (explaining lawyer for intervenor-de-
fendant, Grant County, was relieved because "the county depends on revenue
from cattle grazing and could have also been required to seek state permits for
some of its operations, if [ONDA 1] had been interpreted broadly"). The ONDA H
decision's direct impact includes relieving ranchers in Oregon of the requirement
to obtain state certification before grazing cattle on federal lands. See Alkire, supra
note 10, at 738. The process required for obtaining state certification is reported
to be both time consuming and complicated. Id.
195. For a discussion of the effects of nonpoint source pollution, which could
have been abated or eliminated under section 401's enforcement provision after
ONDA I, see supra notes 18-17 and accompanying text; see also Egelko, supra note
10, at A-14 (following ONDA I, Oregon required ranchers to limit pollution by
managing grazing through installation of fences and monitoring stream vegeta-
tion). For the ONDA I court's holding and rationale, see supra notes 99-106 and
accompanying text. For a critical discussion of the ONDA II court's decision, see
supra notes 144-93 and accompanying text.
196. For the text of this determination by the ONDA H court, see supra note
135; see also Bernard Mower, Nonoint Sources: Grazing of Cattle on Federal Lands Ex-
empt From CWA, Ninth Circuit Says, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 697 (July 31, 1998) (report-
ing on Judge M. Schroeder's decision in ONDA H holding point source definition
does not include animals).
197. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text; see also ONDA II, 1998 WL
407711, at *7 (expanding holding beyond facts of case).
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narrowly the term "point source" is defined. 198 Given the Ninth Cir-
cuit's narrow construction of the term "point source," however,
courts within its purview may be unwilling to expansively interpret
the term "point source." 19 9 Further, states are now precluded from
considering the impact of an enormous array of activity without
nonpoint sources being subject to 401 review. 200
ONDA II is the first case in which a circuit court has held that
the term "discharge" does not encompass nonpoint sources of pol-
lution in any form.20 1 Yet, nonpoint source pollution is responsible
for a majority of the water pollution on federal lands.20 2 Given the
amount of federal land located within the Ninth Circuit, the poten-
tial amount of nonpoint source pollution exempt from state review
and state water quality standards is enormous. 20 3 Exempting
nonpoint source pollution from direct regulation may withdraw in-
centive for states to work toward implementation of new technolo-
198. For an overview of the means courts use to distinguish between point
and nonpoint sources, including broadly interpreting the term "point source," see
supra notes 64-85 and accompanying text. Indeed, one noted environmental ex-
pert pointed out that in the fight against nonpoint pollution, EPA has the power to
expand the list of point sources. See RODGERS, supra note 10, at 308. In the alterna-
tive, he noted that since mandatory state plans and review are much more effective
than promulgation of voluntary state guidelines, "the drawing of the law more
tightly around nonpoint sources may transform them into 'point' sources for en-
forcement purposes." Id.
199. See Egelko, supra note 10, at A-14. In addition, other environmental
groups expressed concern that Oregon, and other western states, will not establish
pollution control plans addressing the effects of grazing, logging and mining given
the court's narrow reading of point source. See id. (noting only point
sources require permit). For a discussion of CWA's failure to adequately regulate
nonpoint sources, and the effect of leaving unregulated the majority of water pol-
lution sources, see supra notes 8 & 10-11 & 17.
200. For the definition of nonpoint source pollution, and nonpoint sources,
see supra notes 6 & 8 & 10 & 11 & 17; supra notes 54-85 and accompanying text; see
also Mower, supra note 196, at 697 (quoting Michael Axline, Attorney for appellees,
who "warned that the court's conclusion also may impair state capacity to control
pollution from timber cutting on federal lands"); cf also Egelko, supra note 10, at
A-14 (reporting environmental groups "hoped the [ONDA 1] ruling would lead to
reductions in grazing on vast federal land holdings in the west and its effect on
water quality ... and could have been extended to such activities as logging and
mining on federal lands"); accord Alkire, supra note 10, at 738 (mandating 401
review for nonpoint sources could have led to required 401 certification on federal
lands for "logging, mining, resort development, road building, and maintaining
utility rights of way for electricity transmission and pipelines").
201. Cf Mower, supra note 196, at 697 (noting Ninth Circuit was first federal
appeals court to address question of animals as source of pollution (quoting Attor-
ney Michael Axline of Western Environmental Law Center, attorney for
appellees)).
202. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
203. See generally supra notes 1-17; see also Ransel, supra note 42, at 270 n.107
(noting existence of 27,000 permits for grazing on federal land which could affect
3.2 million acres of riparian area); Mower, supra note 196, at 697.
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gies aimed at reducing nonpoint source pollution. 20 4 Thus,
without the threat of litigation under CWA, the burden will be on
point source polluters to maintain water quality standards.20 5 The
ONDA II decision is based on policy benefitting discrete, polluter
interest groups at the expense of national resources, and contra-
venes the goals of CWA. 206 CWA should be amended to include
nonpoint source pollution within the ambit of section 401, which
will fulfill Congress's intent for states to protect waters within their
boundaries, and further CWA's goals. 207
Christina Marie Frankino
204. For a critical discussion of current nonpoint source regulation under
CWA, see supra notes 8 & 10 & 11 & 17; see also Alkire, supra note 10, at 738. This is
a particular risk in states that do not have laws requiring compliance with state
water quality standards for nonpoint sources of pollution. See id. For example,
Oregon does not currently have a water pollution control plan regulating
nonpoint source pollution. See Egelko, supra note 10, at A-14. For a discussion of
the problems arising from lax land regulation, see supra notes 8 & 10 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of proposed solutions aimed at effectively reducing
nonpoint source pollution, see supra notes 10 & 17 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 10; see also Adler, supra note 10, at 229 (warning failing to
place controls on nonpoint sources would be inequitable "as point sources would
be required to bear more than their share of pollution control obligations"); Al-
kire, supra note 10, at 738 (placing the burden on point source polluters may "lead
to increased restrictions on point source expansion and discharge permits"). In
addition, one commentator warned that the consequences of federal agencies fail-
ing to limit nonpoint pollution may include "expensive and time-consuming litiga-
tion." Styron, supra note 4, at 114. In addition, Congress may act to mandate
stricter federal controls of nonpoint sources of pollution. See id. Unfortunately,
Congress has yet to make this step toward stricter regulation of nonpoint sources a
reality.
206. For a discussion of possible reasons for Congress's, and the states', fail-
ure to impose stricter controls on nonpoint sources of pollution, see supra notes 10
& 17; see also Egelko, supra note 10, at A-14 ("Oregon Cattlemen's Association says
the cost of state permits - which it estimates at $200 a day for monitoring, and
$4,800 in consulting fees - would make grazing on public lands too expensive.").
207. For a discussion of CWA section 401 as an effective means of furthering
these objectives, see supra note 17; cf Donahue, supra note 8, at 236 (asserting
precluding state review would hinder nonpoint source regulation); Miles, supra
note 4, at 227 ("By giving states the opportunity to certify federally permitted
nonpoint source activities for compliance with state water quality standards, sec-
tion 401 can work in harmony with the other provisions of the Act requiring states
to regulate nonpoint source pollution."). Water quality maintenance is the pri-
mary responsibility of the states, thus it was posited by one commentator that
"[c]onstraining the states from considering [nonpoint source] impacts when con-
ducting 401 reviews would drastically undermine their ability to carry out their
responsibility to control [nonpoint source] pollution and, indeed, to implement
their water quality standards." Donahue, supra note 8, at 236. Current regulation
of CWA has been largely ineffective. See supra notes 8 & 10 & 11. Section 401
offers a viable solution for reducing the most pernicious pollution affecting the
quality of our nation's waters. See supra note 17.
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